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Abstract 
During the 1980s and 1990s, in the area of pay, 'performance-related pay 
schemes' (PRP) became the ultimate buzz-word. The popularity of PRP reflected 
pressure from two main sources. The first was management practitioners and 
consultants, the second the goverments of the day. Both were reacting to what 
they saw as a possible cure for the ills of economic recession. In other words, the 
concept fitted well with an ethos of what successful companies should look like 
and the kinds of policies that they should be utilising. 
This thesis highlights the complexities of the organisation and the effects 
of PRP in 16 case study organisations. It argues that, conceptually, PRP can be 
examined with greater analytical foresight from a control perspective than from 
the usual starting position of whether PRP is motivational or not. 
In an attempt to highlight this, two processes were explored. The first 
process concerns the 'effort bargain'. This involves the reorganisation of work in 
a bid to standardise effort measurement, combined with attempts to intensify effort 
levels. The second is a 'process bargain' which includes a change to an 
organisation's administration systems. Examples include human resource 
management, differing systems of budgetary control and performance 
management which all involve subsequent changes to systems of rules, 
measurement and control. Importantly, it will be argued that this is not a search 
for control per se as simple labour process theory would predict. Representing 
control and reactions to it as homogeneous is dangerous and misleading, and leads 
to labour control systems becoming the sole focus of crisis. Rather, PRP 
represents part of a wider search for competitive advantage which includes 
restructuring and changes to the organisation. 
While vagueness in the objective setting process was common to many of the 
organisations, the research found that the changes in the companies studied here 
were complicated by a search for control, compliance and consent. Further, the 
outcomes were largely specific to each organisation, depending on the negotiation 
of the 'politics of pay'. Ways in which they were aiming to do this were as 
follows: 
control labour costs and their distribution, 
'mass individualism' - individual but standardised contracts, 
flexible standardisation - the combined search for flexibility and 
standardisation simultaneously and 
management - as agents of restructuring. 
An important omission was made in this process, however, and this 
involved performance itself. In a bid to balance out the many contradictory forces, 
performance was actually one of the last issues to be dealt with. The research 
highlights why this is so. What the above implies is that faced with crisis, 
organisations become involved in a renegotiation of effort and systems of control. 
PRP is one way of achieving this in some organisations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: GENERAL AIMS AND OBJECTIVES. 
1.0 Introduction 
Performance Related Pay (PRP) schemes have attracted increasing 
attention throughout the last decade. In particular, they seem to have been linked 
with the concepts of Human Resource Management (HRM) and Total Quality 
Management (TQM). As with these concepts, research into PRP has been 
relatively sparse but this has not stopped it from being prescribed by academics 
and specialists alike as 'the' pay system to solve the problems of the 1980s and 
1990S. 
As well as the traditional use of pay as a means of aiding the recruitment, 
retention and motivation of staff, PRP is said to hold out the promise of a direct 
link between effort and reward and form a means of consolidating moves towards 
the creation of an internal labour market in line with other HRMITQM techniques. 
Supporters of PRP even point to the fact that employees themselves have great 
difficulty in arguing against the logic of such schemes. It is also argued that PRP 
schemes are a fairer way of rewarding people as it is only 'fair' that reward should 
have a direct link with effort. 
These views are simplistic for a number of reasons. Firstly, and probably 
most importantly, the so-called 'positive' effects of PRP are rarely backed up by 
any systematic evidence. Secondly, specific company and/or sectoral factors are 
rarely taken into account so that PRP is offered as a carte blanche recipe for all. 
Finally, the consequences for employees are largely ignored and/or seen as 
unproblematic 'teething' problems. It is assumed that the schemes will be 
beneficial to all employees and that they will understand and agree with the 
particular notions of fairness on which PRP is based, ignoring the possibility that 
perceptions of fairness can vary from employee to employee. 
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it is surprising that companies should place so much emphasis on a 
particular type of pay scheme without evidence as to whether it works or not given 
that these schemes are rarely introduced independently and are usually argued to 
be part and parcel of other business goals and objectives to enhance 
competitiveness. Given the popularity of such schemes it is important that they 
should be fully researched and that their structure, organisation, objectives and 
effects are systematically examined, both from the point of view of the employer 
and employee. This is because it should be emphasised that immense damage, 
both in terms of performance and employee relations, can be inflicted if the wrong 
scheme is used under the wrong pretext. In other words, although consultants 
seem quite happy to do so, it is no use prescribing something if one cannot first 
describe what it is and what it can be used for. 
1.1 Wha is PRP? 
The principle of PRP, or merit pay as it was known, has been well 
established since at least the late 1940s, in particular occupations and sectors, 
along with its counterpart job evaluation. There was basically no change in the 
nature of these schemes until their new lease of popularity in the 1980s (Fowler, 
1988). Since then five basic changes have been noted: 
1. There has been a move away from assessment based on personal qualities 
towards those assessed against working objectives (i. e. rewarding output rather 
than input). 
2. The schemes have been increasingly introduced into the public sector. 
3. There has been an extension of these schemes from their traditional area of 
managerial occupations downwards to all job categories in general. 
4. There has been a move away from a general two part increase which included 
a cost of living increase and a perfon-nance related element, towards a single 
increase based solely on performance. 
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5. These pay systems, it is claimed, are linked more closely to the overall 
business objectives of the organisation. 
Yet, it is still unclear exactly what PRP is and how it varies, if at all, from 
company to company and from sector to sector. Despite the simplicity of the title, 
PRP, it is extremely difficult to say what it is in a simple sentence, given its many 
guises. Useful characterisations are as follows: 
a means of translating and transmitting market based organisational goals 
into personalised performance criteria whilst at the same time preserving 
the integrity of a coherent grading structure (Kessler and Purcell 1992: 16). 
a systen in which an individual's increase in pay is solely or mainly 
dependent on his/her appraisal or merit rating (Swabe 1989: 17). 
Storey and Sisson (1993) also differentiate between individual PRP which 
is measured through output criteria and merit pay which is judged on behavioural 
traits. These descriptions, while embodying many of the sentiments involved with 
PRP, are mainly about different aspects of observed behaviours and are not 
applicable to all aspects and forms of PRP. While none describes PRP adequately, 
due to its complex nature, they provide an acceptable starting point. 
PRP has obvious similarities with Payment By Result (PBR) schemes, but 
whereas PBR is measured by fixed output norms, PRP is measured by behavioural 
traits or the attainment of previously set objectives or targets. Through these, 
effort within PRP is reconstituted to embrace not only levels of output, as is the 
case with Payment by results (PBR), but also the quality of that output, and the 
level of discretion and initiative exercised by the individual. In emphasising the 
individual, appraisal becomes both a means of communicating with and to the 
individuals involved while reward systems based on contribution to the 
organisation's objectives for sustainable competitive advantage are highly 
favoured by employers. Another point is that whereas PBR is mechanistic, PRP 
involves an amount of subjective judgement of performance. 
II 
There are three ways of determining performance: via the individual, the 
group or the establishment, although the latter two are relatively unusual since 
incentive is much stronger when applied at the individual level. Individual PRP 
can also be determined in various ways. These range from progression through set 
pay bands based on the attainment of certain criteria or performance 
targets/objectives (this is similar to progression based on seniority which was 
common place in the public sector) to variable bonus payments that are utilised to 
target money to certain high performing employees. Sometimes more than one 
type can operate at the same time. 
My preferred definition of PRP would be its characterisation by the linking 
of an individual's increase in pay to an appraisal of his/her performance against 
the use of a set of predetermined criteria based on objectives, behaviours, 
competences or some combination of the three. PRP is argued to have all the 
strengths and none of the weaknesses of other schemes. Individually based, a 
rewarder and a motivator, a supporter of organisational, cultural, skill and 
objectives based on change and performance - and capable of relating pay in the 
individual organisation to pay in the outside market. 
Two of the main keywords that are seen as synonymous with PRP in the 
1980s and 1990s are reward management and performance management. Both of 
these concepts are argued to represent a move away from the static salary 
administration of the post-war period. Neither necessarily has to include PRP as 
part of the process, yet, for most, PRP is seen as an essential reinforcement for the 
type of behaviours the organisation requires. 
Reward management recognises that the motivation to improve must 
extend to all employees and not just 'high flyers'. Secondly, they must be flexible 
and not tied to rigid salary structures and job evaluation schemes. There is both an 
implicit and explicit assumption that employees are the key to organisational 
success and that reward management is a means of helping to achieve the 
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individual and organisational behaviour that a company needs if its business goals 
are to be met (Armstrong 1995). Performance management is a form of reward 
management and akin to what Lawler (1990) calls the 'new pay'. It is 'about the 
agreement of objectives, knowledge, skill and competence requirements and work 
development plans' (Armstrong 1995: 260). It mainly emphasises the importance 
of goal setting and feedback - reviewing performance in relation to agreed 
objectives. Fundamentally, it is not something handed down by bosses, but 
reflects all members of the organisation as being regarded as partners. If the key 
difference had to be summed up in one sentence it is probably that while both 
concepts (i. e., reward management and performance management) utilise a 
connection to business goals, Performance management is wedded to the use of 
the performance contract principle. 
1.2 The Extent of PRP 
PRP or merit pay as it is sometimes known gained increasing popularity in 
the 1980s (Fowler 1988; IRN 1992) but the precise extent of its coverage is not 
known because official data sources such as the New Earnings Survey only 
include PRP among the 'catch all' category of 'incentive pay'(Casey et al, 1992). 
However, those smaller scale surveys which have been undertaken show that the 
proportion of companies which use PRP for at least some proportion of their 
employees varies between one third (IRS 1991) and one half (NEDO 1991; WIRS 
1992; IRS 1991; Casey et al 1992). One survey even found that two thirds of 
respondents used PRP (IDS 1991). 
1.3 Why so popular? 
One reason for the popularity of PRP schemes is that they closely fit with 
government ideology of the 1980s and 1990s. Governments have continuously 
promoted the idea of 'market forces' and 'individualisation' of the employment 
relationship, and have been determined to eliminate what they see as rigidities in 
the working of the labour market (Brown and Walsh 1991). Pay, according to 
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government sources, ought to be linked only to what companies can afford (as in 
profit-related pay schemes which have been encouraged through direct tax 
concessions) as well as to an individual's performance as in PRP. This factor 
certainly accounts for the increased use of PRP in the public sector. 
A second reason is that PRP schemes are usually linked to notions of 
HRM/TQM which have gained in popularity over the 1980s and 1990s. Although 
the meaning and nature of these concepts remain elusive, they represent a strategic 
and coherent approach to an organisation's most important assets: its employees 
(Armstrong 1993). HRM puts emphasis on the development of the individual 
employee while TQM emphasises the individual's responsibility to product 
quality and customer service. Thus, individualised reward systems become an 
important part of the concepts of HRM/TQM. They are also symptomatic of 
broader shifts in management practices and the elaboration of strategy specific to 
the development of the individual organisation (Walsh 1992). 
Finally there have been increasing pressures on reward systems throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s which have reinforced the trend towards PRP schemes 
(Vickerstaff 1992): 
1) Both product market and labour market pressures have increased with 
the increasing competition of the last decade and half. 
2) New technology and new forms of work organisation have begun to 
challenge existing demarcation and pay structures. 
3) Reference points for market rates may have increasingly begun to 
internationalise. 
To summarise, the use of PRP is increasing, its nature is changing and 
there are certain political and economic pressures which have increased these 
trends. 
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Despite the fact that between one half and one third of all companies are 
reported to have PRP for at least some proportion of their staff (NEDO 1991; 
Millward et al 1992; IRS 1991; Casey et al 1992) no uniform picture of PRP has 
yet emerged. The literature to date has been dominated by prescriptive approaches 
which support PRP wholeheartedly, or in case studies (Geary 1992; Procter et al 
1993) which have tended to concentrate on particular areas of PRP (cf. Kessler 
and Purcell 1992). As valuable as this latter group of case studies is, it does not 
provide a concerted analysis of PRP. The objective of this thesis is to pull 
together some of the various strands into an encompassing approach to PRP using 
both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The research throws some 
light on to the subject area and shows for the first time the complexities of PRP in 
terms of the types/range of schemes used, their effects on managers, and the 
management of the organisation and their link with performance. Using evidence 
from the empirical research in this thesis, it is argued that the introduction of PRP 
schemes should be viewed as part of a wider re-negotiation of systems of control 
within the organisation and, in particular, as part of the process of the re- 
negotiation of the effort bargain. In this, managers themselves are not only 
wielders of the carrot and the stick but also subject to them and whether they make 
'asses' of themselves depends on whether they 'manage up' or 'manage out' 
(Smith 1990). In other words, do they learn to control these systems to their own 
advantage or according to the company's objectives, in which case, are they 
managing themselves out of ajob? 
Past analysis was limited by the starting point of focusing on motivation 
and attempts to find universal principles. Even very valuable research tends to be 
imprisoned by this (e. g. Marsden and Richardson 1994; Thompson 1993; Kessler 
& Purcell 1992; Lewis 1997 etc. ). That the schemes are viewed within the 
rationale of pay as a motivational tool thus, leads authors to find PRP not 
C motivational' and then have to stop. A second problem is universalism, (i. e. the 
schemes are assumed to apply to all organisations or their components or that once 
applied they change little). Also it is assumed that the objectives of the 
organisation can be applied in a universal fashion. This is surprising as there is 
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already a wealth of literature that indicates that incentive pay schemes especially 
are constantly changing (Brown, 1973; Alhstrand, 1990). For example, at Esso's 
Fawley plant, the grandfather of productivity bargaining, there were 21 different 
agreements over a 25 year period under the guise of the same scheme. This was 
because the schemes very rarely met their stated objectives and were inherently 
unstable due to the presence of both internal and external factors which were 
competing against each other. Yet the need to reduce uncertainty, to manage 
impressions and to keep the rhetoric alive led employers to become locked into 
schemes even where it became obvious that they were not working (Alhstrand 
1990). 
That the starting point of other research into PRP leads them down the 
wrong path even where the initial intentions have been quite different means that 
another means of conceptualising PRP is needed. The opinion of the author is that 
we have to go back to basics. Despite the amount and complexity of literature on 
pay and its elements and despite developments in the analysis of relatively new 
concepts such as Human Resource Management, it still remains the case that a 
body of work written over 40 years ago supplies the basis to begin an exploration 
of PRP. For example, among others, Baldamus (1961) argued four decades ago 
that pay and its associated systems of administration were driven by negotiations 
over the effort bargain and the need for employers and employees to retain as 
much control as possible over its various elements. 
Writing well before the revival of the labour process debates, he also 
highlighted the fact that that attempts at controlling the effort bargain were far 
from deten-ninistic. Rather, there were inherent tensions in the whole process 
which meant that at the end of the day there was very little strategic content to it. 
It is these very concepts that will be utilised within this thesis to aid the analysis of 
the organisation and effect of PRP. It is also this process which highlights the 
complexities of employer control attempts which, in turn, highlights the need not 
to attempt to simplify definitions of all embracing modes of control. 
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1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The research was carried out in three main stages which will be described 
in further detail in the methodology. The first entailed an analysis of the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1990 data (WIRS90) in order to gain a 
quantitative picture of the average PRP establishment and identify the types of 
companies for case study work. The second entailed interviews in 16 companies 
including an examination of their PRP schemes. The final stage involved 
ethnographic study in four of the 16 case study companies. 
Chapter two examines the research to date into PRP and highlights the 
direction which the thesis will take and why (i. e. PRP is better viewed as part of a 
control mechanism involved in the renegotiation of control and the effort bargain). 
In chapter three the methodology used in constructing this research project and in 
choosing the types of companies which took part in the qualitative element of the 
research will be outlined. This includes initial analysis of the WIRS90 data 
concerning PRP. Chapter four has two parts. The first looks at the main features 
of a PRP establishments by examining the data from WIRS90. This provided an 
interesting benchmark from which to examine and select those companies who 
would take part in the ethnographic stage of the research. It was found that on 
average companies with PRP have distinctive characteristics as opposed to those 
without PRP in particular: 
Most were large multi establishment companies; 
They were experiencing much change and reorganisation; 
e But there was little outward change in relations with unions and collective 
bargaining, including being more likely to have more than one union and 
representatives at the establishment; 
9 Differences in management and administration systems; 
a Differences in products and markets, mainly highly competitive. 
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The second part of Chapter Four examines the type and nature of the 
schemes in the 16 case study companies. It particularly highlights: 
9 An enormous variety in the ways in which companies detennine the rating of 
individuals and the link between pay; 
* The fact that they do not operate in a socio, political and economic vacuum; 
9 Fact that appraisal may act as a means of surveillance. 
Chapter Five looks in more detail at how and why the schemes were 
introduced and at the effects of the schemes on the managers and the management 
of the companies. The main points being: 
o Confirmation that the schemes are heavily shaped by the organisation's past 
histories and practices; 
eA preoccupation with increasing performance, controlling the distribution of 
performance, and controlling costs. All of which may have contradictory 
effects on each other; 
* The fact that the schemes may have two main purposes: changing the process 
bargain (administration processes) and the effort bargain; 
e Performance contract used to make management the restructuring agents. 
Chapters Six to Nine examine each of the four companies who took part in 
the ethnographic stage of the research in turn, highlighting the effects that these 
schemes had on both managers and employees and examining the different ways 
in which the schemes were used as control mechanisms. It also examined the 
ways in which employees responded to these factors. The companies were from 
banking, retail, engineering and public sector and the main points highlighted in 
each were: 
*A great amount of organisational restructuring including the organisation of 
work and technology, with standardisation and flexibility being sought 
simultaneously; 
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9A vagueness in the objective-setting process causing the schemes to go wrong 
in terms of effect on performance; 
An obsession with controlling costs and the distribution of performance; 
With a concentration on focus, drive and control of all kinds; 
A 'playing of the game' by employees in an attempt to take part in the effort 
bargain. 
The final chapter concludes on the main ways in which these schemes 
were utilised and their possible effects on the performance of the companies. In 
attempting to conceptualise the main rationale for PRP it also reflects on the 
labour process debate and draws on the lessons from the case studies to provide a 
critique of simplified definitions of modes of control (Friedman 1977 and 
Edwards 1979). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PERFORMANCE RELATED PAY 
2.0 Inti: oduction 
In this chapter, using a review of the relevant literature, I will examine the 
main elements of PRP with a view to highlighting directions for a theoretical 
approach which moves towards an explanation of the use of PRP schemes. The 
aim of this chapter is to lay out the analytical framework for the rest of the thesis. 
It will become clear that the path to this research agenda was very much set by 
practitioners' concerns in the 1980s. Research into PRP, initially carried out for 
or by practitioners, led to issues such as motivation and fairness being major foci. 
It was only when analysis began to highlight other factors that the research 
widened out to examine other elements involved with these schemes. One of the 
issues highlighted, but not developed, was that these schemes were possibly as 
concerned with control as anything else. However, this does not refer to pure 
exploitative control as in the early labour process theory (Braverman 1974). Prior 
to the labour process debate of the 1970s, there was already a much richer 
tradition of examining the employment relationship based on notions of the effort 
bargain (Baldamus 1961; Behrend 1957) and social norms (Hyman and Brough 
1975). This can be utilised to examine the nature of PRP. Both concepts have a 
large impact on the notions of motivation and fairness. This tradition, combined 
with the factors highlighted by previous research into PRP, may provide a much 
richer view of the processes involved in the use of PRP schemes. In highlighting 
the issues of control involved with PRP this research will develop a number of 
questions which will fon-n the main focus of the thesis. 
Using Figure 2.1, it will be shown that PRP was strongly promoted by 
management practitioners who were intent on bringing about an alternative set of 
relations in the workplace to that of most of the post-war period. PRP schemes 
fitted well with an image of solving organisational problems which appealed 
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immensely to companies faced with the intensive competitive envirom-nent of the 
1980s and 1990s. Given a mixed picture of the practical implications of PRP, 
academics were faced with the task of investigating whether in fact these schemes 
met the huge expectations placed upon them, not least of which was an 
improvement in performance brought about by a fairer pay system. Such a pay 
system which was said to be both motivational and fair because it brought about a 
direct link between pay and performance. 
Figure 2.1. PRP: An analytical framewor 
Performance related pay 
Practitioner Academic 
concerns with research into 
PRP PRP 
Synthesis 
ýontrol 
Contingency 
Politics of pay 
Bargaining, uncertainty 
&a pow ti s power relations 
Purportedly, this relationship made it much easier for companies, not only 
to retain their best performers, but also to recruit the kind of staff that dynamic 
organisations require. Overall then, this kind of relationship would bring about a 
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highly motivational environment in which a virtuous performance circle would be 
created. 
Following on from practitioner concerns with PRP, this study will examine 
the academic research to date into the notions of recruitment and retention, 
motivation and the performance pay link involved with PRP which the above 
debate brought into focus. However, as will be seen in the rest of the chapter, 
studies began to find that recruitment and retention issues were much better 
addressed through market structures than by creating inconsistencies in grading 
structures. These apparent inconsistencies meant that very few of the schemes 
were motivational. Indeed, most of the studies came to the conclusion that they 
may be dernotivating in nature. Further, although in agreement with the principle 
of PRP, most of the individuals subjected to it did not agree with it in practice, 
highlighting that the pay performance link was by no means a straightforward one. 
The results from the academic community were somewhat negative 
concerning the purported uses below: 
" recruitment and retention; 
" motivation; and 
" Pay performance link. 
Despite these findings, PRP schemes do not seem to be declining in 
popularity, and although the exact spread of such schemes is not known, 
practitioner j ournals show that the concept seems only to change its form and not 
in its level of attractiveness. Why then do such schemes continue to be utilised? 
Although findings were largely negative for the uses cited above, academic 
research did begin to raise a number of other issues which pointed to other uses 
for PRP. Basically, seven additional objectives from previous research were 
identified which companies have utilised when introducing PRP. All, as Kessler 
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and Purcell (1992) note, concern control and/or management strategic choices for 
bringing about broader organisational change: 
1. they signal a change in organisational culture (Kessler and Purcell 1992; 
Lewis 1991; Procter et al 1993; Fowler 1988; Pendleton 1992. ); 
2. they can be used to bring about a restructuring of the employment 
relationship (Kessler and Purcell 1992; Procter et al 1993; Fowler 1988); 
3. they allow companies to reward selectively without an increase in the 
paybill (Goodhart 1993. ); 
4. they decentralise collective bargaining (Walsh 1992); 
5. they can marginalise the role of the trade unions (Kessler and Purcell 1992; 
Procter et al 1993; Fowler 1988. ); 
6. they allow closer financial control (Kessler and Purcell 1992; Procter et al 
1993; Pendleton 1992); 
7. as organisations become flatter, it becomes more difficult to reNvard through 
promotion. PRP enables selective rewarding, combined with development 
programmes such as performance management systems, to dilute employee 
dissatisfaction (Goodhart 1993). 
These issues have never been developed with any systematic vigour 
Neither has there been an attempt to synthesis them in an all embracing fashion. 
Thus, there are still many questions left unanswered by research into PRP, not 
least of which is the theoretical weakness founded upon the failure to address a 
simple question - 'why do organisations manage PRP the way they do? ' (Kessler 
1994). Kessler argued that the question can be reformulated as three more refined 
questions: 
1. Nvhy do organisations pursue a particular configuration of goals through PRP 
schemes?; 
2. why do organisations design and implement their PRP schemes in particular 
different ways?; and 
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3. Nvhy do organisations continue to pursue the PRP approach despite the 
operational difficulties commonly highlighted by observers? 
The framework for this research will attempt to fill some of the 'gaps' 
highlighted by these questions by combining a number of key analytical concepts 
previously used for other pay systems but rarely employed in conjunction with 
PRP. Not least among these is the concept of control. Another is the concept of 
contingency. Analysis of both of these factors will lead to the need for an 
appreciation of the politics of pay systems - both organisation and governance - 
which point to the bargaining, uncertainty and power relations involved in the 
design and usage of PRP schemes. 
Labour process theory has a ready explanation for such control issues and 
would predict that such schemes are just another means by which the forces of 
capitalism seek to exploit labour. However, labour process theory has little to say 
about the analysis of PRP. Rather, during the 1980s and 1990s it has concentrated 
on developments such as Japanisation, HRM, TQM, and lean production, treating 
PRP as just one element among many associated with these new concepts. 
Further it has mainly concentrated on blue-collar workers in mass production 
industries. Where labour process theory has looked at white-collar workers, it 
concentrated on performance measurement and the appraisal process. However, a 
progressive labour process view has a definite analytical quality for explaining 
such phenomena as PRP. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will set out the above in greater detail. 
Using the analytical framework in Figure 2.1 gives the following main headings 
from which to work and build upon a combination of the academic literature and 
labour process theory to provide possible directions of explanation based on the 
'politics of. pay'. First, the initial practitioners' concerns will be analysed. 
Second, the academic research in the area to date will be reviewed. Third, a 
review of the nature of control. Fourth, the nature of contingency theory, and 
finally, the various elements involved in the politics of pay will be discussed. My 
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overall conclusion is that using a synthesis of the above factors will highlight the 
bargaining, uncertainty and power relations involved with the use of PRP schemes 
and the re-negotiation of control that they involve. 
2.1 Practitioners' concerns with PRP 
Discussions of practitioners' concerns with PRP has taken a number of 
fonns: some have highlighted the spread of schemes, consultants prescriptive 
literature stressed the importance of preparation and so forth, personnel 
practitioners have provided accounts and there have been academic surveys and 
case studies (Kessler 1994). Resulting from this, the opinions of these interested 
parties tend to fall into two camps, the second being by far the most popular: those 
who are sceptical about what PRP is supposed to achieve, including whether its 
objectives are actually possible, and those that realise from the case study 
evidence that not all is well, but instead of accepting these schemes for what they 
are, argue that if only 'this or that' were done everything would be all right. Both 
reward management and performance management are good examples of this (i. e., 
they don't question the theoretical underpinning, merely the process of 
implementation). Professor Caines, the former Director of Human Resources for 
the NHS executive and influential in government thinking on PRP in the 1980s, 
even goes as far to argue that all of an individual's pay should be determined by 
their performance in order to make these schemes work correctly (Radio 4 1993). 
Importantly, this, in turn, set the scene for the nature of research into PRP 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. There has already been mention in Chapter One 
of the spread of schemes and their changing nature. What we will highlight now 
is the debate on PRP to date. For this we need to concentrate on the prescriptive 
literature and then on attempts by academics to clarify how the schemes have 
actually impacted. 
The increasing popularity of PRP reflects pressure from two main sources. 
First, companies were encouraged to use such schemes by management 
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practitioners and consultants. Second, the government directly encouraged such 
schemes through their economic philosophy. In the mid-to late 1980s in particular 
PRP schemes looked as though they were could solve an array of problems. Since 
then, a range of variations - reward management, performance management and 
competency pay - have been attempted in a bid to make PRP schemes work. 
Many of these different approaches have been promoted by various consultants 
and practitioners, but essentially, as Smith (1993) notes, any discussion of PRP 
must also include such issues as the enterprise culture and the rise of HRM as a 
strategic model. However, while doing so any of these concepts need 'to be 
tethered to the post of objectivity' (Smith 1993: 46) in order to separate rhetoric 
from reality. 
In the private sector, PRP proved attractive in an era of increasing 
competition and restructuring. Organisations wanted much more flexible pay 
systems in order to meet the rapidly changing conditions and structures. The 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), for example, saw a vision of an open- 
ended contract where every individual while at work remains free to decide on the 
contribution he/she is going to make. Within this approach, PRP was adopted as a 
cost-effective means of improving motivation and efficiency (IDS 1991). 
Armstrong (1995) has argued that there are three propositions to justify 
PRP: 
" it is an effective motivator, 
" it gives a clear message to employees about what the organisation believes in, 
and 
" that it is right and proper for pay to be related to the contribution of the 
individual. 
Linking these concepts to the 'entrepreneurial spirit' placed PRP on the political 
agenda of Thatcherism. In the 1987 Budget speech, Nigel Lawson commented that 
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&pay is now deemed to be a reward and as such is a key part of the so-called 
enterprise culture' (Smith 1993: 47). 
The perceived growth of PRP schemes left academics and practitioners 
with the job of assessing whether in fact they worked, including an initial 
assessment of what they were supposed to achieve. Most of the original research 
was actually carried out by, or on behalf of, the consultant and practitioner groups 
themselves. Brading and Wright (1990), for example, argue that pay is one of the 
strongest communicators of how much an organisation values the contribution of 
an individual or group. The single most important objective is to improve 
performance by converting the paybill from an undiscriminating 'machine' to a 
more finely-tuned mechanism, sensitive and responsive to the company's and its 
employees' needs. The achievement of these objectives would necessitate the 
nurturing of a performance-orientated culture which stresses pay for results, rather 
than effort, and rewards the 'right' people including: 
" focusing effort where the organisation wants it, 
" supporting a performance culture, 
" emphasising individual/team performance, 
strengthening the performance planning process, 
rewarding the 'right' people, and 
* motivating all the people. 
For an organisation to achieve the above, the characteristics of a successful 
scheme should be as follows: 
" business objectives must be translated into meaningful criteria, 
" clear understanding of jobs, 
" significant rewards, 
" differentiation, and 
" communication and training. 
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This sort of approach gave PRP a strategic outlook and fitted well with the 
debates over the strategic content of HRM. For example, Brading and Wright 
(1990) argue that PRP is one of the most dynamic issues of HRM. Others argue 
that the definitions involved in the work of Sisson (1989) and Guest (1988) all 
place reward management firmly within HRM theory and practice and lent a 
strategic orientation to reward management (i. e. HRM strategies may merely 
'beget' reward strategies. (Smith 1993)). To many organisations, reward 
management driven by strategic HRM was now giving a glimmer of hope that the 
management of remuneration was shifting away from 'muddling through' to the 
pursuit of clear objectives and a more rational decision-making process. 
All organisations are engaged in a search for increased added value from 
their workforce, according to Armstrong (1993), and many see paying for 
performance as the best means of achieving that goal. Lawler (1988) insists that 
the primary reason for PRP is motivation and that every scientific study and 
common sense look says that it should work. He also argues that there is some 
evidence to suggest that individually-based bonus schemes, relying on objective 
measures of perforinance, promote business success, efficiency and gratification 
of some individual needs (Brading and Wright, 1990; Lawler 1977). These 
authors indicate that motivation level is dependant upon the attractiveness of 
reward and that material things are valued in proportion to their size and financial 
value. Designing a pay-for-performance system can take considerable time and 
effort but the results can be more than satisfactory. A successful system - one that 
stimulates employees at all levels to work harder towards achieving the 
company's key goals - can improve the overall performance of the organisation 
(Brading and Wright 1990; Lawler 1977). This crudely deterministic view has its 
roots in scientific management methods in that reward is seen as the primary 
motivator, and clearly presents PRP as something that is positive to both employer 
and employee (Smith 1993). 
The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS, 1990: 2) echo 
this interpretation: 
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"Appraisal related pay in the right context can be of potential benefit to 
both employer and employee. It can for example, help employers improve 
the efficiency of their workforce by emphasising the need for high 
standards of job performance. It is further agreed that it can offer the 
flexibility to help motivate and retain valuable employees by targeting 
higher pay at better perfon-nance. Employees in turn may welcome a 
system which rewards extra effort by extra pay". 
Although it is clear that employers should consider whether it is appropriate to 
their organisation and introduce it only if the primary reason is to improve 
performance, it is assumed that as long as it is measured against the following 
criteria 'all will be well': 
" is it fair?, 
" does it enable the organisation to recruit and retain?, 
" does it accommodate change?, 
" does it measure performance?, 
" does it motivate employees?, 
" does it encourage productivity?, and 
" is it controllable? 
The problem with this kind of analysis is that most organisations are 
unlikely to admit that they cannot meet these criteria. To do so would imply that 
they are incompetent or less successful than the firms which they may be 
attempting to emulate. The point can also be seen in the work of Brading and 
Wright (1990). They argue that successful implementation requires much more 
than "off the shelf' schemes, performance targets and appraisal systems. 
However, despite stating that the scheme must be thought about carefully, and 
despite mentioning that there is no hard evidence of the positive effects on 
performance, the authors go on to cite examples where companies and even 
countries which utilise these schemes are successful. This is quite interesting as 
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many of the schemes in this study look precisely 'off the shelf in character, even 
to the extent that the managers themselves complain that consultants were 
attempting to sell them specific schemes. 
However, there is little evidence of success or of a long-term approach to 
PRP. Rather, according to Smith (1993), the essential outcome of a short-term 
approach are several: a reduced concern with structure (and therefore equity) and 
the scrapping of the going rate and traditional rules and differentials in pay 
determination; emphasis on recruitment and retention, particularly for minority 
groups of key workers; attention to white collar-rewards; and virtual stagnation in 
the development of blue-collar and sales remuneration methods. 
For Smith, the era of reward management does not feature predominantly 
in the list of positive benefits realised in the Thatcher years. Instead, the rhetoric 
of reward management provided an incomplete picture of a complex and still 
misunderstood subject: the link between rewards, peoples behaviour and 
organisational performance. 
Smith is critical of PRP yet even he falls into the trap of seeing some 
solutions to the problems of PRP in overall terms. Commenting on the change 
from reward management to performance management, which he describes as the 
clarification of business objectives and individual and group targets, rebuilding 
manager-subordinate relationships, new evaluations of teammorking and 
communication, Smith argues that if the tentative results of this approach are 
confirined, then there is hope that in some organisations, managers are actually 
intervening in the process of managing human resources to good effect rather than 
leaving various elements of remuneration to do it for them. However, according 
to Cannell and Wood (1992), few organisations put PRP in the context of 
performance. management, which emphasises objective-setting and formal 
appraisal, and few have seriously attempted to monitor PRP schemes. 
Performance management schemes have grown in popularity since the late 1980s 
when Cannell and Wood (1992) were writing. However, nevertheless it reaffirms 
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the case that this is further evidence to assess and improve the effectiveness and 
objectivity of objective-setting and appraisal systems, and to look at the efficacy 
of PRP schemes. 
2.2 Academic research into PRP 
The encouragement of market processes from practitioners and the 
government led to the academic debate into the efficacy of such methods. The 
approach of the fonner to PRP left those more serious-minded practitioners and 
academics with the job of assessing the validity of claims made on behalf of PRP 
in the following main areas, which are considered the traditional benefits of any 
PRP scheme: recruitment and retention; motivation; and the pay perfon-nance link. 
Each will be assessed in turn here, although it should be noted that the pay 
perfonnance link was largely judged through its motivational effects rather than 
by corporate performance. 
2.2.1 Recruitment and retention 
Using pay as a means of recruiting and retaining the right kind of staff is 
hardly a new concept, and therefore only a brief discussion is presented before 
addressing more important features surrounding motivation and the pay 
performance link. Economic theory has long posited that increases and decreases 
in the price of labour are the best means of indicating whether staff are in surplus 
or in demand and pay systems of the past have all had this as a goal in one form or 
another. Kessler and Purcell (1992) find that labour market objectives, such as 
recruitment and retention, tend to compete with those aimed at improving 
performance or productivity. They argue that it is traditionally held that 
recruitment and retention is better addressed through adjustments in pay levels 
(market rates). Therefore, the use of PRP to address labour market pressures 
would suggest that they were not entirely being used to reward performance. 
However, a notable feature of all the companies in Geary's (1993) study and a 
number of those in Kessler and Purcell's (1992) work was that they attempted to 
match or lead the field in terms of the levels of remuneration in both the local 
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labour market and their particular industry. PRP, for them, was considered to be 
an important means of attracting and retaining well-performing employees. Thus 
it is not clear which was the main objective - labour market factors or performance 
- or whether they are compatible. 
2.2.2 Motivation and reward 
Many of the issues linking PRP to motivation have been covered 
elsewhere (Marsden and Richardson 1994; Thompson and McHugh 1995; 
Thompson and Buchan 1993) so only a brief overview of the findings is needed 
here to set the scene as to why a particular line of enquiry was followed. A brief 
examination of the nature of motivation in general can be taken in order to stress 
that motivation is a complex notion which requires more in-depth consideration 
than can be given via attitudinal surveys. 
Cannell and Wood (1992) argue that PRP is a motivator, but only one 
among many. They comment that it depends on the amount at stake and it is 
possible that it can actually be a dernotivator if the money 'is not right' or if the 
average person does not get a share. Many other conditions need to be 'right', and 
insufficient consideration may be given to the effects on the average perfon-ner if 
they are not. For example, people need to feel that a change in behaviour will 
produce sufficient reward. However, it would seem that more work is needed 
concerning the effects of PRP on motivation. Several studies set out to assess the 
effects of PRP on motivation in particular. 
One of these, in a large public sector organisation, was undertaken by 
Marsden and Richardson (1994). Their primary aim was to analyse what they saw 
as the main goal for PRP schemes - motivation - using expectancy theory and 
goal-setting theory. First, expectancy theory stresses the importance of the link 
between certain behaviours and the rewards accruing to those behaviours. The 
authors examined whether employees thought that they could change their 
behaviours, whether they felt confident that a change in behaviour will produce 
the reward and whether the rewards were valued sufficiently to justify a change in 
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behaviour. Their conclusion was that only the first condition was met. Secondly, 
using goal-setting theory, they set out to see whether employees improved their 
performance if goals are set more clearly. Again, the results were negative except 
for the raising of staff awareness of objectives. On balance, therefore, the scheme 
in the organisation they studied was adjudged much more likely to be 
dernotivating. One of the main conclusions is that if the scheme did not improve 
employee motivation, it is hard to see how it could improve performance. Further, 
the scheme was not seen as fair, and for management to improve the scheme, they 
would have to do something to overcome this perceived unfairness. 
In 1997 French and Marsden carried out a return study in the same 
organisation to establish how the scheme was working after eight years. It was 
found that the scheme had completely changed since its initial introduction to a 
performance management system which incorporates the organisational objectives 
into personal objectives. However, despite this, the overall results were still very 
similar to the original study. The new scheme's guide book put stress on the 
contract principle, but two-thirds of staff felt pressured to accept management's 
performance ob ectives without discussion. Staff were also more doubtful of the j 
scheme's ability to recognise good work than they were of its more bureaucratic 
predecessor, and three-quarters of staff believed that there were quotas in place 
despite it explicitly being said that this should not be so. The perception that 
'Performance Management' was a device to get more work out of staff had been 
greatly reinforced. 
Thompson (1992) also looked at motivational effects. His research 
examined the impact of schemes on employee attitudes in three different 
organisations, as well as employer claims as to the main goals of PRP. He found 
that employers posited four main goals for the use of PRP: 
it motivates, 
changes the culture of the organisation, 
rewards employees fairly, and 
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9 is a retention tool via reduced turnover. 
Examining the results of employee attitude surveys, he concluded that the schemes 
were more likely to dernotivate as there was too much variation in the definition of 
high performance, there was uncertainty whether the schemes improved culture 
(those with the highest ratings were more likely to be positive about culture than 
those with low ratings) although culture was mainly described in a positive way 
around concepts of trust and communication and employees were uncertain as to 
whether PRP rewards fairly although high performers were happier about it than 
low performers. 
Before looking at any inferences we can make from these studies, it is 
worth taking a closer look at the nature of the links between motivation and 
reward. It is often said that companies use PRP because they believe that by 
offering the possibility of more money this will be incentive enough to make 
employees work harder. Such a view is simplistic for a number of reasons. First, 
as a means of explaining employee behaviour, it has limited value and ignores 
expectations, perceptions and needs (Kessler and Purcell, 1992; Steers and Porter, 
1979). Second, it is highly questionable whether employee perceptions of the 
performance/reward link underlying the motivation approach can remain 
undistorted by the on-going political, social and economic workplace pressures 
influencing the operation of these pay systems. Third, most senior managers are 
actually sceptical about any direct link themselves (Kessler and Purcell, 1992; 
Gilman, 1993). Although there is an implicit assumption that employees can be 
motivated to work more efficiently and effectively, given a direct link between 
effort and reward, in reality PRP is attempting to address at least other traditional 
labour market factors (recruitment, retention and motivation). This may 'cloud' 
the link if, in fact, there was one at all. Both management and employees realise 
this clearly. 
For many organisations, one of the principal concerns is to find ways of 
raising motivation in a search for ever-increasing productivity levels (Thompson 
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and McHugh, 1995). However, definitions of motivation can differ enormously. 
Examining the many different definitions of motivation over the years, Steers and 
Porter (1987) argue that they all have three common denominators: first, what 
energises human behaviour, second, what changes or directs such behaviour and 
third, how the behaviour is maintained or sustained? 
Thus, what we are looking at are factors which drive individuals to behave 
in certain ways, that individuals and their environments reinforce the intensity of 
this drive and the direction of their energy or to dissuade them from their course of 
action and redirect their efforts. The basic building blocks of a generalised model 
of motivation are therefore: 
1. needs expectations or desires - Motives can only be inferred and not seen 
2. behaviour - motivation is dynamic. One can never be sure about conflicting 
desires, needs and expectations and how to measure them, 
3. goals - differences among individuals means how to select certain motives 
over others becomes problematic, and 
4. some form of feedback - intensity of certain motives is considered to be 
reduced upon gratification. When this happens, other motives will come to the 
forefront. But many also serve to increase the strength of that motive (i. e. a 
pay rise can increase the desire for another one). 
Thompson and McHugh (1995) argue that motivations are viewed as 
choices made about or perceived predispositions to certain behaviours and 
outcomes (i. e. things that we want or the strategies to achieve or obtain them). For 
these authors, motivation can be explained in two ways: first, in terms of 
instinctual drives which we are motivated to reduce (e. g. when we are thirsty we 
seek out drink) and secondly, in the mechanistic terminology of stimulus-response 
when we seek out those things that satisfy us or reward us and avoid those which 
punish or cost us. Thus, explanations are usually given which either examine the 
content of motivations or the process through which they are expressed. The 
former examine what it is that motivates people through concepts such as goals, 
35 
needs and motivators and is exemplified in the work of Maslow, McClelland and 
Hertzberg. The latter examine how people are motivated through the processes by 
which behaviours are selected, directed, initiated and maintained. Included in this 
category is the work of Porter, Lawler, Adams and Vroom. Thompson and 
McHugh (1995: 301) argue that content theory lacks the sophistication to explain 
the strengths of motivations. To be useful to management it is the relative force 
of motivation which needs to be measured, as in process theory such as equity 
theory (Adams) and expectancy theory (Vroom), both of which attempt greater 
accuracy in prediction and control of behaviours. 
However, there are problems with attempting to deduce what behaviours 
motivate and how they can be used to change behaviours. One of these is that, 
much the same as we do not consciously think of the numerous and complex 
series of actions used to make a cup of tea, we do not necessarily take an 
analytical and conscious part in performing many of the behaviours we go through 
at work. A second problem is that models of motivation are overly deterministic. 
They place the responsibility for action on individuals rather than on the context 
which they find themselves in. A good example is McGregor's (1960) theory X 
and theory Y. Theory X refers to those who dislike work and responsibility and 
focus on economic security and who need to be coerced into effort. Theory Y 
argues that those who like work will accept responsibility for their own effort and 
are capable of innovation. However, these theories can be turned into to a 
continuum of managerial attitudes whereby Theory X views held by managers 
will produce an assumption trap which leads to coercive behaviour on their part 
and leads to Theory X behaviour by employees. 
Thus, most of the models would appear to be establishing minimum 
conditions under which workers can be mobilised to consent to the nature of work 
which is demanded of them. This is achieved through a narrow means of 
conceptualising motivation which supplies enough information about an 
individual to be useful in engaging their consent for work practices by actively 
manipulating their perceptions of expectations and preferences. Information about 
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social and material rewards or perhaps the danger of redundancy can be 
manipulated to reinforce control practices by getting workers to internalise the 
rationale for increasing production. What is effectively happening here, according 
to Thompson and McHugh (1995), is that the extrinsic factors, those largely 
outside the control of the individual such as pay and conditions, are being 
translated into intrinsic factors. These include those processes assumed to be 
under individual's control. For instance, their satisfaction and motivation are 
making employees personally responsible for their own situation. 
Most motivation theories work on the principle that individuals tend to 
seek pleasure and avoid pain (i. e. they are rational maximisers (Steers and Porter 
1987)). However, because this is very simplistic, there is a need to examine 
further the nature of motivation. Attempts to motivate are usually founded on the 
assumption that workers need to be led and that management also needed to look 
at ways of extracting an amount of consent. This means that workers need to be 
influenced to co-operate because of their alienation from the productive process. 
Thus, historically managerial approaches to motivation tended to evolve from 
using fear of punishment during the period of the industrial revolution to a 
'traditional' model of motivation based on scientific management methods of 
6economic man'. The human relations model of Mayo then added the concept of 
&social man'. Subsequently, with the human resources model, more sophisticated 
concepts such as TQM and JIT evolved making employees responsible for 
monitoring their own perfon-nance. 
Herzberg (1968) makes a very important point when he argues that in 
attempting to influence someone to work harder, it is the management who is 
motivated rather than the worker. This stems from the nature of the employment 
relationship in that the basic response to the question of how to get a worker to do 
what you want him/her to do is 'kick him (or her) in the arse' (KITA). Hertzberg 
called this the 'negative KITA' and this relied on punishment and coercion. 
Because the negative KITA tended to cause direct conflict, some organisations 
moved on to 'positive KITAs' such as participation, training and communication. 
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Management by objectives would be considered one such source of positive 
KITA. Thompson and McHugh (1995) argue that, nonetheless, these positive 
KITAs are all likely to be short term but that this does not matter to management 
as long as they can rename it and put it under a different construct. They suggest 
that as long as the other product is sufficiently distinctive enough to carry out its 
function as an ideological cover story for yet another technologY of regulation, 
then this will suit them. What is inevitable is that consultants will continue to 
charge ever-increasing fees for designing and implementing them. 
Thompson and McHugh (1995) argue that changes in technologies, tasks 
and job designs produce pressures for structural change which, in recent years, 
have been promoted through attempts to redefine cultural characteristics aimed at 
producing adaptive behaviours on employees. Such structural and cultural 
pressures, driven by the ideologically-legitimated need to change tasks and 
technologies coupled with the long term failure to control intrinsic motivation 
have produced a panoply of modem day KITAs. 
"From the desperate attempts to reassert control over rewards in PRP and 
share schemes through guru based initiatives on autonomous working and 
quality circles to the bludgeon like tools of restructuring and corporate 
culture. What success that these initiatives have is not in the producing 
general job and work motivation but in the production of short term 
movement towards increased effort on specific tasks". (Thompson and 
McHugh 1995: 311) 
If there are no long term rewards for the increased performance in terms of 
self-expression, esteem, worth or consistency then initiatives will suffer 
diminishing returns like other KITAs. The only route which appears to be left for 
increasing general motivation lies in the control of meaning and of group-based 
socialisation into work roles as the main phsyco-social factor subject to external 
manipulation. Kohn (1993) makes the valid point that rewards tend to buy 
temporary compliance, indicating that the problem has been solved. 
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The key point to make is that, while attitude surveys can provide extremely 
useful information, motivation is far too complex a subject to deduce from them 
alone. There is a need to look at the interplay of organisational and social forces. 
It also highlights that the pay-performance link is similarly a complex notion. 
2.2.3 The pay-performance link 
The subject of fairness as already been covered extensively (Kessler and 
Purcell, 1992; Geary, 1992) but it is worth setting out the main arguments in terms 
of how they may relate to PRP. PRP is thought to be based on an underlying 
notion that establishing a clear link between effort and reward will improve 
perfon-nance. That employees make differential contributions leads to the 
assertion that reward should reflect this fact and that it is a fair way of distributing 
reward. Yet, as Kessler and Purcell (1992) argue, where employees associate 
fairness with equality, this assumption seems less plausible. Geary (1993), whilst 
highlighting similar problems, also found that notions of equality and equity, 
rather than strengthening the principles behind PRP, were competing ideologies 
which caused resentment and confusion over what these schemes were supposed 
to achieve. Many of the case studies found that PRP schemes involved high levels 
of dernotivation, especially in less structured environments (Edwards, 1997). 
One of the major problems with PRP is that, even leaving aside its 
simplistic assumptions about motivation and fairness, much of what passes for 
PRP is not based on actual performance. For example, Casey et al. (1992) find 
that only two to three per cent of gross national earnings are accounted for by 
incentive pay of which PRP is only a part. Another survey found that PRP 
accounts for between two and eight per cent of relevant paybills (IRS, 199 1). This 
is because most schemes work on the basis of some kind of incremental 
progression, Employees have a basic salary band, then either all or part of their 
increase within this salary band is determined by the performance element. This 
means that difficulties may arise from attempting to provide incentives whilst at 
the same time maintaining salary structures. This need to ensure a balance 
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between the two can create long term difficulties and indicates that employers 
attempt to solve an array of labour market objectives. For example, Cannell and 
Wood (1992) argue that PRP can encourage short termism. Some ill-thought out 
schemes may adversely effect the medium and long term well-being of the 
business. Steps can be taken to discourage this, for example, by introducing long 
term (but sometimes less quantifiable) objectives. However, there is greater 
temptation because of budgetary constraints to utilise short term measures. 
A reward system is a powerful indication of a company's philosophy and 
approach to workforce management, and as such, has to be seen as being fair, 
equitable and consistent (Gunnigle 1990). However, if a scheme is unable to meet 
all these criteria, it may well signal the wrong messages to employees. In terms of 
PRP's effects on overall costs, it would seem that PRP seems to be self-financing 
in most cases. Some believe that PRP provides better value for money by 
encouraging better performance. Others, however, find it difficult to assess PRP's 
impact on the overall salary bill. Furthermore, there is some indication that 
companies may not know whether PRP improves individual or organisational 
performance (Cannell and Wood 1992). 
Few organisations have formally evaluated PRP schemes. While they 
believe that PRP does improve individual and organisational performance, they 
find it difficult to substantiate this view. Exit interviews, the compilation and 
comparison of performance statistics between departments and attitude surveys 
can help to provide evidence of how the schemes are working. However, that 
budgets are not endless pits may actually constrain PRP's proper distribution, 
although Cannell and Wood (1992) say that few organisations have forced 
distributions. It would seem that in most organisations, however, a typical 
distribution emerges each year and in most the budgeted salary bill acts as a 
constraint. . Indeed, Cannell and Wood advise that target distributions may help to 
achieve consistency between managers. 
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Cannell and Wood also indicate that it may be difficult to even establish 
whether individual perfon-nance can be measured objectively. Particularly for 
those not used to doing so, it can be difficult to set measurable and realistic 
targets, particularly where financial targets cannot be used or are inappropriate. It 
can be difficult to achieve consistency between managers, both in terms of setting 
targets and in terms of appraisal. PRP thus puts a new emphasis on the 
effectiveness of appraisal. This requires training and monitoring. 
Some organisations attempt to counter problems of appraisals being turned 
into negotiating sessions by separating the performance review from the pay 
review. Research by Bevan and Thompson (1991), for example, discuss a 
development-driven and a reward-driven model of PRP. They write that if 
performance management is to meet any of its expectations, greater emphasis 
needs to be placed on the development-driven model (IDS 199 1). 
There have been a number of works which seek to directly assess the 
effectiveness of PRP on performance. One of these (Thompson 1992) tested five 
different hypotheses concerning PRP's effectiveness. These hypotheses revolve 
around employee involvement in the schemes, the fairness with 'which the 
procedures are carried out and the distribution of the rewards, whether feelings of 
collective values impacted on the schemes, the nature of the management 
subordinate relationship and the nature of hierarchical relationships and whether 
control over one's own work plays a role in how individuals are motivated. The 
main conclusions arc fivefold. 
First, there is some indication that unions were being marginalised and 
employers were communicating directly with employees. However, the situation 
was not this simple. This was an attempt to take unions out of the effort bargain 
and no more than that in some cases. Thompson indicates that training can 
improve employees' perceptions of PRP. However, we might question how he 
know this if he is not sure what type of training is being carried out. There was 
also no difference in commitment to the scheme, whether employees were 
41 
informed about it or not. In general, this analysis is problematic because the 
direction of causation is always in doubt with survey analysis and it is difficult to 
see how this can be deduced without knowing the exact nature of the training. 
Second, by far the most influential factorwas the relationship with the manager. 
Manual workers felt this relationship was a lot worse than non-manual workers. 
Not much relationship was found between the size of the award in relation to 
perceived effort levels, other than that poor management can negatively influence 
employee behaviour. Third, the author concluded that there was no relationship 
between feelings for PRP and whether the employee was a union member or not. 
Fourth, it was concluded that poorly-trained or incompetent managers can provoke 
feelings of low commitment. Finally, managerial staff are slightly likely to be 
more attached to schemes than the rest. All staff held the same negative views 
with regard to PRP, but non-managerial employees hold them more strongly. All 
in all this research did not paint a very positive picture of PRP. 
Another piece of research attempting to arrive at an explanatory theory of 
the effectiveness of PRP schemes is that of Lewis (1997). Lewis studied three 
different organisations from the financial sector in an attempt to identify the 
processes by which the procedure is carried out. Examining the interaction of the 
following categories, Lewis found that the following stages were not applied very 
successfully. Where they were, he concluded that the performance management 
process would have been just as useful without the PRP element: 
Stage I Setting objectives 
Stage 2 Measuring performance 
Stage 3 Giving performance feedback 
Stage 4 Translating performance into reward 
Lewis studied the 'soft' aspects of PRP, including the concept of 
communication at all times. He found that the main weaknesses of objectives 
were the narrowness, imposition and number of objectives. Employees felt that 
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the whole process was one of something 'done to them' rather than a shared 
experience. 
2.2.4 Objectives for change 
With the exception of those commentators who argue that PRP can be 
made to work better if organisations change the structure of their schemes or 
increase the amount of reward they pay out, very few positive effects have been 
noted against the traditional uses highlighted above. However, research has begun 
to highlight other potential uses for PRP schemes which may provide a starting 
point for examining the true nature of PRP. Identifying and putting these factors 
together give the seven additional objectives listed on page 23. Very few 
researchers, however, have had the opportunity to take these factors forward, both 
in a systematic or combined fashion. Where they have examined such factors, it is 
mainly the types of argument below that are reached. 
The individual nature of PRP schemes has led to an argument that some 
companies are attempting to change their employment relationship in ways which 
may strengthen links with individuals and weaken their unions through PRP. For 
example, Kessler and Purcell (1992) argue that the mechanisms of these schemes 
involve a restructuring of the employment relationship which could result in the 
greater individual managerial control of staff. However, Geary (1993) noted that 
the companies in his study were attempting to create a collective identity around 
teamwork whilst at the same time using PRP to differentiate individuals' work. 
He noted that management did not see any inherent conflict between the two 
approaches, and argues that this may have been no accident as PRP may have been 
used to 'dissolve any dysfunctional solidarity which may have developed around 
teamwork'. In other words, to signal that the organisation is willing to bring about 
a change in the culture of the organisation may be just as important as actually 
bringing the. change about. However, it is often argued in the HRM literature that 
PRP is a means of strengthening a company's internal labour market. Walsh 
(1992) noted that the growth of decentralised bargaining and individualised pay 
was weakening rather than transforming many of the collective principles 
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underlying internal labour markets. For example, concepts like teamwork, which 
are aimed at building employee identity and thus aligning them with the goals of 
the company, were hindered by the notion of individualism involved with PRP 
schemes. This conflict between the notions of collectivism and individualism was 
a problem noted in many studies. 
Cannell and Wood (1992) note that PRP may not be appropriate to all 
organisational cultures. This is a particular concern in some parts of the public 
sector. The authors argue that PRP alone should not be used to promote cultural 
change. There are also too many factors outside the employees' control which 
may affect their perceptions of PRP. For example, downturns in the economy can 
reduce individuals' performance pay although they may be working harder to 
compensate. Thus, it is also important to have the base pay correctly assessed 
against the market. However, people should try to mitigate outside influences, 
and this can be taken into account when assessing performance. Some 
organisations allow objectives to be reviewed in the light of outside events or 
changing priorities. Others do not encourage this. There is also the question of 
how much people should expect to get in a recession compared with a period of 
boom (i. e. should good performers get less and average performers nothing or 
should rewards be toned down respectively). All of these issues impact on the 
effects of PRP on motivation. 
Because the primary concern to date has been with examining the three 
purported benefits of PRP, there has been little attempt to put PRP within a 
theoretical perspective or to link it to the overall objectives of change and 
restructuring (Kessler 1994). The starting point for researching these issues is to 
begin where Kessler and Purcell (1992) have left off. They show that it is possible 
to identify the structural factors involved in these pay schemes by examining them 
through thre. e dimensions. The three dimensions are the nature of the performance 
criteria, the method by which the individual's performance is assessed against this 
criteria and the method through which this assessment is linked to pay. By 
assessing the schemes against these criteria, Kessler and Purcell are able to 
44 
highlight that there may be more involved with these schemes than has previously 
been thought. 
As was mentioned above, in a bid to fill the theoretical void remaining 
because of the many questions left unanswered by research into PRP, Kessler 
(1994) begins to examine why organisations manage PRP the way they do. Using 
a comparative case study method, which he argues has rarely been used, he 
compared two case study organisations using the following headings: background 
to the schemes, managerial objectives, design and implementation and the 
operation and impact of the schemes. It was found that there is still a tendency to 
talk about PRP schemes in a generalised way. Kessler argues that, despite the 
volume of descriptive literature on PRP, it still tends to be routinely referred to as 
a technique indicative of newer HRM approaches or illustrative of the shift from 
individualism to collectivism. His research attempted to take the debate forward 
by providing some clues as to why variations exist and it found that organisations 
are very much bound by their own histories. 
To summarise from the research to date, two main points can be 
highlighted. First, PRP schemes are supposed to improve performance rather than 
directly affect the recruitment and retention of employees. Indeed, recruitment 
and retention is better achieved through market rates rather than through hindering 
these schemes in terms of improving performance. Again, with motivation there 
is little evidence which supports the use of these schemes. In fact, the evidence 
points firmly towards de-motivation. This is because, as highlighted above, 
notions of motivation and fairness are more complex than those held by 
management. Second, the seven factors mentioned on page 23 highlight the 
possibility of both explicit (financial control) and implicit (changing 
work/organisation and culture) objectives. What the results are beginning to show 
is that in those areas where PRP is used for its traditional purposes, as highlighted 
above, the schemes tend to have a negative effect. Where PRP is used for other 
purposes the results are rather confused, indeterminate and misunderstood. This, I 
believe, is because studies are drawn into examining a link between PRP and 
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motivation when we already know that motivation is far to complex a notion to be 
solely associated with pay alone. The evidence points to the inference that while 
pay may not necessarily motivate, the absence of it or confusion over it will most 
certainly demotivate. Thus, the causation has a higher possibility of being 
negative than positive. What the above highlights raises a fundamental question. 
If the schemes have such negative effects, why do employers continue to use them 
as much as they do? 
It is only when pay is viewed as a control factor or as a management 
choice of organisational objectives that we can start to make sense of the use of 
PRP. Where these schemes seem to provide partial success is in those areas which 
are linked to management choice or control. It is what is happening in this sphere 
that is of most interest and can provide the real rationale for their introduction (i. e. 
they are a means of enabling control within the internal and external pressures 
acting upon the organisation). 
By starting with the concept that pay concerns control over the effort 
bargain and the problem of double contract (Baldamus, 1961; Lupton and Gowler, 
1969), the continued popularity of PRP in the light of the growing evidence 
against it may begin to make some sense. Annable (1980) gives a nice exposition 
of the problem of double contract. It draws upon the distinction between labour 
and labour power (i. e. labour cannot simply be hired and set to work). The 
employer has to use a set of both coercive and motivational policies in order to get 
their employees to work as they would wish. With this in mind, rather than all 
these schemes being doomed to failure (Kohn 1993), 
"Perhaps PRP is being measured against the wrong targets? Instead of 
placing it at the bottom of schemes that motivate it should be placed at the 
top of schemes that lead to control" (Thompson M. Radio 4,1993). 
This is also a direction hinted at by Kessler and Purcell (1992) and Procter et al. 
(1993) but not as yet developed. 
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2.3 Control and the labour process 
Thus far, we have examined PRP in terms of practitioner reasons for its 
use and largely in isolation from other organisational factors. Yet we saw that 
there were seven possible objectives which link PRP with wider organisational 
issues. We can therefore begin the search for ways of explaining such behaviour 
in theoretical terms. 
In several places throughout their research, Kessler and Purcell (1992) 
mention the possibility of control being a major factor involved in the use of PRP. 
For example, they describe one of the two traditions which inforra their mode of 
research as follows: 
The first tradition places emphasis on managerial control and provides an 
insight into the apparently unstable character of pay systems. It sees the 
design and operation of pay structures and systems as central to 
management as well as employee attempts to control a wage-effort bargain 
whose terms can never be fully spelt out in a formal contract (p 17). 
Later, in less direct terms, control implications are mentioned: 
More interesting perhaps than these variations on the traditional 
recruitment, retention and motivation themes are three further aims which 
appear more geared to using the potency of pay systems as part of 
managerial strategies for promoting broader organisational change. The 
first of these objectives is the attempt to use individual performance related 
pay as a means of facilitating change in organisational culture. The very 
concept of PRP is viewed as encouraging a change in organisational 
values, of sending a message about the kind of company we are. PRP as a 
pay system is seen to have characteristics which accord with the company 
image in terms of its flexibility, dynamism, entrepreneurial spirit and 
careful allocation of resources (p2l). 
More directly, they write that 
47 
the very mechanics of these schemes involve a fundamental restructuring 
of the employment relationship which can result in greater managerial 
control over staff (p2 I). 
These themes of control are present in the literature but undeveloped. A 
reader of Kessler and Purcell (1992) may find it difficult to decipher what 
ccontrol' means within the article. There is no direct answer, but implicit here are 
ideas of : 
control as creating order and manageability out of chaos - this may be a non- 
zero-sum aspect; 
control as linking pay to organisational goals; 
control over staff, and the restructuring of the employment contract, which 
may bring gains as well as costs to both sides. 
Control of labour is usually seen as synonymous with labour process 
theory. Labour process theory argues that the contractual relationship at work 
requires the employer to be able to secure from the employee certain levels of 
effort. This is because the employer only buys the right to the employee's labour 
power and not the actual level of labour. To be able to secure a certain amount of 
labour can be costly and sanctions may be needed to ensure that work is 
performed, examples being the threat of job loss and direct supervision (Edwards 
1986). 
Early labour process theory (Braverman 1974) argues that in the twentieth 
century there was a tightening of control by employers through Taylorisation and 
scientific management techniques which de-skill and standardise work tasks so 
that the relationship between effort and pay can be more precisely specified. The 
assumption was that employees are the unknowing recipients of employer control 
techniques,. but Braverman fails to take account of workers' behaviours, arguing 
that only craft skills acted as an obstacle. Yet 'control is not an end in itself but 
rather the capacity to work established by the wage relation, into profitable 
production' (Thompson and McHugh, 1995: 113). 
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Friedman (1977) attempted to rectify this by arguing that workers are 
creative beings who, being alienated from the labour process, may resist 
management authority. Therefore, management can use two types of strategies to 
exercise authority over workers. 'Responsible autonomy' aims to use the 
creativity of labour power while 'direct control' limits the variability through 
close supervision. In Friedman's account, workers do not just resist but are active 
agents in the process. However, the problem is that both 'responsible autonomy' 
and 'direct control', while portrayed as opposing typologies, cover a wide range of 
techniques which may or may not appear together. Another attempt at classifying 
modes of control was made by Edwards (1979). He argues that systems of control 
evolve through periods of increasing tension and are then followed by a 'relatively 
rapid process of discovery, experimentation and implementation in which new 
systems are substituted for older primitive ones' (1979: 18). 'Simple control' 
(similar to Friedman's 'direct control') is direct via the power of the entrepreneur 
and was said to evolve in the nineteenth century. 'Technical control' came 
towards the end of the nineteenth century along with the separation of ownership 
and control and the development of more mechanical means of controlling the 
pace of work, especially in the production industries. Finally, bureaucratic control 
was defined by the institutionalisation of hierarchical power - the rule of law. 
Edwards argues that each system corresponds to a definite stage in the 
development of the firm. 
The problem with both Friedman (1977) and Edwards (1979) is that the 
typologies are far too simplistic and assume that an organisation will only use any 
one mode of control at a time. They also assume that employees react only to the 
actions of employers and Edwards (1979), in particular, fails to recognise that 
coercion, resistance and consent can all interact in a dynamic way to produce 
indeterminate outcomes. The labour process debate has moved on somewhat 
since Braverman to recognise some of the above factors and the fact that 
employers have many concerns and goals other than those concerning labour 
(Burawoy 1979; Edwards 1986; Thompson and McHugh 1995). Yet even these 
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authors wam against the tendency of labour process theory to put control into neat 
categories. 
However, labour process theory is not the only discipline to recognise 
control (i. e. the idea of control is no stranger to the management literature). The 
study of control and co-ordination aspects, especially within MNCs, has created a 
great amount of interest for decades. Scott (1987) argued that all collectivities 
control their members, but that it is one thing to set goals for them and another to 
see that energies are directed towards their accomplishment. Child (1973), for 
example, distinguished between bureaucratic, personal and social types of control. 
Bureaucratic control is formalised by a set of explicit norms and procedures, 
personal is based on direct close supervision and social control consists in 
achieving that managers and employees identify with and commit themselves to 
the company's goals and principles. Other attempts include control as an 
evaluation process based on monitoring, evaluation and rewarding of behaviours 
and output (Ouchi, 1977), co-ordination systems as an administrative tool for 
integration (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989), and of course Williamson's (1985) 
conceptualisation of headquarters control over subsidiaries. 
Although some of the existing literature on PRP does recognise control as 
a legitimate concept involved with pay systems, there as been little attempt to 
examine how it might work in the case of PRP. We know from the research of 
others that control takes many different forms, pointing to the fact that it may be 
contingent on other factors within the organisation. It is, therefore, worth 
examining the nature of contingency theory and how it may be incorporated into 
an explanation for the use of PRP. 
2.4 Contingency theory 
Many of the factors discussed above show pay as a continuous process 
linked to the various environments in which the organisation and its employees 
operate. To a great extent, this means the situation in which the organisation 
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might find itself is contingent on the social, political and economic situation in 
which it operates. For example, one prediction may be that that the outcomes of 
any PRP scheme may be very different in varying organisations even if the 
schemes are largely the same. To some extent, this will become a recurring theme 
throughout the thesis. However, this is not to say that I will utilise contingency 
theory in terms of the strict meaning of the word. 
Contingency theory posits an appropriate functional fit between 
environmental settings and internal organisational structures. It predicts that 
similar industries, or similar technologies, should have similar schemes. It 
appeals because of its normative practical application and because the 'if-then' 
formula constitutes an explicit break with the 'one best way' orientation of 
existing theories while retaining powerful guidelines for what power holders 
should actually do to sustain effective organisation (Thompson and McHugh 
1995). By the mid-1970s it was the dominant approach applied to specifics such 
as payment systems (e. g., Lupton and Gowler 1969). Lupton and Gowler's (1969) 
primary purpose was to provide a means by which any organisation could select 
their ideal payment system. Although the authors note that there are many factors 
which need to be taken into account, they still argue that a profile of the firm can 
be gained by taking four main factors - technology, labour markets, dispute 
procedures and organisational structures - and they split these into 23 different 
dimensions, thus positing a 'fit' between the organisation and a pay system. This 
kind of approach proved immensely popular with companies and is still one of the 
most influential methodologies of viewing which pay scheme might be suitable 
for which organisation. In effect, however, it was still overly deterministic. 
Nonetheless, the contingency approach was somewhat revived with the 
onset of HRM. A variety of the strategic HRM models are contingency models. 
There are essentially three main models: 
Business life cycle - This tailors human resource policy choices to the varying 
requirements of the firm at different stages of its life cycle; 
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Strategy and structure - This shows a range of appropriate HRM choices suited to 
different strategy/structure types ranging from single product businesses with 
functional structures through diversified product strategies allied to multi- 
divisional organisational forms to multi-product companies operating globally; 
and 
Matching husiness strategy and HR strategy - This suggests that an organisation's 
HR approach is only 'strategic' if it fits with the organisation's product market 
strategy and if it is proactive in this regard. In terms of PRP, this would mean that 
the emphasis in the scheme should reflect the various priorities of the 
organisation. For example, if it were innovative, it might go for long term 
measures, whereas if it were on a cost-reduction business strategy, it may go for 
short term measures such as close monitoring and control and an appraisal system 
that rewards and punishes in accordance with these measures (Sisson and 
Timperley 1994). 
However, there are basically two schools of thought in contingency. One 
that says that matters are mechanistic so that they can be solved. These theories 
have been rightly criticised for environmental determinism when in fact there is a 
degree of discretion for power-holders and decision-makers. There is sufficient 
slack in most organisations to allow different strategies to be considered or 
pursued. That is, technological determinism does not fit the picture of most 
studies (Thompson and McHugh 1995). The other, disagrees with contingency 
theory as a set of measuring instruments and precise predictions about specific 
structural features for a particular task, its size and environmental attributes but 
may be useful as a conceptual and analytical framework which can be used by 
those involved in organisational design to aid them in their analyses (Francis 
1994). 
What this research argues is that one can acknowledge the role of 
contingency in that all organisations are driven by their historical background and 
the social and economic contexts within which they are based, Yet this is not a 
process of determinism. Randell argues that a good appraisal system must take a 
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contingency approach in that it must match the needs of the organisation and the 
expectations of employees. (Randell 1994). What in fact happens with the 
schemes, however, is that similar schemes are in different industries thus 
suggesting that to an extent schemes may be a function of consultants rather than 
the industry. At the same time, similar schemes turn out differently because of the 
social and historical backgrounds of the companies concerned. 
2.5 The Politics of Pay 
Thus far, it has been suggested that PRP may not provide the benefits 
purported to constitute its traditional uses. However, the identification of seven 
additional objectives suggests that PRP may be better viewed as a control 
mechanism, whose nature is contingent on the organisation and its context. This 
is not contingency in a deterministic fashion, however, rather, it reflects that 
organisations have a degree of choice within organisational boundaries. This 
means that the research recognises those factors already highlighted by other 
practitioners and academics and combines them with a progressive labour process 
theory and contingency theory which recognise the political nature of pay. It is 
the politics of pay to which we now turn in order to clarify the picture and to 
identify the main lines of inquiry for the rest of the thesis. This can be highlighted 
through an examination of the three 'P's' of the politics of pay: within the 
workplace, at the micro-economic level, and at the macro-economic level. 
2.5.1 Politics with a small IPI: Performance. effort and control 
"Reward management has been treated as something tangible, particularly 
by management consultants and Conservative governments, and has been 
touted as a new input to management practice which can create improved 
economic performance and wealth and as an ingredient of the process of 
change to the enterprise culture across a variety of employing 
organisations" (Smith 1993: 45). 
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As the above quote highlights PRP is essentially about improving the 
performance of the organisation, yet as will be shown below the complex nature of 
the employment relationship means that pay is often utilised to address more than 
this straightforward relationship. 
Linking pay to performance is not problematic in the world of orthodox 
economic theory because the level of pay of any worker is determined by the 
forces of supply and demand. Anyone paying above the competitive market rate 
would find that they would go out of business due to higher costs while anyone 
paying below the competitive rate would find that workers would leave their 
employer for higher paying employment (Brown et al. 1995). In the real world, 
however, we know that there are marked variations in efficiency and a range of 
indeterminacy in pay rates (Lester 1952), even for workers in the same 
occupations and districts (Brown et al. 1995). 
Variations in pay have usually been associated with the availability of an 
amount of monopoly power, either on the part of the employer, employee or both, 
which often leads to the assumption that individualising these relationships will 
bring them closer to the competitive model of wages. As such, incentive schemes 
are supposed to be about keeping employees' effort as close as possible to the 
level for which the wage is paid (BaIdamus 1961). That is, where possible, the 
wage paid to each employee matches the amount produced by the employee 
directly through their marginal productivity and indirectly through such methods 
as time-and-motion study. Piecework is a good example. Piecework pays 
workers according to the number of items that they produce and relates all or part 
of their money to the output produced in direct linear relationships (Brown 1973). 
Effort controls, on the other hand, once established, stabilise the average level of 
individual effort. To change the level of effort, one would need a change in the 
systems of administrative control. As such, variations in wages and efficiency are 
associated with different techniques of administration (e. g. coercion, authority, 
discipline and power). The growth of internal labour markets provides just one 
indication that the firm uses its organisation rather than its market relationships to 
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motivate employees (Brown et al. 1995). Thus, it would not be too difficult to 
argue that PRP represents a failure (or perception of failure) of one system of 
administration -'bureaucratic' - and a search for another new one -'the market'. 
Early labour process theory was overly simplistic and neglected to see that 
employment relations are a dynamic process in which 'management' is not 
necessarily synonymous with capital as the exploiter and 'employee' is not 
necessarily synonymous with labour as the exploited. Both management and 
employees can be exploited and workers may also consent to certain behaviours as 
much as management may consent to some acts of worker control. Prior to the 
labour process debate, however, there was already the beginnings of a rich 
tradition for analysing the nature of the employment relationship (Baldamus 1961; 
Behrend 1957; Hyman and Brough 1975). This tradition proved successful in 
analysing other pay systems will be utilised to analyse PRP. 
For Baldamus (1961), the organisation of industry revolves around the 
administration process by which the employee's effort is controlled by the 
employer. The reason why this problem has received little attention is that it has 
been customary to describe matters in terms of efficiency. Efficiency is usually 
preferred because effort is neither easily measured nor defined. So the problem of 
'how' and 'what' is produced becomes one of definition, concerning what 
interpretation and tenninology are applied to the measurement of performance. 
Performance is usually used interchangeably with concepts such as 
productivity, profitability and efficiency. All of these concepts have their own 
separate definitions, but for simplicity, we will assume that an improvement in 
performance is synonymous with efficiency. Economic efficiency in the use and 
allocation of resources, however, requires that any given output is produced at the 
minimum cost (i. e. both waste and technological inefficiency are to be avoided). 
As such, this means that it is in-feasible to change the existing resource allocation 
in such a way that someone is made better off only at the expense of making 
someone else worse off. 
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Given this, it is also possible for an employer to have higher productivity 
or profitability whilst simultaneously being economically inefficient. This is 
because budgetary controls utilised by firms force systems of financial control and 
assert authority by organisations to use labour in the most cost effective way, but 
usually within a short-ten-n framework. The complexity of the situation, however, 
all too often means that when employers say they are using labour in the most cost 
effective way, this usually translates as reducing the amount of and/or increasing 
the effort levels of employees. Thus, there is a constant readjustment of attempts 
to define efficiency and hence effort and PRP may be seen by some as a 
conceptual way of aligning the two. 
This problem is further confused, however, by the fact that in terms of pay, 
there are at least two separate mechanisms at work in deciding what compensation 
should be allocated to each person. One is the occupational element, the other the 
employment element. The Banner refers to the skills and experience utilised in 
carrying out work while the latter refers to the amount of effort involved in doing 
the work. For Baldamus (1961), this is problematic because it is impossible to 
separate the two elements. 
Behrend (1957) argues that the use of incentive schemes rests on three 
assumptions: that effort intensity can be varied, that the financial motive is the 
most important and that the only way of harnessing increased effort is by utilising 
incentive schemes. One problem concerns the difficulty in isolating effects of 
incentive schemes from those arising because of changes to production and 
technology. The above is justified on the basis that there are different standards of 
effort for time rates and piece rates. Hyman and Brough (1975), however, make 
the interesting comment that underlying the method of time wage, there exist no 
less than that of piece wage, a more or less definite quantitative basis. 
The points to make here are fourfold. First, we are dealing with a notion 
of the effort bargain. Second, there are problems with the effort bargain due to the 
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subjective nature of effort and the fact that it is extremely difficult to specify in 
advance the levels of effort needed. Third, this leads to problems of control and 
how to overcome such problems. This leads finally to the point that employers 
may have to rely heavily on employee consent for many practices (i. e. the 
negotiation of consent). 
The purpose of introducing incentives for employees is to raise effort but 
the final effect is the stabilisation of effort at a higher level. The problem is that 
notions of effort are purely subjective. For example, it is impossible to say 
whether two workers with the same work performance experience the same degree 
of effort. A naturally fast worker is likely to experience less effort to perform a 
given task than the slower worker. To account for these types of differences, one 
must measure the 'average worker' which means that it has got to be a norm 
acceptable to a group of workers. This implies that the rate must agree with 
institutionalised norms of effort. For incentives to work, a group of workers as 
well as management must share the same concept of what constitutes the 'right' 
standard of effort for a given job and the 'correct rate' for it. Behrend says that 
the workers' reaction to the rate, rather than scientific judgement, determines 
whether the rate is considered correct, loose or tight. Yet her picture tends to 
neglect notions of power. However, she still makes the valid point that if the 
effort bargain is not acceptable, it may lead to conflicting interests. A further 
problem is that equal effort does not necessarily represent equal marginal 
productivity, though in incentive schemes, it is equal effort which is rewarded. "A 
policy of paying a standard rate for equal effort and skill may thus conflict with a 
policy of rewarding according to marginal productivity" (Behrend 1957; 511). 
The manager's and the economist's systems of belief can thus differ and 
focus on two distinct elements in wage determination: effort evaluations, where 
standards of. effort and their effort cost are assessed in relation to each other; and 
in opposition to market evaluations, where labour productivity is assessed in 
relation to market price as represented by the concept of marginal value 
productivity. Behrend continues to conclude that management will try to increase 
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the level of effort from labour without increasing costs per unit of output while 
labour will try to increase the level of wages for a given amount of effort. 
Frequently, adjustments in the supply of labour do not take the form of 
adjustments in number of workers or hours of work but adjustments in the 
standard of effort. The phenomenon of effort bargaining indicates that one is 
dealing with conditions of monopolistic competition, even in the absence of trade 
unionism. 
It is worth pointing out that notions of effort have never been merely about 
the amount of energy expended on the job, but have always included the kinds of 
behaviours that should be expressed in doing the job. Dealing with behaviours as 
well as notions of effort means that whatever policies the organisation utilises 
must be seen to be fair by all parties. Yet, as with motivation, notions of fairness 
utilised by proponents of PRP tend to be very much simplified when, in fact, these 
notions of fairness are extremely complex. This can be highlighted by examining 
the role of social norms in determining notions of fairness. 
Hyman and Brough (1975) found that in a study of work attitudes, mention 
of wages fell into two distinct categories. One type of response focused on the 
adequacies of wages as a reflection of the nature of the job and the requirements of 
an acceptable standard of living. The second concentrated on whether they were 
being paid fairly as compared with other workers in other jobs or plants. The 
contrasting emphases were captured in the familiar maxims of 'a fair day's pay for 
a fair day's work' and 'fair comparisons'. The two distinctions parallel those 
between fairness in exchange and fairness in distribution. In the first case, the 
relationship focuses on that between the employer and employee and the fairness 
of the mutual wage-effort bargain. In the second case, it is on the distribution of 
income among employees in the same or different firms' occupations or 
industries. Thus, in a way, this reflects notions of both equality and equity. 
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Performance norms are actually one of the important concepts involved in 
this and Hyman and Brough (1975) write that three factors seem to exert a crucial 
influence on employee norms: 
1. the content and efficacy of primary socialisation, 
2. the exposure to divergent values, and 
3. the rigour of management's expectations and discipline. 
Hyman and Brough remind us of the traditionalism of performance norms 
by highlighting that Weber, in his classic study, argued that attempts to stimulate 
greater worker effort by increasing piece rates often prove counter productive. 
Effort and output actually decline, so that workers' aspirations are actually fixed 
by their customary standard of life, and far from seeking to maximise output and 
hence piecework earnings, they worked merely enough to ensure that the 
traditional acceptable level of earnings is reached. While this may be over- 
stretching the point somewhat, it serves to highlight, as Behrend (1957) suggests, 
that the exact degree of required effort cannot be accurately predicted. The 
employer cannot always see exactly what tasks need performing, how they will be 
assigned among the workforce and what intensity will be required to carry them 
out. This can be highlighted by looking at the role of the work study engineer in 
PBR schemes. Baldamus (1961) argues that the central task of the work study 
practitioner is to discover the prevailing notions of the right level of effort 
required in a particular situation. The success, indeed, the very possibility, of 
systematic time study, including the more sophisticated methods of work 
measurement, rests entirely on the existence of such preconceptions. He adds that, 
in other words, the true purpose of time study is to guess as consistently as 
possible the purely subjective element of effort standards, and consequently, to 
adjust rates of pay in accordance with them. It is interesting to note that with 
PRP, it may. be more of a process of setting the effort rather than discovering it as 
in time study. Another point is that it does not merely concern passive compliance 
or obedience of employees but also concerns the positive application of discretion 
and initiative towards managerially approved ends. So there has to be some 
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consent there. Thus, PRP may be the latest effort to manage what is necessarily 
contested and uncertain. 
Hyman and Brough (1975: 29) argue that the concept of a fair day's work 
for a fair day's pay is used to: 
sustain a sense of work obligation among those whose work offers little or 
no intrinsic motivation to high performance and to denounce those who 
fail to meet managerial expectations. 
One of the crucial points is that, in terms of pay comparisons, the empirical 
evidence in the choice of pay comparisons is typically unambitious and 
powerfully shaped by custom. Major inequalities which establish part of an 
income hierarchy are rarely a focus of contention. 
The force of tradition is quite powerful, and when combined with an 
appeal to custom and practice the principle is strong enough to produce a moral 
content that is recognised by workers and employers alike, even to the point where 
it constitutes, in effect, a countervailing source of legitimacy to that of managerial 
authority. Hyman and Brough argue that there is much evidence that the 
definition of work obligation in the everyday employment situation can usually be 
understood as an example of negotiated order. Thus, what is at issue is the 
ideology and social imagery held by employees and employers, generated not only 
within work but in social life generally. This is the case for both employers and 
employees. In any case, employees usually hold strong views on the maximum as 
well as a minimum level of work effort to apply. 
The level of negotiated order depends on the level of variation open to 
management on two particular points. The first is the stringency of the economic 
constraints under which the employing organisation operates and hence the 
pressure on it to minimise labour costs. The second is the scope available for 
lower level management, who are in regular contact with employees, to engage in 
informal agreements and understandings which further their personal interests and 
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facilitate their immediate tasks of co-ordinating production that may conflict with 
other longer-term objectives of higher management. Once a compromise has been 
reached, employers in turn can usually rely on union representatives to play a part 
in adding to the ideological pressures placed on employees to observe the 
dominant work ethic. Hyman and Brough (1975: 72) quote Flanders: 
One has not to take an over optimistic view of human nature to recognise 
that when job performance is governed by a set of agreed rules and when 
the rewards attached to performance are thought to be justly determined 
there is a much greater prospect of workers feeling a sense of obligation to 
give a fair day's work and of shop stewards using their influence to see 
that this actually happens. This joint regulation leads to involvement and a 
sharing of responsibility. 
In terms of the power relations involved here, while employers have power to 
some extent, the power of work groups is essentially defensive and reactive. 
Given emphasis mentioned above about such schemes, research into the 
actual effects of these schemes is imperative. Does PRP actually translate into 
better performance and can a reward system make much difference to the 
performance of a company? Both managers and employees will respond to the 
messages sent by a reward system, depending on the notions of fairness which 
they perceive to be the norm and that ingrained with the system itself. Runciman 
(1966) wrote, 30 years ago, of the difficulties of changing employee perceptions 
of pay and fairness and that the long-established means of assessing relativities 
and fairness were based on a comparison determined by precedent, convention and 
habit within small reference groups. This was so, despite successive attempts 
through legislation and action by employers and unions to alter the situation. 
Therefore, what reason, if any, is there to view PRP schemes as having different 
effects on pay, behaviours and hence performance? Despite this, it would seem 
that performance contracts may actually change people's perceptions of what their 
roles are in the workplace rather than what they think their roles should 
concentrate on. The outcomes are indeterminate and need much more research, 
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however. Like Burawoy's (1979) 'playing the game', employees quickly learn to 
adapt to the new situations to benefit themselves. 
2.5.2 Politics with a medium 'P': Pay. corporate performance and the 
changing nature of employee relations 
Perceptions of perfon-nance can indeed vary. For the UK government, 
improving the performance of the economy has been based on 'atomistic' 
competition via the introduction of market forces, deregulation and the 
individualisation of the employment relationship. Yet for companies, competition 
may mean gaining greater control of the production process and the strengthening 
of market share. The growth of the multinational corporation (NINC) is certainly 
one indication of this. The trend of deregulation, while closely related to greater 
control within the firm, especially in MNCs, has also filtered down to the level of 
the individual. Over the last decade and a half, there has been very much what 
looks like a trend towards individualised employment contracts. Many have 
argued that the traditional procedural approach characterised by collective 
bargaining was on its way out. However, while the number of workers covered by 
collective bargaining has reduced considerably, it has been shown that most 
individualised contracts are very much 'standardised packages individually 
wrapped' (Evans and Hudson 1993). While the debate carried on between 
individual and collective contracts, PRP and with it the performance contract 
became increasingly popular. The notion of the performance contract in particular 
seems to embody both collective and individual aspects. Procedurally, the 
perception portrayed is very much on a collective basis, while substantively it is 
portrayed on an individual basis. Streeck (1987) argues that economic crisis 
forces employers to look for innovative strategies as a means of competing with 
other firms. While this is true, it is also true that firms tend to follow 'best 
practice' so that strategies sometimes look very similar. 
- 
PRP and performance 
contracts comprise one such phenomenon that, while under-researched, has huge 
implications'for corporate performance. 
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One of the areas highlighted by this research is that the perfon-nance 
contract is becoming a very important part of attempts to change the nature of the 
employment relationship. This needs much more research, however. Most of the 
companies identified here and in the WIRS90 survey that used PRP schemes were 
either large national multi-plant firms or MNCs usually utilising the 'M Form' of 
organisation. Thus, it is worth a detour into the nature and structure of these types 
of companies. 
Although the 1980s and 1990's have seen the encouragement of market forces 
along with atomistic competition, in most countries, the firm is far from that 
portrayed by Adam Smith (1986). Most markets are now dominated by large 
MNCs with their immense influence, wealth and power. With the growth in the 
size of the firin and the greater diversity of corporate business there has been a 
development which Williamson (1985) describes as "the most significant 
innovation of the twentieth century" - the M Form. The M Form evolved as a 
means of making savings on transaction costs which arose from the growth of the 
firm and the accompanying problems of internal control. It involves the creation 
of quasi-autonomous operating divisions run by a central office which are said to 
have the ability of a much more strategic co-ordinating role brought about by the 
centre being released from the involvement in the functional aspects of the 
company, assigning operating responsibility to its divisions. 
By implication, the M Form is said to be a much more efficient means of 
organising the company as through its strategic planning and resource allocation, 
the centre can also act as a monitoring and control apparatus. According to 
Williamson, the centre will be supported by an elite staff that is capable of 
evaluating divisional performance and can create an information base that will 
permit rewards and penalties to be assigned on a more discriminating basis. 
The implication for reward systems and other human resource functions is 
that operation and implementation is at a local level and makes management more 
responsible for ensuring that pay is better linked to divisional perfon-nance and the 
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local labour market. We know from the work on structure and strategy, however, 
that HRM outcomes depend very much on the type of MNC. Depending on 
whether the MNC is ethnocentric, polycentric (Perlmutter 1969), geocentric 
(Bartett and Ghoshal 1989) or eurocentric (Marginson and Sisson 1994) it will 
give different outcomes for employee relations. Nonetheless, there are some 
inherent contradictions in the M form organisation between external and internal 
markets. At both the macro- and micro- levels, the M Form is more about the 
creation of internal markets than external ones. In terms of the internal labour 
market, Doeringer and Piore's (1985) work shows that although companies do not 
completely ignore prices and conditions in the external market, they are much 
more concerned with creating and maintaining consistent pay and grading 
structures. Even in the area of PRP, this research finds that pay is only related to 
performance insofar as it shares out a predetermined pay 'pot' and keeps to what 
the company deems to be a normal distribution of performance to suit their 
grading structures. 
What this means is that the effects on company performance arc at best 
indeterminate. This problem is compounded by the fact that most companies do 
not appear to make any efforts to directly measure the effects of these schemes on 
company performance despite Williamson's insistence on considering the role of 
measurement and monitoring within the M Form organisation. Even indirect 
measures such as monitoring and surveys were largely based on gauging 
employee opinion and consistent application of the scheme (Gilman 1996). This 
is very interesting as the main raison d'ftre of these schemes is that they allegedly 
improve performance. This may mean that we are seeing a move away from the 
traditional M form, which is largely based on management through bureaucracy 
and hierarchy, to management through the market. Thus, processes such as PRP 
may concern changing methods of management more than anything else. 
2.5.3 Politics with a big IPI: Government 
The role of government in the determination of pay and performance 
norms is just as important as that of employers and employees. The Thatcher 
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government came to power in 1979, determined to contain labour costs as part of 
their programme of economic improvement. In this way, Smith (1993) argues that 
what they were attempting with regard to financial rewards was little different to 
that attempted by earlier Labour and Conservative governments of the post-war 
period. The difference was that, rather than using incomes policies and 
agreements with the trade unions, Tory governments sought to address labour 
markets factors directly. Part of this involved the removal of rigidities such as 
trade unions from the equation and basing pay on individual effort. 
By the 1990s, the government's approach and thinking became enshrined 
as an essential element of the Citizens' Charter (1991) which, on the one hand, 
used the public sector as a model to set an example for the private sector to follow, 
and on the other hand, argued that there was a need to make a regular and direct 
link between a person's contribution to the standards of service provided and his 
or her reward in a bid to make the public services work on a model of how he/she 
envisaged the best model of the private sector. The government argued that much 
more was required to make the links between pay, performance, and quality of 
service tighter and more effective including: 
more delegation on decisions on pay, 
extending rewards for performance and penalties for failure, 
securing value for money, and 
ensuring rewards for performance are only given when demanding quality of 
service targets have been met. 
Within this, there was a clear intention by the government to aid 
management's efforts to spread PRP in other nationalised industries. The split of 
various public sector departments into the 'next steps' agencies which are now 
given much. more responsibility to manage themselves is a clear example of the 
government's attempts. The agencies were first ordered to use PRP through the 
Treasury and then, with delegation, they were further encouraged to do so via both 
ideologically and budgetary systems. 
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This kind of approach hints at reward being aimed at more than just 
performance. Indeed, the whole relationship between attitudes and corporate well- 
being was a target for reward management. As Mrs Thatcher claimed 'the 
employee should be wanting to satisfy himself that ... profits are as good as they 
should be'. In essence, the political debate which has centred on and around 
reward management has pursued higher order aims than the motivating effects of 
cash or non-cash rewards (Smith 1993). 
The politics of pay highlights that, to change effort levels, motivation or 
attitudes of fairness, one has to change concepts of social norms, implying that 
there is a socio-political element involved. This means that organisations may not 
be able to completely change their systems (i. e. they have to stay within the 
boundaries of their historical framework). 
Thompson and McHugh (1995) emphasise four factors involved with 
political models of motivation. These are: goals related to values, interests and 
perceptions; strategies to achieve such gaols; coalition or interest groups in 
achieving the goals; and the power- to affect the events or goals. Thompson and 
McHugh argue that these are utilised by management as 'technologies of 
regulation' aimed at increasing control over behaviour and performance. Quality 
circles, autonomous work groups and so forth are examples of such techniques 
The motivations served are the managerial aims of greater unit productivity but 
the drive concerns more work and less waste operates under the cover of 
consensus based participation. PRP in this instance may be used as a concept, not 
only to change motivation, but to change differentials and social norms of pay and 
e ffo rt. 
The state also can play a role in intervening in the conceptions of fairness 
through public policy. Thus, those kind of wages and salary structures that aie 
subject to a more or less uniform norm take for granted the equity of the 
prevailing inequality. This is an interesting point and highlights how the 
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government can intervene in very different ways, starting from the post-war era in 
which incomes policies were used to keep inflation down and wages at a certain 
level. When the Thatcher era is reached, incomes policies were ignored and 
instead attempts to use the market were largely used in a similar fashion in order 
to bring about different sets of wage policy. 
Public policy embraces a conservative conception of fairness, shaped by an 
acceptance of the overall structures of political economy. In the concept of 
incomes policy, it may exert a powerful ideological influence that helps to contain 
those unintended challenges to structural stability. Likewise, the 1970s and 1980s 
saw the government aim to change the direction of its ideological influence and 
aim to create new structures. The main point is that government can shape the 
context within which employers work (e. g. incomes policies in the 1970s and the 
market in the 1980s and 1990s). 
Yet while social norms can create some kind of social order, they can also 
stand in the way of change so that while certain systems, as in free collective 
bargaining, may have been the norm for many years, it has become far less 
acceptable in the 1970s. Due to the escalating costs and complexity of capital 
equipment and the growing size of production units, management have moved 
towards rationalisation and planning. However, for planning to be effective, it 
requires predictability and control. To this extent, control is not a mute concept. 
Labour costs and utilisation, the aspects of companies' economic envirom-nent 
over which they have the greatest direct influence, represent one of the primary 
targets for rationalisation and control. 
Another source of disturbance in social norms is that due to socio-technical 
arrangements or management practices. Flanders, in his 1959 -work, showed how, 
at the beginning of the process of scientific management, the study actually 
threatened a breach of contract between employer and workmen. What it was 
really doing was changing the effort notion of a 'fair day's work for a fair day's 
pay'. This was also a concept noted by Baldarnus (1961), particularly that 
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changes in production techniques can exact more effort for different pay levels 
and pay norms. Another significant consequence of technical change is the 
creation of new categories of occupations, new pay hierarchies and where new 
jobs are located in these hierarchies. Again, these are features which impact on 
the changes from 1979 onwards. Obviously, what the government was attempting 
to do was change social norms. It is also significant that, at the same time, 
through the reorganisation of many occupations, these jobs were then left without 
a particular social structure. This was also a consequence of the search for 
flexibility. Thus, these points may actually fit with any debate on PRP. At points 
throughout time when existing structures of social norms need to be changed, this 
leads to periods of conflict or periods of great changes in structures. 
Rubery (1997: 358) Takes the view that 'labour markets remain social 
markets in which employers cannot fully ignore social expectations', to relate 
current trends in pay structures to the main extant theories of wages, one of which 
is relevant here. Sociologists and institutionalists see wages in terms of their 
stratification or cohesion function: wages reflect social norms and are less 
responsive to market variations than economic theory suggests. The expectation is 
that wages reflect norms of fairness. Rubery argues that the view that wages 
reflect nonns of fairness is problematic in explaining the major changes of the 
1980s and 1990s. 
It can be argued that Rubery is somewhat hard on these theories which do 
not all imply an unchanging moral order (Edwards and Gilman 1998). She does 
not, for example, consider Goldthorpe's (1978) analysis of inflation, which was 
specifically based on the idea of changes in the structure of fairness. Goldthorpe 
argued that inflation in the 1960s and 1970s reflected not only economic forces, 
but also the emergence of a more organised working class which was less bound 
by conventional ideas of fairness than its forebears. There was thus a social 
dynamic which reduced the power of traditional norms. Theories of the labour 
process have long argued that control is shifting and contested, with swings 
between worker autonomy and direct managerial control. It would not be difficult 
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to develop a similar view of the labour market. Both employers and employees 
can use social constructions to legitimise certain levels of wages. From the 1980s, 
one saw an increased ability to engage in behaviour of this kind on the part of 
employers. Thus, what may be needed is a more extended treatment, on the lines 
of Goldthorpe's model of inflation and Rubery's critique of models based on 
social norms, which can explain contemporary trends. The point to be made is 
that norms are not fixed and hence pay standards can be changed. PRP may be 
one way of doing this. 
2.6 Bargaining. uncertain1y and power relations 
The above discussion highlights the extreme complexity of the 
employment relationship. Instead of attempting a prescriptive description of the 
process involved with PRP, this research will argue that more value can be gained 
by highlighting the processes by which this complex interaction works and its 
outcomes. The analysis may lead to some prescriptive conclusions though the 
whole process is better viewed as a bargain with the environmental context (i. e. 
the social, political and economic pressures). It is the re-negotiation of control 
and effort. On the one hand, the employer wants the complete flexibility of labour 
inputs to gain competitive advantage. On the other hand, there are what the 
employer sees as social, political and economic obstacles acting as barriers to this. 
For the employee, this may mean that in some cases much more effort is 
exerted for the same or less reward. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
employees are working more efficiently (Mchaverty and Drummond 1993). 
Efficiency involves the production of more with fewer inputs, whereas extra effort 
suggests greater input and may account for the kind of intensification which the 
increased productivity of the 1980s was squarely based upon (see Nolan 1989; 
Smith 1993).. McLaverty and Drummond, looking at the relationship between 
factors likely to affect effort and work performance, found that most of the staff 
were working over their contractual hours for no extra pay. Routine workers did 
not think critically about the effectiveness of their working time. This is not 
69 
surprising, seeing as they were not involved in detennining, let alone controlling, 
the goals or aims of their work. Their research shows that effort was a product of 
job pressures, resulting from employees attempting to respond to the demands 
imposed upon them and that most managers do not feel that their performance 
satisfactorily reflects their input. 
Of particular interest, related to the changing nature of control, is the issue 
of the differing roles of management and how this relates to the adaptation of PRP 
schemes. Crucial to an understanding of the context within which managers are 
seeking to control individual employees is the nature of the broader organisational 
control systems. It is clear from the existing research that the structure of the 
organisation has a substantial impact on which control systems are adopted and 
how they operate. For example, it is argued that the M Form structure of 
organisation facilitates the separation of strategic and operational decision making 
(Walsh 1992). Within this, the devolution of profit responsibility and operational 
decisions are decentralised to lower levels of the business. In the HRM literature, 
it is argued that this gives managers much more autonomy over the day-to-day 
running of their business units. Exactly how this affects the objectives for the 
design and operation of PRP schemes has not been explored. 
While certain studies have begun to point to the fact that control is at 
present a major part of PRP schemes, they have not examined how it is that 
control factors or management decision-making have interacted with other goals 
and objectives of the company and how important the organisational context is in 
the choice of the type of scheme chosen. This allows an examination of the 
objectives of a PRP scheme and of the internal pressures operating in the 
company. What is also needed is a method of examining the external pressures. 
For example, are there any particular pressures which make them attractive to 
certain types of company, industrial sector or job classification? Beginning with 
the idea that the competitive environment may set off a chain reaction which leads 
to a search for a new control system (Smith 1990) and that the type of product or 
product market which any company is in will reflect the type of payment system 
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that they use (Vickerstaff 1992; Lupton and Gowler 1969), a framework was 
developed to examine how the political, social and economic factors influence the 
choice of pay system. Contingency theory would posit a direct relationship 
between these factors and their success or failure would depend on the 'fit' of the 
various elements. This is far too simplistic and does not recognise that control, 
consent or resistance between the various parties takes place. While not wanting 
to go down the path of contingency theory here, it is useful to examine PRP 
against these kinds of factors. 
As mentioned above, the government has fiercely promoted the idea of the 
individualisation. of the employment relationship, especially in relation to pay. In 
both the remaining public sector organisations and the newly privatised ones, it 
has encouraged management to introduce PRP schemes so as to link pay directly 
to performance of the individual (Citizens' Charter 1991). This is combined with 
a push within the private sector to introduce more flexible pay systems of which 
PRP has been seen as the primary scheme. 
The fact that when PRP is used in the right context it can be of potential 
benefit to both employer and employee (ACAS 1991), is a statement which can 
easily be found running through most of the literature on PRP, especially that of a 
prescriptive kind. For example, Kearney (1979) argues that most people work in 
organisations where the relationship between pay and performance is less than 
direct, and asks why this is so when there is a fairly clear idea of how to use pay 
effectively to motivate performance. Despite noting many barriers, he still insists 
that Performance measurement is the problem that most organisations have the 
greatest chance of overcoming, and that in less hostile conditions, PRP could be a 
success. 
For the employer, it signifies that the schemes will improve efficiency, 
effectiveness and hence productivity in some way. For the employee, it is 
supposed to signify that, given the chance of a link between their performance and 
their rate of reward they can in some way realise that if more effort is exerted they 
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will receive more reward. This is a simplistic notion of PRP. It is a unitary or, at 
best, pluralistic view of the world of work and reward which fails to see the 
realities of the employer-employee relationship. Even when it is dressed up to 
look more complex and more far-reaching, it still holds simplistic notions in its 
main conceptual framework. 
Until the early 1990s work carried out into the nature and extent of PRP 
was mainly of the type which analysed PRP within its original conceptual 
framework of PRP as a motivational and much fairer way of linking work and 
reward. Kessler and Purcell's (1992) and Kessler's (1994) highly commended 
work of the early 1990s set the scene for examining PRP with a view to finding 
out its true nature. Since then the debate on PRP has gone rather stale. 
PRP concerns restructuring as much as rewarding employees and there are 
many complicated factors which need to be taken into account before we decide 
whether these schemes are beneficial or not to the employer. We know, for 
example, that these schemes do not motivate in any positive way, even though 
employers like to think that they might with slight alterations. What we do not 
know, however, are the conditions which make it worthwhile for companies to 
carry on utilising such schemes. 
It is the individualisation of the employment relationship which is thought 
to hold the key to PRP schemes. For example, if reward is based on an 
individual's performance, then one should see some kind of relationship between 
how he/she perforrns and how he/she are paid. Yet if this was the case, one would 
also expect to see a rise in the use of piecework schemes, yet this is not the case. 
Therefore, what is different about PRP? One factor might be that it is in those 
kinds of jobs which have not previously used piecework and are not so easily 
measurable. . 
There are several limitations which run through much of the previous 
research which need to be addressed. First, one of the factors which several 
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previous studies failed to appreciate was that management's objectives may not be 
synonymous with motivation or fairness if they are beneficial to the organisation 
in differing ways. In other word, fairness and motivation may be secondary, or 
even a smoke-screen, for other objectives. For example, Marden and Richardson 
(1994) assumed that Inland Revenue management would have to respond to 
perceived unfairness to make the scheme work better. Yet, in this, the authors 
presume that fairness is in fact one of management's prime objectives. Second, 
and related, research also falls into the trap of using the criteria of employee 
acceptance to judge whether the scheme is successful or not (Lewis 1997), 
whereas the organisation may have completely different criteria of success. There 
is also some temptation to say why schemes are successful or not rather than to 
describe the processes by which everything occurs. Studies also treat motivation 
as a willingness on the part of employee opinion whereas we have noted above 
that both motivation and fairness are highly complex notions. Similarly, French 
and Marsden (1997) found that the perception that 'Performance Management' 
was a device to get more work out of staff had been greatly reinforced. Yet they 
do not go on to say any more about this. This was also a main point in their 
conclusion, yet all that they say is that elaborate goal-setting is unnecessary for 
this. A third criticism of some of the attitude surveys is that they are largely 
carried out for or on behalf of practitioner groups so that although they have raised 
some interesting points, their conclusions are rather prescriptive and never 
followed through. For example, Thompson's (1992) research was intended to 
determine the extent to which different types of scheme had more or less impact 
on the attitudes of the employees subject to their scope. The conclusions are given 
in a simple form, however, and whilst noting that PRP often raises awareness of 
the competence levels of the organisation's management, it did not pursue this line 
of inquiry at all. It is fair to say that the conclusions are written in a very 
prescriptive way to say that the overall findings are so negative. A point worth 
making is that it is not just what is done, as indicated by Thompson (1992), but 
also how it is done and how this interacts with other elements. This brings us to a 
final criticism which is that attitude surveys in general do not allow an 
investigation into the dynamics of the schemes. Kessler (1994) takes the debate 
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forward but is still weak in his overall analysis of the facts, only looking at the 
design and implementation and not the total package of effects. Nor does he 
analyse in detail why the schemes took certain paths. Finally, as Kessler (1994) 
mentions, there is no attempt at representativeness. 
However, it is not enough to simply criticise the work of others without 
suggesting a better way of going about it. It would not be true to say that this 
thesis actually criticises the work of others. Rather, it is a case that the majority of 
good research carried out into PRP has not been able to go further precisely 
because of the novel nature of the research. That is to say it has been bounded by 
attempting to investigate certain elements of such schemes. Where this research 
differs is in bringing together some of the strands suggested for further research by 
previous authors into one concise research project. It also attempts extend beyond 
anything carried out to date with its wide-ranging ethnographic research, and with 
the aid of a representative survey of the economy, to point out those areas where 
PRP is most prominent. 
It is already recognised that some of the areas which are covering have 
been noted in one form or another in other research but they have not been brought 
together as an all-embracing method and also the subject has been mainly 
approached by single case study methods or larger-scale attitude survey which, 
while extremely useful, can be problematic in that participants have only the 
written questions to respond to. 
What is considered here is how organisational factors interact with PRP 
schemes. Part of this involves an attempt to integrate the approaches taken by 
previous authors into a much clearer description of PRP. In particular, the 
interaction between goals and objectives of the schemes and the ways in which 
these are then delegated down to individuals or groups are examined. 
Other studies do much to chart the way forward but little to investigate the 
organisational factors and the way that the various schemes interacted and 
impacted at a more human level (i. e. they were either studies identifying different 
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organisational objectives or larger scale studies which were not able to go into 
much detail). 
While initial research concentrated on recruitment and retention, 
motivation and the performance-pay link, it has become clear that it is not 
sufficient to keep insisting that if one add more money or if the objectives are set 
better the schemes will be successful. Other academic work began to look at 
schemes in a more thematic manner but still remained largely wed to the old ideas 
of motivation and so forth. This is not surprising, as improvement of performance 
is supposed to be the main goal by providing a reward system that motivates 
people, retains them or seems fairer than past systems. It has become increasingly 
clear, however, that organisations, are using the schemes for far more than just 
these three factors. 
What this chapter aimed to show is that in the confusion over what has 
been seen as the widespread introduction of PRP researchers have been attempting 
to find out whether the purported benefits of PRP are in fact true. This meant that 
questions as to the real nature of PRP have only been identified slowly as research 
progresses, thus leaving a huge gap in the knowledge of PRP. Academics have 
now filled some of these gaps, but there is still a large element of incompleteness 
around PRP, one of which stemming from the fact that we know very little about 
how the organisational context fits and acts with the dynamics of the schemes. 
Cannell and Wood (1992) are the first to notice that, as well as being 
introduced to remedy the perceived difficulties involved in incremental schemes, 
PRP schemes are being reviewed and revised from time to time. However, they 
neglect to say why this is so and that PRP schemes may cause exactly the same 
kinds of problems on a different scale with management having more control over 
it. 
Kessler and Purcell (1992) and Kessler (1994) clarify that PRP schemes 
vary and also identify the process of cultural change, and not just individual 
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motivation, as a reason for the use of PRP. What this research intends to do is 
build upon their work. Whereas Kessler and Purcell tend to stress that matters 
vary, and Kessler highlights the variation in two organisations, this research offers 
more detail and also places the schemes within a framework. Regarding cultural 
change, while others have charted the way forward, this research attempts to 
highlight the processes by which cultural change is hoped to be used and the ways 
in which it is utilised. Part of this involves an explanation of the process of 
objective-setting throughout the organisations. As Marsden and Richardson 
(1994) argue 'management's objectives are not easily established, however you 
would think that they were hoping to use it as an incentive to raise performance'. 
It is not enough to hope when analysis is needed. The reason why they are not 
able to establish management's objectives is because, as they say, their 
concentration is on the inherent characteristics of the scheme rather than its 
organisational and managerial context. Similarly, the work of Kessler (1994) 
examines the extent to which objectives have been met rather than the nature of 
the objectives. 
Furthermore, definitions of motivation used by many of the attitude 
surveys have, by their very nature, tended to be simplistic because of the need to 
extract answers from a limited number of questions. For example, the definition 
of motivation used by Mardsen and Richardson (1994: 247) is 'a willingness or 
preparedness to do something, which means that it is a state of mind'. They are 
measuring whether PRP changed staff motivation, utilising the opinions and 
beliefs of staff. They also say that the politics of the scheme's introduction do not 
greatly distort the working of the scheme, a fact which would be difficult to 
deduce from an attitude survey where one has to infer what some results mean. 
Much of the previous research implies a positive function to motivation. Yet 
when looked at in terms of social norms, motivation may well be conceptualised 
as compulsion or consent which puts a whole new emphasis on the sub ect. As 
Cannell and Wood (1992: 109) state, 
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little thought seems to have been given to the processes by which PRP 
works. Confusion about the reason for the introduction of PRP is one 
effect of this uncertainty ....... In particular there is a lack of critical 
evaluation. 
This research aims to remedy this. Firstly, building on previous work it 
will identify schemes and their changing structures and put them in the context of 
their wider application. It will build a framework with which to identify the 
difference in emphasis and the reason for this. Secondly, it will study in detail the 
practical and theoretical application of the schemes in 16 different organisations 
and then in four of the organisations using an ethnographic case study 
methodology. This will allow a focus on the organisational and social context 
within which the schemes operate, and in particular, the choice of objectives and 
the means by which organisations manage the schemes the way they do. Finally, 
the objective will be to put the schemes into a wider theoretical context utilising 
notions of restructuring and control mentioned throughout this chapter. This does 
not merely mean examining control in simple labour process terms of exploitation, 
but rather combining a more progressive labour process approach with the fact 
that control is part and parcel of everyday organisational language, especially in 
large MNC organisations. Particular emphasis will be paid to the emerging 
themes of the 'effort bargain' and the 'process bargain'. The effort bargain is the 
balance between effort and reward, while the process bargain involves how the 
foriner balance is managed and regulated (i. e., the administration system of the 
organisation). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHOD LOGY 
3.0 The overall approach 
I Yin (1994) argues that different types of research methodology have 
particular advantages or disadvantages depending upon the following three 
conditions: 
1. the type of research question, 
2. the amount of control over behavioural events, and 
3. the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena. 
Using the three conditions above, Yin advises that the basic questions of 
'who', 'what', 'where', 'how' and 'why' should be applied to the research 
question and hypothesis. This leads to the assertion that the 'how' and 'why' 
questions are more explanatory and suitable to case studies, while surveys are 
more appropriate to the 'who', 'what', 'where' and 'how many' type questions. A 
common misconception is that the various strategies used should be arranged in a 
hierarchy with case studies being used for an 'exploratory' phase while surveys 
are used for a 'descriptive' phase (Yin 1994). 
Because of the lack of systematic research into PRP it was initially thought 
desirable to include both a quantitative (survey) and qualitative (case study) 
research element in this study. While the survey was thought to be useful for 
looking at the extent and organisation of PRP, the case study would enable the 
examination of complex social phenomena, addressing the effects of PRP and the 
interaction between organisation and effects. 
A common problem mentioned with regard to case studies is that they 
provide little base for generalisation. While this is a much overstated fact, to 
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avoid any bias which might occur, a survey was used to identify those sectors 
where PRP is more common and its main characteristics. Furthermore, in order to 
provide a better link between the quantitative and qualitative, a panel case study 
method was used, whereby a larger population was used to assess the main 
characteristics and organisation of PRP and then a smaller population was derived 
from this for detailed case study work, including participant observation. To 
avoid the possibility of a 'lack of rigour' (Yin 1994), a semi-structured interview 
technique was incorporated throughout so as to introduce an element of 
consistency. 
As explained in Chapter Two, much of the research into PRP was carried 
out using an attitudinal survey methodology. While this was very useful in 
generating knowledge concerning some of the features of PRP and the fact that 
PRP seems to cause a great deal of dernotivation (rather than motivation), it left an 
important gap in the literature in terms of how and why the schemes continue to 
be utilised. One of the main reasons for explaining this gap is the methodological 
aspect, in short, the difficulty of understanding the totality of the processes at 
work without the use of a detailed qualitative methodology. In-depth studies are 
able to explore and explain the objectives of the organisation and the ways in 
which the organisation interacts with the various elements of its environment. 
Furthermore, Porter argues (199 1) that the complexity, situation specificity 
and changing nature of the firm and its environment strains the conventional 
methodological approaches while Pettigrew (1990) points out that a detailed 
comparative case study provides the opportunity to examine processes in context, 
drawing on the significance of various interconnected levels of analysis. Any 
organisational process needs to be understood within both the external and internal 
context in which it takes place. This requires the use of a multi-level analysis 
(Hendry and - Pettigrew 1990). The external context is broadly defined as the 
external environment within which the firm operates, and the internal context is 
understood to be the internal dynamics and features of the firm itself. 
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Equally the multi-level perspective also allows for a simultaneous 
examination of the institutional, sectoral and organisational contexts within which 
any industrial relations phenomena occurs. As Fox-Wolgramm et al. (1998) 
argue, ignoring a multi-level perspective results in a lack of understanding of how 
organisational dynamics are embedded in its institutional and temporal context. 
A further advantage of case studies is that they are able to generate theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 1994, Pettigrew 1990). A distinctive feature of building 
theory through case study research is the capacity to make adjustments during the 
data collection process (Eisenhardt 1989). The research process becomes flexible 
and it can adjust taking into account findings from preliminary investigation, 
adopting changes to data collection instruments. However, as Eisenhardt argues, 
this flexibility is not a license to be unsystematic. Rather, it is a controlled 
opportunism to take advantage of the uniqueness of a specific case and the 
emergence of new themes to improve resultant theory. Theory building, however, 
should begin as close as possible to 'no theory' under consideration and 'no 
hypotheses' to test. Therefore, the starting point for this thesis was 'why are PRP 
schemes so popular given the negative aspects being highlighted by other 
researchT. 
The case study approach also allows insight into the history of the case in 
question. The historical approach can be stressed in validating an understanding 
of the organisational identity and the configuration of its various practices. 
Chandler (1990: 621) argues that he/she 'who has studied the past experience of 
the institution is in a better position than most analysts to identify which 
developments are truly new'. This relates to an understanding of the historical 
situations, both internal and external to the firm, especially during periods when 
strategic expansions and/or organisational changes take place. 
A historical investigation was essential in this thesis because any pay 
system does not operate in isolation from its wider surroundings and 
organisational context. History, infrastructure and culture permeate all aspects of 
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life within a company, including its norms, values, and the behaviours of its 
employees and managers. Behavioural characteristics become an ingrained part of 
each company's 'ways of doings things' and shape its organisational structure and 
processes. Similarly, the historical analysis is crucial to the construction of 
explanations about patterns of labour relations (Sisson 1987; Gospel 1992; Crouch 
1996). 
Data analysis and interpretation is the most critical and difficult element in 
qualitative research (Yin 1994; Miles and Huberman 1994). Due to the immense 
amount of data collected and to attempt to avoid 'data asphyxiation' (Pettigrew 
1990), it was decided to organise and structure all of the information gathered by 
writing chronological, extensive case studies for each firm. These write-ups were 
often descriptions but central to the generation of insights (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Further interpretation permitted rewrites of these case studies now organising 
them by issues rather in a than chronological way. Equally, aiming to avoid the 
risk of constructing case studies as compendia of descriptive information which 
suffers a lack of conceptual and theoretical integrity (Doz and Prahalad 1991), the 
final case study chapters were carried out bearing in mind the aspects raised in 
Chapters Two and Five. 
The aim was to put together the insights of the literature review and the 
preliminary findings of the fieldwork, generating a framework that systematised 
the process of writing up the case studies from a more theoretical base. In doing 
this, the researcher should have the chance to learn and validate the priori 
constructs of his or her research. This type of research approach, in the vein of 
grounded theory, is well suited for complex organisational phenomena such as in 
the exploratory and explanatory studies of the pressures and structures of 
industrial relations policies, where solid constructs can not be defined rigorously a 
priori. Grounded theory is a research process that attempts to start with an initial 
guide collecting and verifying data but allows the researcher to be aware of other 
contingencies that will affect the original framework or hypothesis (Glasser and 
Strauss 1967). As Eisenhardt (1989: 546) states, the case study process is clearly 
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iterative: 'while an investigator may focus on part of the process at a time, the 
process itself involves constant iteration backward and forward between steps'. 
3.1 The research process 
In addition to the detailed literature review of the subject matter, the 
research went through three main stages. Firstly, the Workplace Industrial 
Relations 1990 data (WIRS90) were analysed. The second stage included the 
identification of a case study panel of 16 companies. The third stage involved in- 
depth case study work, including an ethnographic approach to examining four 
organisations chosen from the original 16. Each stage was used to build upon the 
other to create and refine the ideas and questions that formed part of the thesis. 
3.1.1 The WIRS90 data 
The WIRS90 data, were analysed, and this included an assessment of what 
the main characteristics of PRP companies were as opposed to those without such' 
schemes. The initial idea for researching the organisation and effects of PRP 
related to a quantitative survey of PRP undertaken for the study, prior to the 
commencement of detailed case study work. It was decided at a very early stage, 
however, that not only would this require too much time and too many resources 
but also that in order to explore the central research hypotheses that (i. e., 'PRP is 
better viewed as part of a re-negotiation of the effort bargain and systems of 
control) case studies provided the best way to proceed. Nevertheless, there was 
still a central role for quantitative work and the best way to proceed on this count 
was to use available secondary data sources. The WIRS90 data were thought to 
provide an ideal secondary source. Although the merit pay question was far from 
perfect, it still gave a good indication of the extent, nature and main characteristics 
of PRP. The WIRS data were additionally useful because the concept of 
population sampling is crucial as it defines the set of entities from which the 
research sample is drawn. It also helped to define the limits for generalising on 
theory. While the cases were chosen at random this is neither necessary, nor 
preferable, as to choose cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent 
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theory may be more suitable. In the event efforts to do both were taken for 
reasons that will be explained below. 
There were several problems with using the WIRS90 data which need to 
be highlighted as they provide possible limitations to a representative study of 
PRP. Firstly, the data did not pick up any longitudinal effects (i. e. it is a static 
snap shot of industrial relations in 1990). Unlike some of the other questions in 
the WIRS series, the merit pay question was included for the first time in the 1990 
questionnaire so could not be compared with the previous two sets of data 
(surveys carried out in 1980 & 1984). Secondly, the data did not indicate the 
success or failure of these types of scheme. Consequently, nothing was known 
about why they succeed or fail, even though it has been shown in many of the 
previous studies of PRP that these schemes are constantly tinkered with or even 
completely altered in the hope of improvement. Nor did the surveys have 
anything to say about those companies that have ceased to use PRP or were still 
considering its introduction. Thus, 'why' questions could not be asked. Thirdly, 
the data could not tell anything about the changing nature of PRP schemes. For 
example was there a move towards group determined schemes? Was the growth 
of PRP in traditional areas or was it related to restructuring of companies in other 
industrial sectors? Finally, the merit pay question was the last part of a three part 
follow-on question which may have been confusing for some respondents who 
may have replied to one section to the detriment of others. There was some 
indication from the base figures that this did happen. Limitations aside, the WIRS 
data base was a huge source of unique material. It therefore made a valuable 
source. 
In the light of the above, four possible research methods for proceeding 
with the choice of type of company were identified. These were based on the 
cross tabulations carried out with data on merit pay and the one digit SIC' codes 
(cross tabulations against four digit codes were carried out later): 
1 Standard industrial codes (SIC) begin with one digit codes that highlight the main industrial 
sectors. They then break- down into smaller industrial classifications using 2,3 and 4 digit codes. 
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1. Column figures which show the total numbers and percentages of companies 
in the survey which had a PRP scheme for at least some proportion of their 
employees were used. It was then decided in which areas PRP is concentrated 
in both at the one and four digit SIC levels. 
2. Row figures which gave an indication of how widespread the use of PRP is 
within particular industries and sectors were. Again, it was decided which 
areas PRP is concentrated in at the one and four digit levels. 
3. Steps I or 2 were carried out, this time use the two instead of the four digit 
level. This method may have been more appropriate if the total numbers in 
each of the four digit sectors were small. 
4. Some combination of the above was used to suit the particular factors of the 
research in order to address some of the above problems. 
5. 
The following sections look at some of the results that were found from the survey 
data and which method was considered to be the most appropriate. 
The following variables from the WIRS survey were used as the main variables. 
They were all taken from a three part question concerning incentive pay. They are 
as follows: 
KI) Are any of the employees in this establishment paid by results? 
K2) Are they paid by results as individuals, members of a group or on 
an establishment or organisational basis? 
K3) Do any employees in these groups receive merit pay or pay related 
to the assessment of individual perfon-nance? 
Each of these was a follow-on question so that if one answered positively to one, 
one carried on to the next. The respondents were also given a choice of eight 
occupational groups. This obviously gave eight variables for each question. At 
To simplify the analysis it was better to begin with single digit codes then proceed to examine 
significant results in more detail. All figures refer to 1993 Standard Industrial classifications. 
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first, a new variable was created from combining each occupational variable from 
K3 and each occupational variable from those who replied to the individual part of 
question K2. This method was advised by the authors of the 'Workplace 
Industrial Relations In Transition' to give a more accurate picture of the extent of 
PRP, given that some respondents answered K2 and then did not bother to answer 
K3. The authors argue that because the merit pay question was asked last, there is 
some doubt that the results fully reflect the extent of PRP (Millward et al. 1992). 
Eight occupational variables which were labelled PRI to PR 8 were thus 
produced. After working with these variables it was found that the results were 
extremely difficult to summarise. Some of the results seemed to be distorted by 
those who were paid by results as individuals, (i. e. K2) and these people were 
more likely to be employees paid via piecework. It was thus decided that because 
an overall picture of PRP was required the eight occupational variables from K3 
needed to be combined. This then gave one 'merit' variable which could then be 
used to examine the relationship of those establishments with PRP and those 
without. This would also cut out most of the distorting factors of individual 
payment by results, although small distortion may still remain. 
The fact that the WIRS90 data included a question on PRP meant that 
analysis could be carried out to examine the main characteristics of PRP 
establishments to ascertain whether any of the factors indicated in Chapter Two 
were identifiable. This, it was felt, would aid the picture of the organisation of 
PRP, allowing a combination of the data from this and subsequent stages of the 
research. From the analysis, only those results which were highly significant to a 
minimum of the 1% level were used. In terms of the characteristics, a wide 
picture of PRP establishments was built up and then gradually as the research 
progressed, some of the main elements identified in Chapter Two were focused 
on. These were then utilised to form the first part of Chapter Four, describing the 
characteristics of PRP. 
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3.1.2 Identifying the panel companies 
The second stage included identification of the industrial sectors from 
which to chose the companies and the case studies of a panel of 16 companies. It 
was found from the WIRS90 data that over 75% of those companies which used 
PRP for at least some proportion of their employees were concentrated within four 
of the one digit SIC sectors (see Table 3). 
TABLE 3.0: PRP by industrial sector 
sic 
Code 
Industrial sector 
Number of 
establishments with 
PRP 
% of total 
establishments with 
PRP 
4 Other Manufacturing 75 11 
6 Distribution 170 25 
8 Banking / Finance 159 23 
9 Other services 112 17 
However, these figures were representative of the companies which took 
part in the survey that had answered yes to the merit question. They were not 
representative of whether or not PRP was prominent within particular industries / 
sectors or the economy as a whole. In order to do this, row figures needed to be 
examined. 
Another test which also needed to be applied to both sets of figures was to 
work out the standard errors for each sector and then to apply the ±2x standard 
error rule to be confident of the range within which the true figures lay. It could 
then be said that the figures were truly representative. The results are shown in 
Table 3.1. The standard error rule made little difference to -the column 
figures, but 
for the row figures the top four prominent sectors changed from those of Table 
3.0. 
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TABLE 3.1: PRP bv two di2it SIC 
Sic Division PRP Standard Range PRP Standard Range 
Row % error N Column % error N 
1.00 ENERGY 27 0.1018 7-47 0.7 0.0032 . 1-1.3 
2.00 42 0.0691 28-56 3 0.0068 2-4 
EXTRACTION 
OF MINERALS 
3.00 METAL 46 0.0411 38-54 10 0.0115 8-12 
GOODS 
4.00 OTHER 40 0.0357 33-47 11 0.0120 9-13 
MANF. 
5.00 40 0.0573 29-51 4 0.0075 3-5 
CONSTRUCTION 
6.00 50 0.0272 45-55 25 0.0166 22-27 
DISTRIBUTION 
7.00 38 0.0482 28-48 6 0.0091 4-8 
TRANSPORT 
8.00 BANKING 67 0.0305 61-73 23 0.0162 20-26 
9.00 OTHER 23 0.0192 19-27 17 0.0144 14-20 
SERVICES 
* tivo standard errors 
Throughout the tests, two sectors remained dominant in terms of PRP 
being a majority pay system. These were Banking and Finance and Distribution. 
A third sector - other manufacturing - also appeared in both sets of tests. 
However, although PRP was prominent, it was present in less than 50% of the 
sector. This left one sector in each set of tests that was different from the other. 
VAien using the column figures (Table 3.1), other services ranked third in terms of 
the sector with the most respondents with a 'yes' for PRP. But in tenns of 
representativeness within this sector as a whole, however, PRP was only present in 
a minimum of 19% of establishments. On the other hand PRP was present within 
a minimum of 38% companies within the metal goods sector. This left two sets of 
four industrial sectors depending on which set of figures were used: 
1) Column Banking/Finance, Distribution, Other services, and Other 
manufacturing. 
2) Row Banking/Finance, Distribution, Metal goods, and Other 
manufacturing. 
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Taking this into account, it was decided to use all five sectors in the first 
stage. It is worth noting at this point that the research is primarily about the 
organisation and effects of PRP and not necessarily about the differences between 
PRP and other payment schemes. It is for this reason that the companies chosen 
for the panel survey were primarily in those areas where PRP is prominent. Even 
so, it was also seen to be important to look at those companies which had 
introduced PRP despite the fact it was not a prominent part of their particular 
industry. The decision to include other services was taken on this basis, as it is a 
sector where PRP is increasingly being introduced, largely due to the influence of 
government policy which is fiercely promoting the idea of PRP. 
The second stage was now to apply the standard errors to each of the four 
digit industries within each of the five one digit sectors. This was important in 
order to reduce and identify the type of companies to be approached concerning 
the qualitative analysis. This was not an ideal exercise as most industrial sectors 
in the survey had only small numbers of companies (most did not comprise 30 
companies - the usual minimum applied). Due to these small numbers, it was 
decided that the test would be applied at the two digit level but the results from 
these tests were at best no more successful and in some cases less successful than 
the four digit ones. It was thus decided to stick with the results at the four digit 
level. 
3.1.3 Matching companies to the four digit industries 
Table 3.2 shows all those four digit industries which have PRP in at least a 
minimum range of 50% of their establishments according to the survey data. We 
now had 17 four digit industries from which to select the panel companies. Before 
we could proceed, however, to the next stage, we needed to have a list of 
companies from which to chose. 
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TABLE 3.2: Four dii! it SICs with a maioritv of PRP establishments 
Four Digit 
sic 
Row 
percentage 
Standard 
error 
minimum 
range 
3251 100 
3410 100 - 
4671 71 0.1000 50 
4751 82 0.1568 50 
6120 84 0.1222 60 
6149 100 - - 
6180 100 - - 
6430 73 0.1146 50 
6710 94 0.0659 81 
8140 92 0.0339 86 
8150 100 - - 
8350 80 0.1332 54 
8394 80 0.0900 62 
8396 100 - - 
9111 73 0.0839 57 
9150 89 0.1043 69 
9400 85 0.1597 54 
* two standard errors. 
A list was created with the assistance of the Industrial Relations Review 
and Report (IRRR) from 1990 to 1993. This list (comprising over 200 companies 
which were reported by IRRR to be utilising a PRP system) was created showing 
the year and edition in which the report appeared and incorporating the company 
SIC codes. This meant that companies could be matched to the four digit codes in 
Table 3.2. This left only six of the industry codes without matched companies. 
To overcome this deficiency, it was decided that companies should be identified 
by their four digit codes via CD ROM data bases such as 'FAME' or 'Who Owns 
Whom' and then to see if they could be matched with any of those companies 
which had been reported to have PRP from other studies or surveys. In the event, 
the problem was rectified by searching F. A. M. E. for companies in these industries 
that were based in either the East or West Midlands. Small groups were identified 
in each industry and these companies were then contacted by telephone in order to 
establish whether they had PRP schemes, and ultimately, whether or not they 
would be prepared to take part in the survey. This now meant that companies 
were identified for all sections of the survey. 
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The original proposal was to choose 15 companies for the panel survey on 
the basis of their representativeness within the WIRS90 data. Due to the changing 
nature of PRP over the 1980s and 1990s mentioned in the introduction it was 
decided that only 10 of the companies should be used to represent the findings 
from the data set and that the remaining five should be used to address the 
problems identified with the data and the changing nature of PRP. The following 
are questions that were left unanswered by the WIRS data and which are not 
addressed by previous research. Therefore, it was proposed that the final five 
would be selected from the authors knowledge of companies that had been using 
or introducing PRP, matching them as far as possible to some of the factors below: 
1. companies where PRP had failed or had caused extreme difficulties, 
2. companies where PRP was being considered for the first time or was in the 
process of introduction, 
3. companies where the nature of the scheme had changed over a period of time. 
Related to this was: 
4. companies where PRP had historically been a part of the company's pay 
policy, 
5. companies which had experienced an appraisal system but had never used 
PRP, 
6. companies who had recently made, or who were in the process of making the 
transition from public to private sector status, 
7. areas in the public sector where the use of PRP had traditionally never been 
considered due to the past nature of their industrial relations but which were 
now doing so, 
8. companies that had made a conscious effort to introduce HRM/TQM 
techniques and with them PRP, 
9. companies that now had introduced PRP for its manual employees as well as 
its non-manual employees, 
10. companies that had restructured, due to intense competition over the period of 
the 1980s and 1990s, 
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11. companies that used PRP to get rid of trade unions and, at the other end of the 
scale, those that actually accommodate trade union views and 
12. multinational companies that may have used PRP as a means of controlling 
management in different plants (i. e. tying objectives to their pay in order to 
make sure that centralised policies are adhered to). 
None of these areas were necessarily mutually exclusive and, although 
some of the companies in the first 10 may well have had some of these attributes, 
these are important areas which need addressing in their own right. Further, these 
were just some examples of the types of companies which could be approached to 
make up the final five panel companies. They were, of course, only companies or 
areas which had been identifiable from other reports. 
The 16 case studies involved interviewing senior managers at several 
levels in the organisations where appropriate. They also involved interviewing 
managers in different job functions to gain an idea of the interaction of policy and 
strategic issues and the ways in which they impacted on pay. Altogether, over 60 
managers, and where possible workplace representatives, were interviewed using a 
semi-structured questionnaire which allowed some probing within a systematic 
framework. Some managers were interviewed on more than one occasion thus 
giving the approach a longitudinal aspect over the period 1994 to 1997. The case 
studies took place in many regions of the country stretching from Southampton to 
Edinburgh. 
3.1.4 The four ethnographic case studies 
The third stage involved in-depth case study work, including an ethnographic 
approach to each of four organisations chosen from the original 16. Two to three 
weeks were spent in each organisation, observing how employees worked and 
how the various factors involved with the PRP schemes interacted with their daily 
work. In all cases, free access was given to interview people as and when 
required. The only exception was in those positions where it was difficult for 
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employees to leave their posts. In these cases, interviews were pre-arranged but 
employee selection was still possible. 
Again, interviews were structured on the basis of semi-structured 
questionnaires so as to maintain some consistency. Combined with the fon-nal 
interviews, employees were also interacted with on a daily basis allowing more 
detailed analysis of certain factors as they appeared. 
The amount of case study work undertaken for this research meant that a 
great deal of time and access from companies was required. Given that almost all 
of them were undergoing rapid bouts of restructuring, further access for the 
ethnographic case study work was seen as a large burden by many. Hence, the 
choice of the four case study companies for the next stage was bounded by this 
constraint. Nonetheless, an effort was made to make the companies as 
representative of certain issues as possible. Firstly, companies from different 
industrial sectors and different types of occupation were chosen. Secondly, the 
nature and growth of performance management was examined as this was seen by 
many organisations as the way to be moving forward. Thirdly, a blue collar 
scheme and one with trade union involvement were included in the investigation. 
Some companies pulled out of the research on more than one occasion due 
to restructuring, only to rejoin at a later date. Fortunately, therefore, all the above 
issues were eventually covered. Three of the companies had introduced 
performance management systems (Bank Co, Retail Co and Public agency). Yet, 
in different ways, this allowed an insight into their different facets. Further, 
Engineering Co had both a blue collar scheme and one in which the unions' 
influence was very strong when compared with other companies. In a preliminary 
interview, management indicated a wish to integrate this group with the main 
management performance management scheme at some stage in the near future. 
Thus, the key objective of the four case study chapters is to look at four of 
the schemes in detail using ethnographic case studies. The research for the 
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chapters took place between 1994 and 1997 although the main ethnographic 
elements were undertaken in 1997. This meant that although the study did not set 
out with a longitudinal perspective, it managed to chart some of the effects of 
change over the period. 
As well as staff interviews, written documentation concerning the schemes 
and the organisations under study was also utilised. This was also complemented 
by a review of past literature on each organisation from academic, practitioner and 
newspaper sources so as to construct a complete picture of a history and many 
pressures acting upon the organisations. Triangulation with archival and 
newspaper data was an important and useful method, confirming the reliability 
and accuracy of the interview information (Yin 1994). In both institutions, the 
access obtained was considerable, with many days spent in visiting premises in 
different regions, attending company meetings and inter-viewing people chosen at 
random. 
Table 3.3: Case study details 
Company Locations visited Total No. of employees 
interviewed 
Bank Co. Leicester 
London 40 
Nottingham 
Retail Co. Altrincham 
Beeston 
Coventry 80 
Nottingham 
Smethwick 
Stourbridge 
Engineering Co. Beeston 30 
Nottingham 
Agency Co Altrincham 
Macclesfield 50 
Sheffield 
Stratford on Avon 
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During stages one and two all, of the case study companies allowed me 
access to written materials and data concerned with the schemes. Although some 
data on costs and distribution were used in the analysis, there was insufficient 
time, nor was it the purpose, to examine pay and performance data in detail. Only 
when one understands the complex processes involved with the schemes can data 
be integrated and understood. Therefore, whilst it is now thought that it is 
imperative to investigate the link between pay and performance using any data 
available, this should form the next stage of any research into the subject area. 
Finally, preliminary findings from the second stage of the research and 
then later a draft of the case studies were sent to the companies who gave oral 
feedback that helped to clarify some data and validate the information and its 
accuracy; thus enhancing construct validity of the case study, as Yin (1989) 
argues, by respondent validation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ORGANISATION OF PERFORMANCE RELATED PAY 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter sets the context of a detailed study of PRP by: 
looking at the overall patterns of PRP usage, and 
examining the nature of the schemes in 16 case study companies. 
It will carry this out by firstly examining the WIRS90 data and secondly 
examining the main characteristics of the 16 schemes. 
First, it aims to identify the characteristics of those establishments with 
PRP and whether there are in fact any significant differences between the average 
PRP establishment and average non-PRP establishment. While doing so, it is also 
considered important to attempt an examination of whether any characteristics are 
evident which confirm or refute any of the factors mentioned in Chapter Two. Let 
me stress that this section is not aiming to explain the use of PRP but is rather 
looking at patterns (i. e., seeing whether PRP is linked to organisations with 
competitive product markets, undergoing change, changing industrial relations 
systems and so forth). For example, Kessler (1995) argues that although change 
to pay systems is nothing new, what is novel is the use of PRP in conjunction with 
other HRM techniques to support the process of organisational transformation is 
innovative. More particularly, it is said to be part of a strategic approach to the 
management of employees - performance management - linking their jobs and 
performance to the main goals and objectives of the organisation (Storey and 
Sisson 1993). Does PRP lead to high performance/high profitability or is it 
actually the poor performers who utilise PRP in the hope that it may improve their 
position? Does this mean changing the relationships of collective bargaining, 
consultation and communication? Are establishments individualising their 
relationships with employees, ridding themselves of unions and using more 
sophisticated models of internal communication or are companies merely moving 
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back to a unitary kind of relationship? Further, if, as Baldamus (1961) implies, 
organisations need to change administration processes to gain a change in the 
effort bargain are there differences between establishments? Finally, products and 
markets are reported to have a significant role in the type of control strategies 
utilised by organisations (Edwards 1986). If this is the case, are there any 
identifiable differences? 
If organisations are truly experiencing problems with the re-negotiation of 
control and the effort bargain, then in line with contingency theory, it should be 
possible to note certain characteristics which differ between those organisations 
with PRP and those without. However, in line with the non-deterministic element 
of contingency theory, one should also be able to note some distinct differences 
between the case study organisations and PRP schemes. Thus, the aim of the 
second part of the chapter is to examine the organisation of the PRP schemes in 
each of the case study companies and the circumstances under which they have 
been introduced or developed. The emphasis is on highlighting that they are very 
much related to each organisation socially and historically and are therefore 
bounded by the organisation. This means that, in contrast to what the prescriptive 
literature on PRP would have one believe, the outcomes of the schemes are very 
different despite their similarity on paper. 
4.1 PRP schemes Part 1: WIRS. the main features of PRP 
No clear picture has been arrived at as yet in tenns of the characteristics of 
the type of company which utilises PRP. In order to aid the image of the 
'organisation' of PRP, it was felt worthwhile to attempt to construct one from data 
available in the last Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS90). In 
addressing these questions, one is not looking for a detailed analysis. Not 
ignoring the fact that companies and the processes within them are extremely 
complex, a 'snap shot' of any distinctive features of PRP and non-PRP (NPRP) 
establishments is required. As such, the chapter only includes those parts of the 
96 
analysis where the results were highly significant, to a minimum of the one per 
centlevel. 
4.1.1 Background- characteristics 
From the outset there are clearly identifiable features for those 
establishments with PRP. As mentioned in the previous chapter, PRP is 
concentrated within certain industrial sectors. Moreover, of those establishments 
with PRP, three-quarters are located in the Limited Company trading sector and 
just under a fifth are in the public sector. PRP seems to be concentrated within 
large multi-establishment organisations in that schemes are much more likely to 
be present in those establishments which are part of a group rather than single 
establishments. Furthermore two-thirds of these are MNCs and although the 
majority in the survey are UK-owned, PRP is much more likely to be present in 
foreign owned MNCs. It is more difficult to say anything about the total numbers 
of employees affected by these schemes, yet it is known that four-fifths of those 
establishments with 1,000-plus employees have PRP, while at the other end of the 
scale, only a third of those with 25 to 50 employees have PRP. This indicates that 
the probability of PRP being present is related to the size of the organisation. 
Table 4.1: Occupational group by PRP 
Occupation Percentage paid by PRP 
Unskilled manual 10 
Semi - Skilled manual 16 
Skilled manual 22 
Clerical/Admin. /secretarial 31 
Supervisors 32 
Junior technical/professional 29 
Senior technical/professional 31 
Middle/seni6r managers 40 
Base: all establishments with five or more employees, N=2,061 
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Table 4.1 shows the percentages of each occupational group paid by PRP, 
confirming the likelihood of PRP being related to hierarchy within these 
establishments. Thus confirming the view that PRP may be part of a wider 
package. 
As Table 4.2 highlights, PRP establishments are also, in all cases, more 
likely to operate a variety of rewards schemes than NPRP. 
Table 4.2: T 
. ype of reward schemes used 
PRP 
N 
NPRP 
N 
Profit related or bonus 54 32 
Deferred profit share 15 5 
SAYE share option 31 19 
Discretionary/executive share option 25 12 
Other types of share ownership 10 4 
Base: All establishments trorn trading sector, N=1,222. 
If any of the factors hinted at in Chapter Two are present within PRP 
establishments which call for a new type of pay system, then one should be able to 
highlight them from an investigation of the WIRS data. For example, one might 
expect the organisation to be in a highly competitive product market and in 
reaction to this, be undergoing a certain amount of restructuring in order to gain an 
amount of competitive advantage. One might also expect their system of 
employee relations to change from one based on traditional industrial relations 
towards an HRM approach. This may mean that the organisation also has to 
transform its administration systems. Finally, would this show up as an 
improvement in performance? All these factors are examined below. 
4.1.2 Products and markets 
As was mentioned in the introduction to the chapter, products and markets 
are likely to play a large role in the type of control strategies utilised by the 
organisation. This is already indicated by the fact that PRP is'concentrated within 
particular industrial sectors. The WIRS data set also allows an examination of the 
98 
nature of product/market in which the establishment is located. It highlights that 
establishments with PRP are more likely to be in a sector with many competitors. 
This fits with the hypothesis that the competitive environment and restructuring of 
the 1980s and 1990s may have led to a search for new structures and work 
methods, and consequently, a search for new forms of control among which PRP 
may have seemed very attractive. Further questions are posed to test this 
proposition. Those establishments with PRP schemes are far more likely than 
those without PRP to say that their contribution to total UK sales is less than five 
per cent. They were also more likely than NPRP establishments to say that over 
the past 12 months, the value of sales of the main product or services of the 
establishment has been rising although they are also more likely to say that the 
value was unstable over the same period. 
Establishments were asked whether they produced a single product or 
service or different products and services. Two-thirds of establishments with PRP 
said that they produced different products and services compared with only half of 
those without PRP. 
Single product or service 
Furthermore, NPRP establishments were more likely to say that the 
majority of their products or services was not sold to another part of the 
organisation if they produced a single product or service. In terms of customers, 
where the establishment produced a single product and the majority of its products 
or service was not sold to another part of the organisation, the proportion of total 
annual goods supplied to the establishment's largest customer showed in general a 
linear relationship in that more and more establishments sold a declining 
percentage of goods to any one customer. It also showed that those establishments 
with PRP schemes were significantly more likely to supply less than one per cent 
of goods to the largest customer. 
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If the establishment produced a single product or service which accounted 
for over a quarter of total sales revenue, then PRP establishments were less likely 
than NPRP to have many competitors but far more likely to dominate the market. 
Different products or service 
If the establishment produced different products or services, then those 
establishments with PRP were more likely to say that the main product or service 
was not sold to another part of the organisation. 
In terms of customers, a similar picture emerged with those establishments 
where there were different products and services to those with a single product. 
This time the figure for those companies with PRP increased when it was over 
75% of the product, thus giving a picture of PRP companies with either many 
customers or dominating the market at the other end of the scale. 
Where the establishment produced different products and services but the 
main one accounted for more than a quarter of total sales revenue, it was more 
likely that those establishments with PRP would say that less than one percent of 
the total annual value of goods and services was supplied to the establishment's 
largest customer. If, on the other hand, the main product and service did not 
account for at least a quarter of total sales revenue, then those establishments with 
PRP were less likely to say that less than one percent was sold to the largest 
customer. 
This trend was also confin-ned by a question which asked the 
establishments whether their market was dominated by their organisations, 
whether they had a few competitors or whether they had many competitors. With 
those establishments which had a main product or service which accounted for 
more than a quarter of total sales revenue, then PRP was much more likely than 
NPRP to be in the 'many' or in the 'dominate' section. With the second category, 
that is, those whose main product or service accounted for less than a quarter of 
total sales revenue, PRP was much less likely to be in the 'many' but the number 
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in the 'dominate' section increased significantly. It would seem that the greater 
the variety of products, with total value to the company shared out more equally 
between products, then the more likely it was that the establishment would sell a 
high percentage to the largest customer. 
To gauge responsiveness of the product or service to changes in market 
prices, establishments were asked if there were price increases of five per cent 
whilst their competitors' prices remained the same and how much of a demand fall 
this would lead to? Of PRP establishments, 65% said more than 10% (NPRP 
32%). NPRP were more likely to say less than 10%. This might suggest that the 
types of companies being considered are mainly in highly competitive sector or 
based on a dominant product with competition between an organisation's 
establishments. 
4.1.3 Organisational transformation 
In line with the argument that the competitive environment and 
restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s may have caused changes both in working 
practices and to the structure or organisation of companies, those establishments 
with PRP were more likely to have introduced changes in working practices that 
reduced job demarcation or increased flexibility during the last three years (48% 
compared with 34% for NPRP). Yet these changes in working practices were not 
aimed at all of the employees within the establishment. Although only a small 
minority of establishments said that all employees were affected, those 
establishments with PRP were twice as likely to be among this section than NPRP 
establishments. Of those establishments who were only changing working 
practices for some employees, this was happening particularly within the white- 
collar sectors of the company with the clerical/administrative and 
supervisory/foreman groups being of a significant nature - both of these groups 
were more. likely to be in establishments with PRP. Forty percent of 
establishments with PRP also complained that a lack of skills among the 
workforce was limiting the way in which management could organise work. The 
corresponding figure for NPRP was 20%. 
101 
Establishments were asked 'whether during the past three years there had 
been any of the following types of change directly affecting the jobs or working 
practices of any section or sections of the non-manual workforce'? The response 
were as follows: 
Table 4.3 Any of the following jyPes of change- 
PRP NPRP 
A) The introduction of new machinery or equipment 68% 49% 
B) Substantial changes in work organisation or practices, not 
involving new machinery or equipment 
48% 34% 
Base: All establishments, N= 2061 
In both cases, establishments with PRP were more likely to have 
experienced such change but more so with respect to new machinery or 
equipment. They were asked whether, with any of the two changes labelled A or 
B, discussions or consultations xyere held with any of the following about the 
introduction of change or the way it was implemented: Individuals; groups; joint 
consultative committees; specially constituted committees; trade unions; or 
outside union officials? Both groups were more likely to discuss these issues with 
individuals rather than groups but the establishments with no PRP scheme had a 
higher propensity than those with PRP. This was also the case for specially 
constituted committees. 
Table 4.4: How are A and B introduced? 
PRP NPRP 
A a Negotiated with trade union reps and dependent upon their 5 11 
agreement 
0 Management still free to make the decision 74 53 
0 Not discussed with trade union 12 31 
B 0 Negotiated with trade union reps and dependent upon their 13 11 
agreement 
* Management still free to make the decision 66 69 
,b Not discussed with trade union 10 20 
Base: All establishments experiencing changes in working practices, N= 1582 100% 
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Surprisingly, and against the picture of PRP as a means of individualising 
the employment relationship, PRP establishments were more likely to discuss 
issues with a joint consultative committee or hold meetings with groups of 
workers. However despite the picture above management felt that they retained 
the power to make decisions unilaterally. Table 4.4 highlights this clearly. 
4.1.4 Employment practices 
Those establishments whose respondents said that there had been 
reductions in the number of employees in the last 12 months were asked what had 
been the main reasons for them. Those with PRP were much more likely to have 
made these reductions due to automation/mechanisation/new equipment: 56% of 
PRP said that redeployment had been used to reduce a section or sections of the 
workforce. The figure for NPRP was only 35%. 
Where compulsory redundancies applied during the last 12 months the 
basis of selection in PRP establishments was much more to do with monitoring 
performance than NPRP. For example, just under a third of PRP used 
disciplinary/attendance records as the basis for selection as opposed to just 10% of 
NPRP. Similarly, just over two-thirds used bad performance records while for 
NPRP, the figure was only 16%. 
Where people had been employed, it was again significant that 
establishments with PRP were much more likely to take on white-collar and 
professional staff, while NPRP were much more likely to take on unskilled 
manuals. 
Table 4.5: Which categories of employees were recently employed? 
EmPloyment category PRP 
N 
NPRP 
(%) 
Unskilled manual worker 38 52 
Clerical/Admin. /Secretarial 69 45 
Senior tech. or professional 30 21 
Base: all establishments recruiting in last 12 months, N= 1916 
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PRP establishment are also much more likely to have taken on freelance 
workers over the past 12 months and to have employed staff working on the basis 
of fixed short ten-n contracts for 12 months or less 
Table 4.6: Are any of the following services carried out for you by another 
company? 
Service 'No outside 
employees' 
'Within the 
organisation' 
'Not within the 
organisation' 
PRP NPRP PRP NPRP PRP NPRP 
Cleaning 33 55 4 9 52 30 
Security 57 72 6 6 28 14 
Catering 67 70 3 10 21 13 
Building Maintenance 24 25 11 27 46 32 
Printing 62 62 12 12 14 12 
Payroll 56 45 30 42 7 6 
Transport of do cuments/goods 39 43 11 25 37 20 
Base: all establishments where a service carried out, N=1,871. 
Table 4.6 shows that PRP establishments were less likely then NPRP to 
have any of these services carried out by people who were not employees of the 
establishment, except for payroll issues. It also shows that where the services 
were carried out, they were more likely to be provided from outside the 
organisation (i. e. by another related establishment). 
When asked whether management gave employees or their representatives 
any information before the implementation of change, 60% said that they gave 
information about staffing or manpower plans. Of these, PRP establishments were 
more likely to say that they gave 'a lot' while NPRP were more likely to say 'a 
little'. Three-quarters said that they consulted staff over changes to work methods 
or work organisation but establishments with PRP were less likely than NPRP to 
consult over such matters. 
Other types of information given to employees or their representatives 
concemed intemal investment plans and the financial position of the whole 
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organisation of which the establishment was a part. With the former, 
establishments with PRP were more likely to give 'a lot' of information while non 
PRP were more likely to give 'non'. With the latter, however, NPRP were more 
likely to say that they gave 'a lot' of information while those establishments with 
PRP were more likely to give only 'a little' information or 'none' at all. Thus, it 
would seem that establishments with PRP were much more likely to give out 
information, albeit on a selective basis, but much less likely to consult with 
employees than did establishments without PRP schemes. 
4.1.5 From industrial relations to human resource management? 
To find out whether there was a changing relationship from industrial 
relations to HRM, various avenues were investigated, including an examination of 
the relationship between unions and their members, the state of collective 
bargaining arrangements, fon-nal procedures and consultation and communication 
networks. 
Union membership and recognition 
This can be examined further by looking at the relationship with unions. 
Despite the fact that establishments with PRP were more likely to have no union 
members, they were still more likely to recognise a union, especially a non- 
manual union. PRP establishments were more likely to say that there had been a 
request for recognition by non-manual unions or members. It would thus seem 
that establishments with PRP were more likely to have seen a growth in non- 
manual membership and recognition, leaving questions about whether PRP was 
leading workers to seek protection or whether it was just the nature of the type of 
restructuring which may have been happening within the establishment (i. e. white 
collar restructuring). 
Guest (1995) argues that an examination of establishments with greater 
than 50 employees in the WIRS90 data highlights that the presence of unions in 
the establishment was associated with less use of PRP. The analysis here of all 
establishments revealed that NPRP establishments were more likely to have a 
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combination of manual and non-manual members, but establishments with PRP 
were more likely to have either only manual members or only non-manual 
members. Those establishments without PRP schemes were more likely to have 
experienced a decrease in the number of trade unions or staff associations over the 
last three years. This does not fit with a picture of establishments attempting to rid 
themselves of unions through the use of PRP. 
In tenns of negotiating groups 60% of establishments with PRP had fewer 
negotiating groups than three years ago, but more PRP establishments (40%) said 
100% of their employees were covered by the largest negotiating group, 
(compared with 32% for NPRP). The companies were also asked about the 
presence of stewards or representatives. Seventy per cent of PRP establishments 
with unions made up of only manual members said they had stewards or 
representatives while this was the case for 58% of NPRP. Again, for unions with 
non-manual members only, PRP (69%) were more likely to have representatives, 
compared with 53% of NPRP. Also, where there was union membership at the 
establishment, those NPRP establishments were more likely to be represented by a 
steward or a representative from outside the establishment. Thus, this suggests 
that PRP establishments have much better internal representative structures than 
NPRP. This looks more like establishments -%vho were attempting to change the 
pattern of negotiations rather than to rid themselves of unions completely. 
Where no unions were present, PRP establishments were also more likely 
to have non-union representatives (excluding safety officers) within the 
establishment, especially for non-manual workers. While this may be significant 
because PRP is prevalent for non-manual workers, it may also indicate that PRP 
establishments are more likely to have local non-union structures for white-collar 
workers. 
Collective bargaining 
For the purposes of collective bargaining, of establishments which 
recognised trade unions, those with PRP were more likely to have a written 
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agreement for non-manual workers (not significant for manuals). Only a quarter 
of establishments had attempted to alter these bargaining arrangements but 
establishments with PRP were more likely to be among these. Only five per cent 
of establishments had attempted to change bargaining in the direction of fewer 
trade unions although there was a slight tendency for this to be more common 
among establishments with PRP. This would bring into question the argument 
that PRP is being used directly to get rid of trade unions, and instead support that 
it has the effect of marginalising them, intentionally or not. This is further 
confirmed by the fact that only 10% of establishments had made moves towards 
creating fewer negotiating groups. Yet, again, this was significantly more likely 
to happen in establishments with PRP. In addition, of the 14% who said that they 
made checks to see if those they were hiring were trade union members, PRP 
establishments were much more likely to be in this group. Thus, companies with 
PRP seemed to be making changes to their bargaining arrangements in the 
direction of single-table bargaining yet not necessarily attempting to rid 
themselves of unions altogether. It would also seem that they were attempting to 
monitor who union members were which may indicate a closer monitoring of 
individuals. 
Those establishments with negotiating groups were asked: 'at which levels 
did negotiations which formed the basis or directly resulted in the most recent pay 
increase take place with unionsT For manual workers, although the majority of 
both PRP and NPRP establishments said that either 'national' or 'industry' level 
was most important, those companies with PRP were less likely to say this was 
the case. For non-manual workers, the levels at which collective bargaining takes 
place became more pronounced than for manual workers. Those establishments 
with no PRP schemes were much more likely to negotiate at 'national' or 
'industry' level (70%) whereas those establishments with PRP schemes were 
much more. likely to negotiate at the 'overall organisational' level for all 
establishments. Not surprisingly, the 'establishment' level was more likely to be 
important for those companies with PRP than for those without. 
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Where the 'establishment' was the most important level for the most recent 
pay settlement, establishments with PRP were much more likely to consult with 
management 'here and at higher levels' (70%) in the organisation before the start 
of negotiations with trade unions than those without PRP (37%). This was also 
the case before the final settlement was made with union representatives at the 
establishment, although the percentages were lower (PRP 53%, NPRP 29%). In 
terms of the factors which influenced the level of pay which was decided upon, 
increased cost of living, recent productivity, labour market conditions and the 
individual employee were all areas mentioned by PRP companies, whereas ability 
to pay, based on external comparison, was a factor mentioned mainly by NPRP. 
Establishments were asked whether the largest negotiating groups 
negotiate over certain issues such as working conditions, staffing levels, 
recruitment, redeployment, redundancy payments and the reorganisation of hours. 
In general, where the largest negotiating group was for manual workers, a picture 
emerged in which PRP establishments in total had a higher propensity to negotiate 
at the 'establishment' while NPRP had a higher propensity to negotiate at the level 
of 'all establishments' in the organisation. When this was broken down further, 
NPRP had a higher propensity than PRP organisations to negotiate both at the 
level of 'more than one employer' and 'all establishments' in the organisation. A 
similar picture emerged when asking at which level in the organisation the actual 
decisions were made. 
There was, however, a change with the non-manual groups of workers in 
terms of the level at which negotiations take place. Instead of industry or national 
level being prominent, the level of the 'overall organisation including all 
establishments' became the dominant level. This time, however, there were 
differences over some of the issues that were dealt with. For example, NPRP 
establishments were more likely than PRP to negotiate over working conditions, 
staffing levels, recruitment and redeployment. PRP establishment were more 
likely to negotiate over redundancy pay and the reorganisation of hours. 
108 
In order to assess the arrangements which management had over various 
issues with non-manual groups who were not part of a trade union or staff 
association, establishments were asked whether there was a committee of non- 
manual representatives which discusses with management matters affecting any 
members of the non-manual workforce not covered by agreement with recognised 
trade unions or staff associations. PRP companies were more likely to say Yes 
(68%) while NPRP more likely to say No (52%). They were then asked how are 
pay levels set for these non-manual workers. Seventy-one per cent of PRP 
companies said higher in the organisation compared with 48% of NPRP. When 
asked whether they were set by some other body, 16% of NPRP said this was the 
case compared with none of the PRP establishments. 
The establishments were then asked: 'did management alone decide the 
pay of non-manual workers or did they consult or discuss with employees or their 
representatives before deciding on pay ratesT Seventy per cent of PRP said that 
management made decisions unilaterally, compared with 41% of NPRP. Forty per 
cent of NPRP said it was through negotiation compared with 29% of PRP. The 
establishments were then asked what factors influenced the level of pay which was 
decided on at the last occasion. Forty-three percent of PRP said that performance 
of the establishment was a factor, compared with only one per cent of a NPRP. 
Yet more surprisingly, 51% of PRP said increased cost of living was a factor, 
compared with only 28% of NPRP. Thus, dual forces of performance and cost of 
living appeared to be acting upon each other. 
Procedures and agreements 
Where there was a formal procedure for individual grievances, 37% of 
establishments with PRP said they had employees who have formally raised 
matters in the last year, compared with only 20% of NPRP. Table 4.7 highlights 
the types of grievance which were raised: 
In all issues, PRP establishments were more likely to have experienced 
employees using the procedure than NPRP, except in the area of pay which is 
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where most grievances were raised. The establishments were then asked which 
grievances were the procedures ineffective at handling. For PRP establishments, 
the main two were performance appraisal (45%, NPRP 0%) and relations between 
employees (25%, NPRP 7%). For those companies with no PRP, it was pay and 
allowances, job grading, conditions of employment and disciplinary matters. 
Table 4.7: Type of grievance raised 
PRP NPRP 
Pay and allowances 22 25 
Job grading 12 6 
Promotion 3 2 
Conditions of employment 5 2 
Performance appraisal 
- 
10 1 
Disciplinary matters T 23 21 
Base: establishments where a grievance was raised, N= 899 
Establishments were asked whether during the last year whether any of a 
list of disciplinary sanctions had been applied. Those areas where there was a 
significance showed that two-thirds of establishments with PRP said they used 
formal written warnings, compared with just over a half of NPRP. PRP were also 
more likely to use deductions from pay although this was only for a small 
minority of cases. The establishments were then asked whether during the past 
year any employees had been dismissed for reasons other than redundancy. Fifty- 
two per cent of PRP establishments said Yes, compared with 40% of NPRP. 
Consultation and communication 
One would expect that if trade unions are being marginalised and if HRM 
type policies were present, that systems for consultation and communication 
would be more common. Those establishments with PRP, however, were much 
less likely to have a committee whose primary concern was consultation. 
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Table 4.8: Most important matters discussed by JCC 
PRP 
N 
NPRP 
N 
Physical working 
conditions 
9 1 
Welfare 4 2 
Production issues 10 17 
Financial issues 5 4 
Pay 8 5 
Working practice 7 4 
Base: establishments with consultative committee, N= 934 
Those establishments which have a joint committee of management and 
employees whose primary concern is consultation were asked: 'what were the 
most important matters discussed'? It was found that production issues were more 
likely to be discussed in NPRP than in PRP, whereas PRP were more likely to 
discuss pay and working conditions type issues. Again this is in opposition to the 
portrayal of employees being integrated into the organisation as a valued element 
of production (Storey 1995). 
Besides consultative committees, there Nvere a variety of other ways in 
which management communicated with employees. As would be expected from 
the soft HRM approaches, regular meetings among work groups or teams to 
discuss aspects of performance (i. e. quality circles and so forth) were more likely 
to be present in establishments with PRP, as were regular meetings at least once a 
year between senior management and employees. Systematic use of the 
management chain for communication was used in three-quarters of those 
establishments with PRP compared with only half of NPRP establishmentsJ, thus 
resembling more of an old style unitary relationship. This is surprising in light of 
the expectation that communication would be more sophisticated in organisations 
which use HRMITQM techniques and in large organisations which are part of a 
group 
To recap, establishments with PRP were more likely to have no union 
members than NPRP establishments, yet at the same time where members were 
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present they were more likely to recognise a union. Further, there had been a 
growth of white-collar members and recognition in PRP establishments while 
NPRP had experienced a decline in unions. PRP establishments were also more 
likely to have union stewards or representatives present within the establishment, 
but fewer negotiating groups. Even so, they were more likely to have a 
collectively-bargained agreement. On a spectrum of 'national bargaining' to 
'establishment bargaining', PRP establishments were more likely to be located at 
the establishment end of the spectrum. 
Where there are no unions present PRP were also more likely to have 
representative structures, but this was accompanied by unilateral management 
decision making. PRP establishments were also more likely to have procedures in 
place and more likely to use them. Surprisingly, however, they were less likely to 
have systems for a committee whose primary concern was consultation than 
NPRP. Where they did, they were more likely to discuss pay and working 
conditions whereas NPRP where more likely to discuss production issues. This 
may be due to the fact that PRP establishments are more likely to have quality 
circles and teams which may be used for production issues. However, PRP were 
more likely to make systematic use of the management chain to communicate. 
This, again, remains more of an old form of paternalism than new HRM. this was 
also confirmed by the fact that twice as many establishments with PRP used 
suggestion schemes and they were also more likely to have a company newsletter. 
They were twice as likely to use regular surveys of employee views and, of those 
establishments who use video or film presentations, 94% also utilised a PRP 
scheme. Thus, it would seem that organisations with PRP had much more varied 
and sophisticated arrangements in place although there is some indication that 
they may have been attempting to simplify these arrangements. 
4.1.6 Administration process 
Baldamus (1961) argues that the causes of recurrent disorganisation are 
due to, on the one hand, changes to production techniques and technology, and on 
the other hand, imbalances in the distribution of effort and rewards. This means 
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that there is a possibility of an ineffective framework of controls which will be of 
strategic importance to the organisation. In order to stabilise effort levels, there 
has to be a change to the techniques of administration. For Smith (1991), this 
means a new strategy of 'cohersive autonomy' in which budgetary autonomy is 
achieved on the understanding that managers will 'manage out' a new socially- 
defined category of poor performers. While the WIRS90 data cannot confirm or 
refute these assumptions, we need to assess whether there are characteristics 
present which may signify differences in the systems of administration between 
PRP and NPRP establishments. 
It would seem that PRP companies were also more sophisticated in terms 
of being likely to have some computer facilities in place. Again, this may be a 
function of size. It may however, also signify the extent of formal networking 
, which Storey (1995) argues is essential to be in place for HRM practices. The 
table below highlights the differences in technological capacity. 
Table 4.9: What types of computer facilities did these companies have? 
Type PRP 
(%) 
NPRP 
(0/0) 
Main Frame 25 16 
Terminal link to other sitewithin organisation 68 31 
On-site mini-computer or other non-main frame 49 37 
PC operating in isolation 68 58 
PC linked to network 41 25 
Terminal linked to computer belonging to another 
organisation 
21 12 
Home link 8 3 
Bureaux services 19 8 
Base: all establishments with computer facilities, N=1,601 
Management organisation 
In terms of management organisation, PRP was more likely to be present 
in establishments where there was more than one intennediate management level. 
One explanation might be that while management may need less explicit ýqontrol, 
if viewed as the agents of the owners of the firm (Armstrong 1989), where there 
are many layers of management, there may be more of a need for systematic 
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methods of control (i. e. bureaucratic control (Edwards 1989)), to install norms of 
behaviour. 
All those establishments which were part of a multi-establishment 
organisation, but which were not headquarters, were asked whether 'they had 
contact with a manager or director at a higher level and separate establishment 
within the organisation who spends the major part of their time on personnel or IR 
matters'. PRP were more likely to say yes, although this was the case, overall, for 
only half of the PRP establishments, compared with two-thirds of NPRP. When 
asked how regular the contacts with this manager were, those establishments with 
PRP were more likely to say once per month whilst those establishments without 
PRP were more likely to say once per week, thus pointing to more autonomy for 
establishments with PRP. Of course, this result says nothing about the nature of 
the contact, making it difficult to comment on autonomy. 
Managers of establishments which were multi-establishments 
organisations had to make decisions about the appointment of new senior 
managers said these appointments would be made on the basis of a 
recommendation made at the workplace and then approved in the case of PRP 
companies by headquarters, and in the case of NPRP, by intermediate level. A 
similar representation of decision-making was apparent over the recognition or de- 
recognition of trade unions. Again, this may point to more autonomy for 
managers of establishments with PRP. When asked a similar type of question 
over the use of financial surpluses, NPRP companies were more likely to say that 
decisions could be made at the local or intermediary level, whilst PRP companies 
were more likely to say that intermediary or headquarters level authority was 
needed. Thus, budgetary control seemed more important for establishments with( 
PRP while those without PRP were more centrally controlled over other 
employee-related issues. In terms of secking external assistance over employee 
relations matters, companies with PRP were more likely than companies without 
PRP to have obtained advice from a person or body outside of the organisation. 
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4.1.7 Performance 
When asked 'how does the level of labour productivity at the 
establishment compare with what it was three years agoT, establishments with 
PRP were more likely to say that their labour productivity was 'higher' or 'a lot 
higher', compared with similar establishments, whereas those without PRP were 
more likely to say'the same'. 
Table 4.10: How does productivity compare with 3 years ago? 
PRP NPRP 
A lot higher 35 28 
High 41 36 
Same 21 31 
Low 3 4 
A lot lower 0 3 
Base: establishment replying to question, N=1,099 
When asked the same question about financial perfonnance, however, 
those establishments with PRP were more likely to say 'below average' and those 
with no PRP were more likely to say 'average' or 'above average'. This throws 
up some interesting questions which, will be discussed in later chapters, 
concerning how PRP affects company performance and vice versa. 
Further confusion is added by the fact that in terms of management 
relations, those establishments with PRP were more likely to provide a spectrum 
of views from 'good' to 'poor' while those with no PRP were more likely to say 
'very good'. One interpretation of this may be that PRP may cause poor relations 
or that PRP is a response to a poor climate. Another may be that the introduction 
of PRP is part of wider restructuring which has caused unrest at the workplace. 
Either way a picture emerges of establishments who have high productivity, but 
who feel they are struggling financially and experiencing industrial relations 
problems. 
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4.2 PRP Schemes Part 2: The case studies 
In most of the prescriptive literature, PRP is portrayed as an integrated 
system, and despite the fact that different concepts are intrinsically recognised, 
there is still a tendency to portray it as a coherent whole. Furthermore, 
consultancies are well known for attempting to sell 'off the shelf' schemes which 
are then 'tinkered' with to suit the employers needs. There has been very little 
comparative research, however, into the processes involved with PRP. In 
particular, there is little indication of how the organisational context interacts with 
the schemes or the choice of scheme (Kessler 1994). Further, there is little 
indication of what management's objectives are and whether these were in fact 
met (cf. Thompson 1992; Kessler and Purcell 1992; Kessler 1994). As Kessler 
and Purcell (1992: 19) state, 'an understanding of why a company chooses a 
particular type of PRP system must be rooted in a broader appreciation of the 
organisational and industrial relations context within which it operates'. Kessler 
and Purcell (1992) did not manage to do this wholeheartedly in their research but 
they did go some way to begin to highlight the differences that exist. Also much 
of the academic literature (e. g. French and Marsden 1997) is about evaluations, 
not the schemes themselves. In this and subsequent chapters, the thesis seeks to 
address these issues and highlights the complexities of the various schemes. 
Companies were not found to be implementing PRP as a completely new system, 
strategically thought out and well integrated, how ever much they might have 
wished to do so. PRP might be very different to previous schemes but it is still 
constrained by historical and organisational boundaries (Rubery 1997). Further, 
some existing institutional arrangements may be costly to change and may be 
taken for granted to such an extent that no one thinks of changing them (Edwards 
1990). 
4.2.1 The case study companies and their schemes 
For this stage of the research approximately 60 managers, and where 
possible, workplace representatives, were interviewed using a semi-structured 
questionnaire. Interviews were conducted with the most senior managers 
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concerned with pay and related issues such as policy and finance at different levels 
within the organisation. Documentation was also provided by the companies 
about their schemes. Some people were interviewed more than once over the 
research period, thus giving it a longitudinal aspect. 
Table 4.11 lists the 16 companies that took part in the research. It can be 
noted that a great many of them are NINCs or subsidiaries of foreign owned 
MNCs and are therefore quite large employers, thus confirming the findings from 
the WIRS90 data. 
An examination of these companies and their reward schemes highlights 
that there seemed to be no limit to the number of schemes that a company could 
use. 
Table 4.11: Case study companies 
COMPANY LINE OF BUSINESS EMPLOYEES OWNERSHIP/ STATUS 
Electric Co Manufacture of electrical 
components for the 
telecommunication industry 
503 US. Subsidiary. 
TV Co T. V. and Radio 23000 UK. MNC 
Bank Co Banking and Finance 89400 UK. MNC 
Retail Co Retail chemists 81260 UK. MNC 
Air Co Airline company 58210 UK. MNC 
Insurance Co Insurance and Finance 2870 German Subsidiary. 
IT Co Information technology/Computer 
systems 
1777 UK 
Public Agency Co Public services 36793 UK 
Health Co NHS Trust Hospital 2022 UK 
Public Co Public services 52252 UK 
Tyre Co Tyre/Exhausts 5530 UK MNC 
Building Soc. Co Building Society 10815 UK 
Car Co Car service/sales 2764 UK 
Manf, Co Manufacture and fitting of 
underwater Telecommunications 
systems 
880 French Subsidiary. 
Pharm. Co Pharmaceutical manufacture 53808 UK MNC 
Oil Co Oilproducer 2652 French Subsidiary. 
Five companies had one scheme, seven had two schemes, two had 3 
schemes and one company had five schemes. Within this eight companies 
commented that their schemes were their 'first attempt', one said that it was 
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attempting to introduce a 'real' PRP scheme for the first time. The rest had all 
changed their schemes at least once in the last five years. Initially this seemed to 
indicate that the companies, in contrast to what is suggested in the prescriptive 
literature, recognised the fact that differences may be needed to address different 
occupations. It would seem, however, that, within this broad picture there were 
certain trends that pointed against this. In particular, companies were moving 
towards a simplifying of grading structure with less grades but with wider band 
ranges. There also seemed to be a movement towards a single scheme for all 
employees (although this usually meant a different slant between the senior 
management version and that for the vast majority of employees), thus pointing to 
a narrowing of the amount of schemes any company used and a convergence of 
pay schemes within any one company. 
Table 4.12 highlights the main characteristics of each of the schemes. 
Retail Co. had two distinct divisions - manufacturing (Engineering Co, a sub- 
division of this was studied) and retail. Thus, it was treated as two separate 
companies. 
4.2.2 PRP Schemes 
From Table 4.12 overleaf it is possible to identify three broad categories of 
schemes, although in reality many contained mixed elements. First, there were 
those companies which did not really reflect PRP given a strict definition of the 
term. Instead, the vast majority of their performance related element was 
determined by profit related issues and not a evaluation of their personal 
performance through appraisal. Thus resembling more of a PBR scheme than a 
PRP one. These include Electric Co, Tyre Co and Car Co. All three 
organisations, however, insisted that their schemes were, in fact, PRP. For this 
reason, although they did not meet the criteria set out by t he definition here, they 
were included in the research in order to investigate how much they differed from 
other schemes. Second, there were companies where assessment was very much 
based on behaviours. Example included Air Co, Engineering Co, Insurance Co, 
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IT Co and Health Co. The rest were based on the principle of meeting objectives 
(e. g. performance management). 
The table highlights the finding that, despite the argument that PRP allows 
a greater propensity to differentiate between individual performance, all of the 
schemes were highly centralised in terms of both design and application. Local 
autonomy was confined to the awarding of ratings, and even in these cases, many 
managers complained that their hands were partly tied by central guidelines. For 
example, the way in which guidelines were written purposely placed all but the 
very best and the very worst performers in the 'average' category. 
Most organisations had grade bandings and there was a distinct trend 
towards wider salary ranges with many smaller incremental steps in between 
This, thus prevented staff from progressing through the salary range too rapidly. 
All of the schemes contained a minimum and maximum involving non- 
consolidated pay increases once the max. had been achieved. In the case of those 
schemes involving performance related bonuses, these were solely non- 
consolidated regardless of position in the salary range. 
Many of the older schemes contained a wide range of ratings. Once again, 
however, there was a definite trend towards the narrowing of ratings, with 
perfon-nance management schemes containing only three ratings - exceed, meet or 
fail - thus making it much more difficult to differentiate between performance. 
Hence, it would seem that that performance ratings were more about identifying 
the 'very best' or the 'very worst' performers and not about rewarding 
performance per se. An individual could perform 100% better by his her own 
standards but if he/she did not achieve the standards set by the organisation then 
they would fail. 
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Only seven of the schemes had an amount of flexibility in the way awards 
were distributed. Further, only two schemes - Retail Co and IT Co - had the 
ability to make awards at the local level. Even then, the amount of flexibility was 
within strict guidelines for the percentage range they were allowed to award or the 
overall budgets allowed for each department. Some might argue that this is not 
surprising as all pay systems work to budgetary controls. The major difference 
with PRP, however, is that it was portrayed as being about individual 
performance. Thus, individuals expected to be rewarded according to their own 
expectations and not those of the organisation. 
Despite the three broad categories, it can readily be seen then that the 
schemes were far from uniform between the companies despite the fact that most 
were described as performance management schemes. This was also the case for 
guidelines on ratings, criteria and the performance pay link. In an attempt to 
portray this visually, two diagrams were created to highlight the assessment 
criteria and the link with pay. Diagram 4.1 illustrates the diversity of performance 
assessment criteria and the ways in which they are connected with each other. It 
can best be visualised as four separate triangles with the company triangulated 
between the three main axis of the triangle, but affected by the pull of factors in 
other triangles. 
The diagram attempts to locate each company on a matrix according to the 
criteria used to appraise employees. So, for example, 'productivity' signified 
those criteria which were linked directly to measures such as sales or output, 
whereas objectives signified those criteria where targets or objectives were set for 
individuals to achieve. Armstrong (1996) argues that objectives should be clearly 
defined in quantified or output terms, thus making them very similar to 
'productivity' measures. For many jobs, however, objectives can only be 
expressed in qualitative terms. This leaves much room for interpretation and 
application. In general, however, the aim was to agree objectives in the form of 
performance standards which state that a certain aspect of the job will be done 
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well if certain criteria happen. Hence, objectives can be defined as targets, 
standards or projects to be completed. 
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On the horizontal axis, 'competences' are supposed to signify a measure of 
an individual's occupational skills and experience while 'behaviours' signify the 
kind of behaviours which employees are to display while engaged in their work. 
'Core values' reflect a largely American concept, linking a whole range of factors 
that the company believes to be its core aims and objectives. These are often 
linked to the competences or behaviours. The problem with the horizontal axis is 
that, in reality, the differences between the three factors along it could be very 
wide or a very thin dividing line. For example, competences could refer to skills 
or they might be no more than behavioural factors. Competency, like many of the 
concepts relating to PRP has become another one of the buzzwords of the 1990s. 
Armstrong (1996) argues that competitive advantage is to be gained by 
concentrating on the organisation's unique competences. For many organisations 
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the need to respond rapidly to change, a concentration on costs and the perceived 
need to develop management have made this all the more attractive. The only 
problem has been that the term is riddled with inconsistencies, with no one person 
or organisation ever agreeing on what the term itself means. Armstrong argues 
that competences represent the functional aspect while behaviours represent those 
that affect the job, but Antonacopoulou and FitzGerald (1996: p27) assert that they 
are 'virtues unique to each individual which are expressed in the process of 
interacting with others in a given social context', thus making them 'more' then a 
set of skills. 
The idea behind a competency framework is to develop an accepted 
inventory of competences so that standards can be applied to the diagnosis and 
fulfilment of development. Skills are, however, to a large extent, socially 
constructed and the way that any one person utilises a skill may be different to 
another's approach. As such competences may be more to do with attempting to 
standardise. 
"The task of detailing competences is unlikely ever to be completed, the 
movement is a manifestation of the quest for certainty in human affairs ... In 
this respect, competency based models can be viewed as an effort to exert 
a controlling and restricting influence ... In as much as the competency 
statements are compiled apart from the circumstances to which they allude, 
they carry with them an air of artificiality" (Antonacopoulou and 
FitzGerald, 1996: 32). 
Therefore they are less about perfon-nance and leaming, and more about 
measurement and accreditation. 
To look at some examples of how to use the diagram, Bank Co utilised a 
mixture of criteria based on competences and objective-setting while Pharm Co 
used competences and objective-setting related to the core values of the company. 
The diagram. is not supposed to be a scientific method of looking at the appraisal 
procedure but rather a means of visualising the diversity of methods used without 
having to go through each scheme in detail. 
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Diagram 4.2 further illustrates the diversity of means which are then used 
to relate appraisal to the pay link. Again the main purpose of the appraisal/pay 
matrix is to show the diversity of schemes. The two categories in the centre of the 
matrix signify that most of the companies have some kind of rating system and 
band ranges within their grading structure. The categories along the outside of the 
hexagon show the different methods used to link reward to the individual's 
performance. 
'Direct' refers to where there is a direct relationship between performance 
and some element of the reward package, as is the case with Tyre Co whose 
performance related element is directly related to their production via profit levels. 
'Discretion' refers to the case where managers have some element of opportunity 
to award as they see fit, but often within guidelines. 
'General' refers to those cases where there is a general cost-of-living 
increase as well as a PRP element. 'Shares' is exactly as it implies in that the 'pay 
pot' will be shared out on the basis of some pre-determined formula of so many 
shares per rating. 'Scores' refers to those schemes where an overall score is 
applied to performance and then certain amounts of pay are given to certain scores 
(e. g. Health Co). 'Levels' are where the pay bands are split into layers for the 
purpose of sharing out pay within a particular pay spine (e. g. Public Co). Each of 
the latter three have in common a preoccupation with controlling the distribution 
of pay into either a forced distribution, which implies a normal distribution of 
performance, or a ranking which largely makes the same assumption. The 
headings have been arranged around each trapezium within the diagram so as to 
allow the company to be further distinguished between the various other factors. 
For example, at Tyre Co pay is related via a mixture of a direct link to the total 
amount of sales within a branch and individual shares which are based on the 
representation of skill and hierarchy. 
127 
DIAGRAM 4.2 
Direct 
C CO 
-re Co 
Scores "ý *Car Co Share 
afth Co YublicAget qy Co 
*Air co 
*Insuance Co 
*Public Co *Reudl Co CO 
Levels Wallf. CO 
*TVCo 
*OUCO General *Building Sor. Co 
Discretion 
Another example is Air Co where ratings were scored through a complex software 
programme which then distributes them into levels which gives a percentage 
increase depending where one was located in the pay range. The two diagrams do 
not relate to each other at this stage but they do emphasise the diversity of means 
available to companies. 
4.2.3 Design of the schemes 
Just over half of the companies indicated that they used consultants in the 
design of their present schemes and although the companies did not in general 
have very positive comments about the role of consultants, this did not seem to 
stop them fr9m using them again when designing new schemes. There seemed to 
be no clear pattern emerging with regard to the use of consulta nts, despite the fact 
that many companies did not have good experiences with them. The most 
consistent criticism seemed to be that consultants attempted to push their own 
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particular schemes and did not want to customise them to suit the individual 
circumstances of the companies. 
Despite the fact that most of the companies realised that their own 
particular structures were very important, only one company said that it involved 
all of its own line management in the design of its schemes. For most companies, 
it seemed that schemes were either designed by senior managers or small working 
parties, sometimes in conjunction with consultants. 
None of the companies actually involved employees in the design of the 
schemes although five said that they had involved trade unions. This was out of a 
total of 13 which had unions present for at least some proportion of their 
employees, all of which now took part in these schemes. What this meant was 
that the companies usually first designed the type of scheme that they required and 
then offered it to the unions for comment. This usually meant that the unions 
were left negotiating about a scheme that was drawn up on management's terms. 
Kessler and Purcell (1995) argue that in a minority of cases, unions are actually 
able to take part on joint working parties and detailed negotiations to design the 
schemes. This is confirmed by this research but rather than the emphasis being on 
the positive side of this process, it was difficult for unions to do anything other 
than negotiate around the ground rules that management and consultants had 
already prepared. Unions were usually ill-prepared and received little backup 
from regional or central union headquarters. This was, thus, by no means an equal 
status relationship. The unions may be able to influence the outcomes but they 
were not taking part in working parties as equal parties to the bargain and usually 
the consultants were presented as 'third party neutrals' rather than as being in the 
employ of the company. 
4.2.4 The Role of appraisal 
All of the schemes, except those in Electric Co and Tyre Co were based on 
a fonnal appraisal (which is considered by this author to be one of the 
distinguishing features of a PRP scheme). It is therefore worth looking further at 
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the concept of appraisal before we examine why the schemes were introduced in 
the next chapter. Appraisal is important, not least because it forms a pivotal role 
in PRP in deciding how the criteria of individual perfon-nance should be set, how 
the individual meets the criteria set to measure his/her performance and therefore 
how much reward he/she should be allocated. 
As Newton and Findlay (1996) point out, our knowledge of appraisal is 
lacking for a number of reasons, not least because most descriptions of it adhere to 
a neo-human relations perspective which leads to a unitary approach to the 
subject. Where problems are recognised they are seen to be more to do with the 
conflicting role of the appraiser as both 'judge' and 'counsellor'. More recent 
definitions of appraisal from those who adhere to the performance management 
school assume that matters are much clearer now in that the whole organisation is 
included in the appraisal process and that appraisal is now based on agreement, 
expectation and development (Armstrong 1996). The focus is now squarely on 
improving perfon-nance rather than employee behaviour per se. Behaviour is more 
focused on outputs than the input of the job. These views are inadequate for a 
number of reasons, not least because they do not recognise the dynamic nature of 
the employment relationship. 
Another way of looking at appraisal is from a labour process perspective. 
A simplistic labour process explanation of appraisal would be purely to a means 
by which management forces labour to work harder. A more dynamic approach, 
however, would recognise both consent and conflict. It is argued, for example, 
that changes in work organisation which require the exercise of discretion have 
produced a particular kind of control problem for management (Townley 1989) in 
that they have to find new means of control other than direct super-vision. 
Appraisal is one of the means by which management have sought to regain control 
and there are various ways in which it can be used to do so. One is through setting 
the agenda (Townley 1993). Management legitimises the target-setting process by 
giving the impression that the targets are externally set while at other times control 
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is said to be implicit through employees setting their own targets whilst being told 
what goals are valued by the organisation. 
For the organisation access to and control of information is a crucial 
element of the appraisal scheme. Yet this introduces one of the inherent 
paradoxes of appraisal: that the information required to ensure effective work 
organisation will not be forthcoming from individuals if it is thought that this will 
jeopardise them in some way (Townley 1993). 
It is also argued that Burawoy's (1979) 'playing the game' and 'making 
out' are particularly relevant to appraisal, given its emphasis on management 
strategies aimed at eliciting a measure of voluntary compliance (e. g. appraisal can 
be seen as a process through which previously collective issues such as 
performance levels and allocating pay increases are transferred to the level of the 
employee and their super-visor). 
Performance appraisal also stimulates competition by employees ranking 
themselves against each other. Thus, it may be less to do with performance 
management and more to do with legitimising management decision making. It 
has also been argued that appraisal is the 'paper equivalent' of Foucault's 
6surveillancc panopticon' - an information panoptican (Townley 1993. Newton 
and Findlay 1996) - that is, anonymous and continuous surveillance as seen in the 
articulation of the monitoring role. It represents the extreme of control at a 
distance and allows the absence of face-to-face contact without the absence of 
control. It is argued that the rhetoric of delegation and decentralisation may help 
to disguise enhanced surveillance and concentrate power at the centre. 
Townley also argues that appraisal is about the setting of norms, while 
Newton and. Findlay say that it is more concerned with Taylor's 'first class 
worker' idea than with the setting of norms (i. e. management set the outlier as the 
model employee performance. In traditional labour process tenns management try 
to squeeze out the last drop of surplus value out of labour). 
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However, workers can often be aware of the attempts to reshape their 
attitudes but see that relative gains are to be made by complying. There is a need, 
therefore, to acknowledge the propensity of employees to resist the normative 
influences of appraisal. Appraisal schemes rarely work as their formal procedures 
suggest so it is not difficult to argue that appraisal remains intrinsically linked to 
the contested terrain of control and that this lies at the heart of the management of 
the employment relationship. In consequence, performance appraisal needs to be 
seen in the broader context of other fonns of performance management, 
surveillance and accountability (Newton and Findlay 1996). 
4.3 Summary 
In part one of this chapter it was highlighted that, as contingency theory 
would predict, there were certain distinctive factors about the organisations which 
utilised PRP. Yet, true to the prediction in chapter two that organisations have an 
area of choice over the way they implement policies and strategies it was shown in 
part two that even in only 16 organisations the application of the schemes had 
many differences even where on paper they appeared to be exactly the same. 
4.3.1 The average PRP establishment? 
We now have a picture of the average PRP establishment, one which is 
large in size but also part of a much larger organisation. As expected, product 
market factors also produced distinctive results. The PRP establishment is much 
more likely to produce a range of goods and services which were not sold to other 
parts of the organisation and were more likely to account for only a small 
percentage of total UK sales for the organisation. If the establishment produced a 
single product or service, then it is more likely to sell it to another part of the 
organisation.. Most establishments had many customers and competitors although 
a significant minority dominated their market. Demand for the product was also 
more likely to be sensitive to movements in prices, thus suggesting that for the 
ma . ority of PRP establishments, there is, indeed, a highly competitive market. 9 
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PRP establishments experienced much more change, both in terms of the 
reduction of demarcation lines and an increase in the introduction of flexibility, 
especially for white collar-workers. They were more likely to have experienced 
reductions in the workforce due to automation or new machinery and to have 
reduced the workforce through the redeployment of staff. They were more likely 
to be experiencing changing employment practices including reductions in staff 
due to automation, redeployment and the use of performance as a means of 
cmanaging staff out'. 
Importantly, the data point to the fact that the individualisation of the 
employment relationship is much more complicated than many commentators 
(e. g., Kessler and Purcell 1995) have hitherto envisaged. It would seem that 
establishments with PRP were more likely to have seen a growth in non-manual 
membership and recognition, leaving questions over whether PRP was leading 
workers to seek protection or whether it was just the nature of the type of 
restructuring which may be happening within the establishment (i. e., white collar 
restructuring). 
PRP establishments are likely to have more then one union present and 
were likely to have experienced a growth of both non-manual union membership 
and recognition. They are also less likely to have experienced a decrease in the 
number of unions recognised. A similar picture emerged for negotiating groups 
although PRP were likely to have experienced a slight reduction due to 'job 
decreases'. PRP establishments were also more likely to have a steward or 
representatives present and to have a written agreement for collective bargaining - 
with few attempts at altering these arrangements. As expected, those with PRP 
were also more likely to have decentralised forms of collective bargaining. Thus, 
companies with PRP seemed to be making changes to their bargaining 
arrangements but not necessarily attempting to rid themselves of unions 
altogether. Although it would seem that they were attempting to monitor who 
union members were. 
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PRP establishments were also less likely to have a committee whose 
primary concern was for consultation. Where they did have committees, they 
were less likely to discuss production type issues. However, they were more 
likely to have meetings for teams or groups over quality circles and so forth. In 
fact, they were more likely to have regular meetings once a month, but on the 
other hand, they also made systematic use of the 'management chain'. They were 
also more likely to give out infon-nation to staff about company issues but less 
likely to give them information about financial issues. 
In the event of a failure to agree at the establishment, those with PRP were 
more likely to refer to an outside body in terms of pay issues but less likely to do 
so over discipline and dismissal issues. PRP establishments were also more likely 
to have experienced individual grievances, especially over pay, and indicated that 
they thought their procedures were ineffective in dealing with appraisals and 
relations between employees. At the same time, however, they were more likely 
to have applied disciplinary sanctions. Thus suggesting conflict over the 
framework of controls (Baldamus 1961) 
There was a distinction between the administration systems of those with 
PRP and those with NPRP. As expected, with larger organisations, PRP 
establishment tended to have more management layers. They were less likely to 
have regular contact with an industrial relations specialist higher in the 
organisation but they were more likely to have obtained advice from outside the 
organisation, possibly from consultants. Rather, they were more likely to make 
industrial relations decisions at the level of the establishment but less likely to 
make financial decisions without consulting higher levels in the organisation. 
Thus, this suggests that financial or 'paper profits' were more important to the 
central organisation (Smith 1991) than industrial relations decisions. 
PRP establishments were also more likely to think that management 
relations with employees were poor. Thus, this suggests the need for change. 
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Technology was utilised more in PRP establishments as was the use of computer 
facilities, indicating the possibility of more sophisticated systems. PRP 
establishments were also more likely to monitor staff over a range of issues and it 
may be the case that computer technology was used for this purpose. In terms of 
the actual performance of the establishments, those with PRP were much more 
likely to think that their productivity was higher but that their financial 
perfonnance is poorer. 
The above gives a picture of organisations which are faced with highly 
competitive markets and are making sweeping changes to their administration 
processes, seeking to give autonomy to establishments within tight financial 
constraints. Within the multitude of change strategies, these organisations seem to 
be attempting to individualise the relationship between reward and effort yet are 
not attempting to rid themselves of unions per se. Obviously, the above cannot 
say anything about the direction of causation but does give an interesting starting 
point from which to progress with the examination of the organisation and effect 
of PRP. 
4.3.2 The case study schemes 
At first sight, there would seem to be three types of schemes. First, there 
are those which resemble more the traditional types of payment-by-result schemes 
such as Electric Co. and Service Co. Second, there were those PRP schemes 
based on behaviours such as Engineering Co. and Insurance Co. Third, there were 
those companies which utilised objectives, targets and performance contracts such 
as Retail Co and Bank Co. When examined in detail, however, each scheme is 
almost as different in many respects as it is similar so that, in effect, schemes were 
scattered over a broad spectrum. This is because organisations have histories. 
They do not operate within a vacuum and cannot ignore their socio-political and 
economic situation. 
Despite the fact that over half of the organisations used consultants with 
their latest schemes, they realised the importance of their own organisational 
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contexts. Further, despite this, there was very little involvement of their own 
managers and even less of employees in the design of the schemes. In addition of 
13 organisations, where unions represented employees, only five had involved the 
unions at any stage in the design of the scheme and this was usually towards the 
end of the process. 
It was highlighted that therewas a diversity of performance criteria utilised 
with conflicting results. Objectives seemed to be conflicting over qualitative and 
quantitative components while the relatively new concept of competences was less 
about learning and performance and more about measurement and accreditation. 
There was also a diversity of means of linking performance with pay. Further, 
some of the issues surrounding appraisal in terms of it being identified as a mode 
of control and the various ways that it can be used as such given the contested 
terrain of the employment relationship were set out. 
The scene is now set in terms of looking at the organisation of PRP. Thus, 
the reasons why companies indicated that they introduced the schemes and the 
initial effects of these will now be examined. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, the intention is to examine the reasons why PRP was 
introduced into organisations and its perceived effects from the point of view of 
senior managers within the companies. Their views were gathered by means of a 
semi-structured questionnaires. The survey was structured in such a way that it 
served two key purposes. First, it allowed a comparison of some of the main 
issues involved by providing managers with a selection of multi-choice options. 
Second, it allowed the researcher to probe deeper into the context and nature of the 
replies which were specific to the managers and the companies which they 
worked. From this analysis, a preliminary view was gained of what some of the 
effects of PRP may be. They, in turn, provide benchmarks for the detailed case 
studies. 
Where possible an examination of PRP was made using similar sections to 
those identified in Chapter Two so that a comparison can be made between my 
research and the findings of other research. The main difference between this and 
previous work on PRP relates to the fact that this research has the benefit of 
probing more deeply into the organisational factors. 
5.1 The objectives of PRP 
5.1.1 Why is PRP introduced. 
To confirm some of the reasons why PRP was introduced, a series of 
questions were asked during the interviews to tease the various factors out. First, 
the companies were asked: 'why did you introduce PRP'?. In public sector 
companies, the initial reply was 'because the Government told us to'. This reply 
was usually qualified by the fact that these departments now had a choice in 
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deciding their own particular pay schemes and had chosen to continue with PRP. 
The reasons for this usually mentioned simplifying grading structures, having a 
single scheme for all staff and linking pay more closely to organisational 
objectives. The overall emphasis fell on three main factors, however. First, the 
need to change the organisation's culture was mentioned. Second, the need to 
address the role of line management and give them more autonomy and 
responsibility to address the third and final area which was the assertion that pay 
should reflect performance and effort put into the job rather than skills and 
experience or seniority. 
Private sector companies also mentioned most of the factors above but 
they also emphasised the point of trying to move away from a subjective system to 
one that might be more objective. This may reflect that these were usually the 
schemes that were more mature. On this point, though, it must be noted that there 
was a detectable sense that because of problems over what issues can actually be 
precisely measured in objective terms, companies were now trying to 
reincorporate some behavioural factors into the appraisals often under the guise of 
competences. 
An additional factor mentioned by those private sector companies that 
included blue-collar workers in their schemes was that where they had included an 
element of multi-skilling in their working practices, combined with changes such 
as teamwork, the distinction between supervisory staff and the blue-collar workers 
was less pronounced in terms of job content. This overlap meant that the manual 
and managerial pay schemes needed to be very similar in order to allow a 
relatively easy passage from one to the other. 
After being asked open-ended questions, managers were given a further 
check list of factors which related to some of the issues identified in Chapter Two. 
They were asked: 'were the schemes introduced to aid any of the following'? 
Table 5.1 illustrates that most of the companies tended to choose those factors 
which could be called 'soft' options with a very similar emphasis to that identified 
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by Kessler and Purcell (1995), such as aiding motivation, retention of staff, the 
link between pay and performance and bringing about a change in organisational 
culture. The 'hard' options which may involve control elements (i. e., job 
flexibility, control of labour costs and changing the role of line management), 
were mentioned less often. Culture may be included in the control elements as 
well, but at this stage 
Table 5.1 
Culture 60% 
Decentralise bargaining 7% 
Individualise contracts/restructure employ. relationship 13% 
Job flexibility 47% 
Control of labour costs 47% 
Marginalise trade unions 0% 
Aid the role of line management 33% 
Motivation 73% 
Tighten the link between pay/performance 100% 
Recruitment 33% 
Retention 60% 
in the questionnaire, the emphasis was on the softer side of cultural change as 
might be expected with concepts such as FIRM. This reinforced the finding that at 
this stage there was not a sharp break from the findings of Kessler and Purcell 
(1995). 
5.1.2 Recruitment and retention 
Almost two-thirds of establishments said that they used PRP for retaining 
staff while only a third commented that they used it for recruitment. Recruitment 
was only an issue for certain types of jobs, as within most companies, the general 
trend had been one of downsizing. The emphasis with recruitment lay in being 
able to show potential 'high flying' employees that they would be able to earn 
salaries in relation to the amount of effort they applied. However, on further 
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investigation, senior management's main rationale for this was that they did not 
want to, or were not able to offer more money in terms of base salary to those jobs 
in demand, without upsetting existing grading structures. The same kind of 
rationale was present for retaining what companies saw as their high performers. 
However, as can be seen from the figures, retaining high performers was much 
more important than recruiting them. Even so, a fundamental question was left 
unanswered concerning whether the schemes were addressing performance or 
labour market factors. 
5.1.3 Motivation 
Surprisingly, although like other research (Thompson 1993; Marsden and 
Richardson, 1994; Cannell and Long, 1991), motivation was said to be a prime 
reason for the introduction of PRP, none of the companies said that it had helped 
to bring about more motivation. Although the majority of companies had 
mentioned motivation in their choice of factors and had mentioned motivation in 
nearly all other words throughout the interviews, all were completely sceptical 
about the role of PRP in aiding motivation in the first instance. 
Positive Negative 
influence manipulate 
educate override 
impress push 
attract impel 
invigorate force 
encourage compel 
inspire bias 
mislead 
induce 
convert 
bribe 
Source: Longmans, 1986. 
140 
Motivation, as discussed in Chapter Two, is by far too complex a concept to be 
addressed by a pay system alone. It would also seem that motivation can mean 
two separate things. It either denotes something positive or it can be of a negative 
nature. A positive nature is usually associated with PRP, when in fact, its negative 
elements are at play. This may be illustrated by looking at the above words from a 
thesaurus dictionary listed under the word 'motivation'. It would seem that while 
managers preferred to emphasise the positive or 'soft' side of motivation, what the 
schemes were really addressing was the negative or 'hard' side of motivation. 
This had a great bearing on the conclusions that were likely to be drawn, for if 
researchers ask questions about the positive aspects of motivation whilst the 
negative ones are prominent, outcomes may differ significantly. 
5.1.4 The pay performance link 
It is difficult to say much about faimess at this stage of the research 
without first gaining a rounder picture from all employees. However, in terms of 
the design of the schemes perceptions of fairness were certainly based on the 
principle of equity rather than equality. Most of the public sector companies 
mentioned that they were experiencing particular problems with staff because their 
previous notion of fairness based on equality and seniority were ingrained into 
their cultures. This was particularly the case with public sector organisations. 
Indeed, even the senior managers themselves admitted that they and others they 
knew worked within the public sector because of the civil service culture. It was 
this culture which had been the main motivator rather than money per se. 
Obviously the source of their motivation was now being removed. 
What ever the way in which motivation was used, in the absence of any 
motivational factors, there still needs to be some way to measure whether the 
schemes are achieving their purported primary objective (i. e. improve 
performance). Companies were asked whether they had attempted to objectively 
measure the effects of PRP on productivity. Three-quarters of the companies had 
not made any attempt to measure the effects on productivity. Some said that they 
would not know where to start. One company said that it was in the process of 
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attempting to work out how to do it because it was something which it would like 
to do. However, the nature of this company meant that it would be difficult to in 
practice. The remaining three companies who said they measured the effects of 
PRP on productivity were those which had a direct link with sales or output within 
their schemes. Their measure was simply whether sales or output had improved 
since the introduction of PRP. This still actually makes it difficult to separate out 
the effects of the schemes from other activities that management were 
undertaking. Indeed, one of the car companies had actually, for the first time in its 
history, introduced a flat rate salary for all of its staff in one of its garages and was 
reported to have higher productivity than the garages which paid PRP. 
Three-quarters of the companies said that they monitored the schemes in 
other ways but their means of doing so were somehow never quite convincing in 
terms of what they were trying to find out. Their means of monitoring ranged 
from employing MORI to do a poll of employees to relying on feedback from 
managers after the appraisal period. Whichever means they utilised, the choices 
seemed subjective and 'loaded' in terms of skewing questions to gain certain 
replies. 
All companies also said that they measured the overall costs of their 
schemes in terms of labour costs. All thought that the schemes were much less 
expensive in terms of total paybill. However, only two said that they measured 
their indirect costs such as appraisal time, training and administration. As these 
processes are typically very time-consuming, one would have thought that an 
overall costing would be seen as essential for estimating the net effect to the 
company. It is difficult from the above results to see how management and 
consultants can make such wide sweeping statements about the positive effects of 
their schemes in terins of employees or performance. Also if pay were truly 
linked to performance one would expect that as well as being rewarded for good 
performance staff could be reprimanded for poor performance. Yet only two 
companies said that in theory a reduction in pay was possible. This was only with 
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the senior management section of their scheme and no one could actually 
remember a case where it had been put into practice. 
5.1.5 Objectives for change? 
Similar to the argument of Kessler and Purcell (1992), it was also found 
here that only 13% of companies felt that PRP was introduced to individualise 
contracts or change the nature of employment contracts. Only one company 
commented that their schemes were introduced to decentralise collective 
bargaining and none of the companies said that they had introduced schemes to 
marginalise the role of the trade unions although several mentioned that they had 
had this effect, irrespective of their intentions. What this might actually mean is 
that companies showed, in contrast to Kessler and Purcell's (1992) findings, that 
they still valued the role that trade unions play in some areas as long as they were 
not encroaching on management's right to manage. As mentioned above trade 
unions were sometimes included in the negotiations of the schemes but only on 
management's tenns. It would seem, however, that trade union acceptance is 
sometimes needed in order to give the schemes credibility. It becomes clear 
below that these schemes are about more than just performance (Rubery 1997). 
Employers may value trade union involvement in maintaining consistent grading 
structures but at the same time they do not value trade union interference. 
It was mentioned above that, when given a list of factors and asked the 
question of why PRP was introduced, employers preferred to highlight 'soft' 
factors. Yet, as the research probed further into the nature of the schemes, the 
'harder' side began to emerge as the prime motivator for companies. When asked 
why they chose the particular scheme that they had at the moment, four factors 
came through more strongly than others. These were: organisational culture, 
flexibility and the role of management, controlling costs and pay for performance. 
Second, when asked what the main aims and objectives of their performance 
related pay schemes are, again, four themes commonly occurred: culture, control 
of costs, pay for performance and the role of line management. Third, companies 
were asked how schemes fitted with other organisational goals and objectives. All 
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companies said that the decision to have a PRP scheme had come from 'the top' 
and that they had been part of the organisation's objectives. Again, very similar 
factors were mentioned: a move towards a performance culture, making 
management more responsible and a more flexible system. 
All of the managers mentioned a more competitive environment in which 
people needed to be highly geared to their organisation's objectives and the needs 
of the customers. Performance culture often meant a move away from systems 
based on seniority, experience and skill towards systems based purely on 
individual performance. It also meant a move away from the paternalistic or 
traditionally heavily unionised culture to one where management prerogative was 
paramount. This was not, however, management prerogative per se because the 
problem that many companies faced was the fact that management was very often 
considered to be inadequately equipped to carry out the task. Many of the changes 
were, therefore, aimed not only at the role of general employees but also at the 
role of management. Lastly, the companies were asked: 'what role did the 
organisational context play in the choice of their PRP schemes'? Again, most of 
the companies' managers mentioned that it was very important that these schemes 
actually fitted with their particular organisational structures, occupational 
structures and their market structure (i. e. the type of product/s they were 
concerned with). Companies also mentioned that the schemes had been strongly 
shaped by past and present systems and cultures despite the fact that most 
companies were attempting to completely change their cultures. This had major 
implications, especially for those companies that took the business re-engineering 
approach of a short, sharp complete change to all of their systems in the hope that 
this would bring about the changes which they required. Indeed, these companies 
may experience more difficulties in the future as their employees try to re- 
establish some pattern of work and conditions with which they feel comfortable. 
Senior managers were able to discuss the 'soft' or the 'hard' side of their 
intentions, depending on the way in which the question was posed. It was, 
therefore, useful to examine which areas of PRP proved successful in their 
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opinion. Thus, the research went on to ask the companies whether they thought 
the schemes had been a success in those areas that they mentioned in Table 5.1. 
Again, by categorising the replies into those areas that were most frequently 
mentioned the same sorts of groups began to re-emerge. They commented that 
PRP had been successful in helping to shape a new culture, to change the role of 
management, control costs and link pay more closely to performance. Below is a 
medley of quotations which helps to summarise the overall response: 
It's been a success at getting perfon-nance management in ... That's good for 
making the business Plan work, so that's effective ... It controls the cost of labour and we now have control of the value every year .... It's working on 
culture, labour costs and people are beginning to realise that there is a link 
between pay and performance ... It keeps an absolutely tight link for us on 
pay and performance ... and its moved culture away from that paternalistic 
type of thing, but other than that it is an act of faith .... It's a thing of the 1990s, isn't it, how to get more out of people. 
One cannot fail to note that, in all of this, which reflects a fair 
representation of comments from all of the companies, there is no mention of the 
'soft' developmental benefits to the organisation or its employees. 
5.2 The management of objectives 
5.2.1 Problem areas 
Companies were clearly experiencing far more problems with the use and 
introduction of PRP than just the de-motivation of employees. Only one company 
said that there were no constraints on the effectiveness of its PRP scheme. Not 
surprisingly, this was the company that did not wish to have anyone else 
interviewed on this matter. Further, although the respondent for this company 
said 'no' to this question directly he later went on at some length to explain major 
constraints that had operated on the scheme in the preceding year which had 
forced major'alterations to it in order to stop employees from attempting some 
constructive choices on the types of work they wanted to carry out. They had 
been concentrating on those jobs which would bring them most reward. 
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The constraint mentioned by nearly all companies was that there was 
always insufficient funds to 'drive a lot of performance forwards' (Bank Co. ). 
Another factor mentioned mainly by the public sector companies concerned the 
role of managers themselves. 'It is the ability of managers to manage from what 
was a prescribed system to one that is discretionary' (TV Co. ). What this meant 
was that managers were now expected to manage performance and not to apply 
the rules or administrate. Third, companies actually mentioned that the setting of 
objectives was in itself a constraint. In one company, its business cycle was 
changing so rapidly that it had to change its objectives and hence management's 
performance contracts three times in one year alone. Another company mentioned 
that it didn't think the organisation was 'as sharp as it could be in setting targets or 
objectives'. Finally, although there were numerous other constraints, they fell into 
the category of causing some kind of inconsistency. This was either to do with 
distribution, the scheme being too flexible or that it did not seem fair to 
employees. The biggest inconsistency with one company was that no one wanted 
it other than the managing director. 
Combined with the constraint and the problems over objective setting, only 
two companies commented that they did not experience, or did not know of, any 
problems with staff concentrating on their objectives or targets to the detriment of 
other aspects of their jobs (Manf. Co, Insurance Co). The remaining two had the 
opposite problem in that employees did not concentrate on objectives until 
appraisal time. 
It is clear that the companies did not think that the schemes were an 
astounding success and recognised that there was a wide variety of problems with 
these schemes. Nonetheless, something droves them to continue utilising the 
schemes even if it meant dusting down the working par-ties or calling out 
consultants again. Many of the companies interviewed had changed or are 
changing their schemes since interviews began. Some have opted for minor 
changes whilst others have gone for a completely new scheme. Yet none of the 
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companies have actually given up on the idea of PRP altogether though the 
supposed effects of these schemes on performance are far from clear (i. e. 
increased productivity does not necessarily mean or translate into increased 
efficiency). Clearly, without a measure of the effects of these schemes, their 
validity has to be in question. 
5.2.2 Pay strategy 
If these schemes are part of a total company strategy or plan it might mean 
that they are successful in other ways? Only half of the companies, however, said 
that they had a plan, strategy or philosophy concerning pay. Even with these 
companies, the picture was not as straightforward as it might sound. Many were 
unclear, mentioning factors like 'we aim to be in the top quartile for the industry' 
or that it was only 'between senior managers who knew quite well what it was'. 
None of the companies could or would provide anything in writing and most 
clearly had a lot of trouble explaining what it might be. 
What did seem to be important with these various structures of pay, and 
surprisingly this was never mentioned explicitly in any of the replies to the 
questions about what the PRP schemes were doing, was that there seemed to be a 
particularly unhealthy preoccupation with the distribution of pay. This is despite 
the fact that these schemes are supposed to be based on individual performance. 
All of the companies except two said that they controlled the distribution 
of pay thus going some way to confirming the findings of Kessler and Purcell 
(1992) that companies are more concerned with relativities and consistency of pay 
schemes. This is also a very important finding, pointing to the fact that 
performance only plays a small role in the actual determination of pay. It assumes 
that there is a normal distribution; therefore, only a certain percentage of 
employees are to receive particular awards or ratings or some combination of both. 
Sometimes, this took the form of directly placing certain people in certain ratings. 
On other occasions, the process was carried out on a more informal basis with 
managers being strongly advised about how the distribution should fall. Of the 
147 
two companies that said that they did not control the distribution of pay, one 
commented that 'grade drift' was becoming a particularly serious problem and 
that it was planning to respond to it by moving towards a controlled distribution. 
The remaining company, although saying no, advised business units to give extra 
awards only to the top 20% of performers. The company also had strict 
limitations on the maximum range of each grade so that once the maximum had 
been reached, no further performance awards could be earned (only the occasional 
one-off bonus payments were possible). 
This preoccupation was confirmed by all 15 companies saying that 
external factors were a big influence on the amount they paid. Two-thirds said 
that internal pay was a big factor, as was profits. Only half of the companies, 
however, said that business unit strategy was a major influence. 
Thus, consistency and relativities may be a major preoccupation for these 
organisations while the performance element is making employees focus on what 
is important to the company and intensifying effort. Certainly the 'harder' 
elements seemed to be at the fore of these schemes rather than the 'soft' 
developmental issues mentioned by Kessler and Purcell (1995). 
5.2.3 Management's RoIC 
Management's role is clearly very important for these schemes. Before we 
look at the perceived effects of PRP on management, it is worth examining what 
management is before looking at what it does. 
What is management? 
In the prescriptive literature, in a search for a definition of what 
management is, it concentrates on attempting to list standard roles of what a 
manager does. All in all, management is portrayed as homogeneous, with little 
being said about how its role may conflict with that of the employer. Similarly, an 
early labour process definition would be that management is synonymous with an 
employer in that its job is to control labour (Braverman 1974). As Thompson and 
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McHugh (1995) argue, however, the problem with the early labour process 
literature was that it assumed a high level of rationality: It assumed that 
management always knows what Capital's interest is and that it is possible to draw 
a neat line between workers and managers. 
In reality management's role has become differentiated and may take place 
at many different levels - ownership, administrative, innovation and production. 
Two major consequences of this new division of labour are as follows. First, 
although the power of administrative machinery may have increased, the power of 
individual managers has tended to diminish due to the rationalisation and 
routinisation of their duties (Smith 1991). With the development of more complex 
managerial structures, new techniques have been introduced to integrate, monitor 
and control lower and middle-level managers. Second, the growth of structural 
conflicts and imbalances between the different levels and functions means that 
each level of management tends to follow a 'rational' logic of its own. 
While some may talk about the prolatarianisation of middle management 
(Braverman 1974) others (Arrnstrong 1989) prefer to discuss struggles for control 
within capital reflecting the tensions and contradictions in the agency 
relationship. In other words, employers and senior managers are inescapably 
dependant on other agencies to secure corporate goals and policies. A focus on 
competing agencies and professions also emphasises the specific historical bases 
and differences in the development of management theories and practices 
(Thompson and McHugh 1995).. 
As Smith (1991) notes, there is a clear link between restructuring of the 
organisation to regain competitive advantage and a critique of management. 
There is a lack of systematic evidence about this relationship, however, in the US 
the limited available evidence based on the 'decline perspective' argues that the 
new competitive environment forces organisational leaders to scale down 
operations. This creates dysfunctional dynamics that top-level leaders must 
manage. There are problems with this literature, however, in that it is too rational 
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in its dynamics. Smith noted that since the mid- I 960s, US companies' response 
to increasing competition had been to create the illusion of prosperity in the form 
of profit gains on paper. Cash management was emphasised over commitment to 
production. This was also the case in the UK in the 1980s and was exaggerated 
ftirther by the peculiar role that the City plays in forcing companies down this 
route. Many organisations were seen as easy pickings for take-overs if their books 
were not looking healthy. As such from this time management, for the first time, 
were not immune from the displacement process affecting workers. The 
competitive process led to radical alterations to organisational. structure and 
employment conditions. This, in turn, led to aggressive attacks on staff and 
organisational management in effort to reduce overheads, including the paring 
down of corporate size and greater centralisation. The reductions in layers 
allowed management to regain and maximise control over the production process 
while reorganisation, merger and acquisition had the same effect of putting many 
managers out of work. 
Many industrial relations specialists now argue that companies can no 
longer afford to pay for bureaucratic or individual models of control over 
employees. Companies have been unravelling the stable employment relationship 
framework that has been in place for many decades. At the same time they have 
tried to maintain continuity and gain employee consent to restructuring but this 
presents significant organisational and personnel challenges to the running of 
organisations. Smith (1991) argues that top management have positioned middle 
management as the agents of restructuring. The idea of 'entrepreneuralism' is 
designed to undermine an implicit contract that middle management have with 
large corporations through its use as a justification of deep rooted structural 
change. It is used to provide justification for an attack on the past poor 
management of enterprises and the philosophical underpinning and organisational 
means by which management can attack their own past styles. 
We can now move on to examine the effects of PRP on management in the 
companies to see if any of the above can be identified or clarified. 
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How did PRP affect management? 
It is difficult to make gencralisations at this stage about how all of this will 
affect employees in general; this will follow from the next stage of the research. 
However, it is possible to make some points about the effects that it will have on 
management. The debate about the effects of centralisation or devolution of 
control began to emerge at this point. These are clearly outlined in the debates 
over the M form of organisation (Williamson 1975). It is argued that companies 
find it more cost effective to control divisions/subsidiaries via financial controls. 
It has already been mentioned above that the HRM literature tends to assume that 
these schemes have the effect of giving management more autonomy over their 
work areas. Against this, there are suggestions that autonomy occurs within tight 
constraints (Edwards 1987). This was something in this research which seemed to 
have grown in intensity with all the senior managers noting the presence of 
financial and rule making control. In the following section, the extent to which 
this is the case will be examined. 
The importance of budgetary control on management in large MNCs and 
subsequently on industrial relations issues is now well established in sources such 
as the second Company Level Industrial Relations Survey - CLIRS2 (Marginson 
et al, 1993). It was, therefore, thought beneficial to utilise some sections of the 
questionnaire to look at budgetary pressures and their relationship with the 
management of PRP, especially the use of budgetary targets as performance 
targets. Therefore, many of the tables in this chapter derive from those parts of the 
questionnaire which were customised questions from CLIRS2. 
First of all, the survey asked about the senior managers that were 
interviewed and how senior they were? Attempts to talk to the most senior person 
dealing with-pay in the companies was achieved with only four of the most senior 
managers that I interviewed commenting that they had to report to someone else 
more senior in a similar job function. Most qualified this by saying that this 
person was not directly involved in a similar job function, but rather, he/she was 
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usually in a co-ordinating role between the person responsible for remuneration 
and another person responsible for appraisal, for example. 
Managers were then asked a series of questions to ascertain whether they 
were responsible for deciding some of the details of the schemes. For instance, it 
was asked: 'which roles are played by you in the design of bonus, indicators of 
perfon-nance and the proportion of PRP'? Over two-thirds said that their job 
function deten-nined the details of designing the bonus scheme. A further 13% 
said that it was their responsibility along with other ftinction/s. The fact that 20% 
said that they had no role may mean that, in some companies, the bonus system 
may be imposed from very senior management levels. This is something which 
needs further investigation, in light of the trend in some companies towards 
unconsolidated PRP bonuses. Eighty per cent said that they had a role in 
designing the indicators of performance. The remaining managers were in 
companies where there were separate functions for determining pay Matters and 
the details of the appraisal system. In these cases I interviewed managers from 
more than one functions. The only senior manager Nvho said that his particularjob 
function did not have a role to play in deciding the proportion of PRP was located 
at Tyre Co. Even here, this person seemed to have the ultimate say in how much 
the proportion would be because he was in ultimate control of the budgets and the 
HR team had to report to him. It seemed as though it was someone else's job to 
propose the amount of increase in pay rates while the nature of the scheme itself 
determined how much would go into PRP. 
When asked whether the role of their job function in the detennination of 
pay and salaries had increased, decreased or remained the same 58%, said that it 
had increased, with the remainder saying that it had remained the same. Thus, it 
would seem that the role of the centre, over pay, had increased rather than 
devolving autonomy out to local management. This was confirmed by asking 
managers how much discretion they now exercised over certain issues since the 
introduction or most recent changes to their PRP scheme in the following areas: 
the way pay is distributed to subordinates, control over financial matters, setting 
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of targets and objectives for themselves, setting of targets and objectives for others 
and pursuit of policies which in their opinion may be more efficient. 
In the first three areas, all said that the amount of discretion that they now 
had had increased. With the setting of targets for others, the majority said that this 
was now supposed to be an agreed process although there did not seem to be much 
room for manoeuvring with some of the schemes in ten-ns as far as employees are 
concerned. In fact in the case of those companies that had introduced performance 
contracts as part of their schemes, those jobs that were considered to be lower 
down the occupational ladders where the majority of employees might be, have 
standardised performance contracts, while it was mainly management who have 
the individualised performance contracts. The companies often mentioned that it 
would just be too difficult to give each employee an individualised performance 
contract. Finally, most managers also said that the majority of policies would 
have to come from the centre anyway. 
Most of the companies mentioned that the competitive environment 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s had been very intense for them. Many of them 
had gone through more than one bout of serious restructuring. They were asked 
whether any of the factors in Table 5.2 had occurred over the last five years as a 
proxy for the amount of restructuring experienced: 
Table 5.2 tends to confirm a great amount of change in most companies. 
Along with this all of the respondents said that the pressures on business unit 
managers had increased considerably over the past five years alone. This was 
emphasised when they were asked what would happen to the business unit, the 
manager and the workforce if a business unit was under performing. 
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Table 5.2 
Closure 71% 
Setting up of long term contracts 77% 
Divestment 73% 
Expansion 67% 
Formation ofjoint ventures 50% 
Investment in new locations 60% 
Merger and acquisition 71% 
Rundown of existing sites 54% 
None 0% 
Only one company said that they were fairly 'soft' on these types of issues 
and that they certainly didn't like to dismiss people. They commented that they 
would put plans into place and that they would review individuals targets and 
objectives. This was surprising as the company was very unitarist in its approach 
to HR and the amount of turnover of staff moving through its HR department 
itself was quite high. There had been two completely different management teams 
in HR in the year that I was in contact with them alone (i. e. they were now 
employing their third management team). The rest of the companies emphasised 
the enormous pressure on management to hit targets and objectives. If the 
business unit was under-perfon-ning it would mainly be seen as a management 
problem, with three-quarters of the companies saying that if there was a serious 
problem management would be dismissed! There was a tendency for the public 
sector companies to emphasise that the management role was crucial and that this 
was reflected all the way up or down the management hierarchy. The private 
sector companies also emphasised that the unit would be sold or closed down. 
The fact that the management role was seen as more crucial within the public 
sector companies could relate to the way that they perceived their future direction 
(i. e. trying to emulate the private sector), or it may also be due to the fact that they 
do not usually have the option of closing down although they had exercised the 
option to merge offices in a lot of cases. Another factor was that some of their 
less financially viable operations might be outsourced or put out to tender. This 
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was particularly the case in TV Co. and Health Co. Manufacturing Co. said that it 
would not be allowed to happen in the first place. They were very much reliant on 
contract work which meant that if overall targets were not met, then they would 
start to incur quite heavy financial penalties. 
Managers were now also more likely to have indicators of business unit 
performance as specific targets now. Table 5.3 shows that most of them seem to 
relate to the costs of production and labour. Most companies also said that there 
had been changes to the financial indicators now required from business units. 
Table 5.3 
Administration to sales ratio 66% 
Production costs to sales ratio 75% 
Direct labour costs to sales ratio 70% 
Market and distribution expenses to sales ratio 70% 
Operating profit to sales ratio 46% 
Return on investment 30% 
Sales to capital invested ratio 20% 
Sales 54% 
Unit labour costs 54% 
Other measures 70% 
For most, this meant more indicators but for some (especially those in the 
public sector) it also meant performance indicators for the first time. 
Companies also seemed to be collecting more information about the 
performance of the individual business units. As can be seen from Table 5.4, 
however, surprisingly, only a third actually collected figures on labour 
productivity.. So if pay is largely centralised other than the setting of objectives 
and targets, have managers and especially business unit managers got more of a 
role to play in actually deciding business unit strategy? The data suggests not. 
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TabL5.4 
Absenteeism 
Accidents and injuries 
Dismissals/discipline 
Numbers employed 
Overall labour costs 
Labour productivity 
Overtime working 
Movements in rates of pay 
Resignation/recruitment's 
Strike/industrial action 
None 
57% 
50% 
57% 
93% 
79% 
36% 
64% 
93% 
93% 
36% 
0% 
5.2.4 Business unit strategy 
Debates over management autonomy are not confined to pay issues but 
have involved decisions in the whole of a business unit and its strategy. This 
clearly applies in reverse order, with pay being equally affected by business unit 
strategy. Thus, if pay is highly centralised, there may be room for management 
autonomy in business unit strategy over other factors that influence pay. It is, 
therefore, important to investigate these broader influences to see how 
management are affected in these areas. 
In terms of the process of deciding business unit strategy the majority of 
managers (60%) said that business unit strategy must fit into an overall strategy 
which is decided at company head office. This is what is called a 'centralised 
structure' here. Twenty percent said that, as long as business strategies fitted into 
an overall head office structure, they could negotiate around that and this has been 
termed 'centralised negotiation' in this study. The remaining 20% said that 
business unit strategies emerged from a review process which involved individual 
managers and company head office. This is termed 'negotiated'. Although one 
may say that there is not much difference between this and the centralised 
negotiations, there is, nevertheless, an important shift in emphasis between the 
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two, with top management having more control over the latter. Only one 
company said that the financial element alone was starting to become more 
important as a means of control (i. e. business unit strategies must fit an overall 
strategy decided at head office), but more and more< there was some flexibility in 
how to apply that strategy as long as the units achieved their financial targets. 
Even those business units with their own budgets were still tightly controlled by 
head office or division. 
Sixty percent of the senior managers said that the influence of their job 
function in the determination of strategy at business unit level had actually 
increased over the past 5 years. Only 20% said that it had decreased and the 
remainder said that it had remained the same. Again, this points to the lack of real 
autonomy for business unit managers. 
At the same time, however, as the strategy/pay policies were placed firmly 
in central control, budgets in terms of pay were being applied downwards to 
business unit level. This increased the pressure on management to perform yet, at 
the same time, give them some room to negotiate over budgets. This is confirmed 
by the finding that in terms of the part played by 'staff cost' budget holders in 
determining their budget, only 21% said that budget holders had no say in 
determining the budget. Seventy-five per cent said that budget holders proposed 
budgets which were then negotiated with head office. The remaining company 
said that senior management proposed a budget which is then negotiated with the 
budget holder. Only one company, however, said that their budgets are allowed to 
vary with activity levels without authorisation from head office. Fifty-seven per 
cent said that they were not allowed to vary at all and 35% said that it would 
depend on the circumstances but would still have to be negotiated with head 
office. 
Respondents were then asked what would happen if management of a 
business unit felt it necessary to authorise a pay award which would result in the 
staff cost budget being exceeded. Half said that it would not be possible for this to 
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happen. Twenty-three per cent said that the authority of higher level accounting 
or finance management would be needed and a further 15% said that the authority 
of both higher level HRM/Finance would be needed. Even here, it was 
emphasised that increases would often have to be found by the units through 
'efficiency' savings. This means that overall budgets for staff costs were highly 
centralised. None of the companies said that business unit managers would be 
free to implement their own awards, even if the overall budget was tied to their 
performance targets. 
5.3 Summaj: y and Conclusions 
Despite the fact that PRP is promoted as a kind of neutral pay system 
which can be easily applied to all occupations and industries, most of these 
schemes were heavily shaped by the individual organisational contexts, both in 
terms of past and present structures and cultures. Hence despite the uniformity 
implied by concepts like performance management and reward management, 
schemes were by and large very different. The one aspect that they all shared was 
a preoccupation with controlling the distribution of pay, increasing performance 
and controlling costs. 
Kessler and Purcell (1992) have probably done most to further the 
understanding of the nature of PRP in Britain. In a more recent work (Kessler and 
Purcell 1995), they attempt to put PRP into the context of its 'softer' and 'harder' 
uses. This is very similar to that which has been attempted within HRM (Storey 
1992). While not disagreeing with the content of their argument, it is felt here that 
their attempt to put it into the context of 'individualism' and 'collectivism' and their 
model of management styles may have led them to misunderstand what PRP is 
used for. Hence, in concentrating too much on attempting to base PRP within 
these realms,. and by judging trade union exclusion or inclusion in terms of 'soft' 
or 'hard' goals, they are forced dowm the path of viewing PRP in the 'soft' 
developmental light. While the results of this research are, in some senses, similar 
to theirs, the interpretation of these results was somewhat different. It may well be 
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useful to look for a different dichotomy to the now traditional 'hard'Psoft' one as 
this tends to force one down particular paths. 
The schemes studied here were not being used in any serious way to 
address those areas associated with their traditional uses. If they were, this 
occurred only in a marginal sense. The main areas which were mentioned were to 
do with the following four main factors: 
" Organisation culture 
" Role of management 
" Performance 
" Costs 
Process Bargain 
Effort Bargain 
It seems that the first two have a lot in common, relating to addressing the 
processes and structures of bargaining and fit with changes to the administration 
process (Baldamus, 1951) while the latter two combine to address the effort 
bargain. Further, it seems that it is not a case of pay-for-performance, but rather, 
more performance for the same or less pay. These factors all appear to emphasise 
the 'hard' control side rather than the 'soft' developmental side. They also had a 
definite emphasis on flexibility in all its shapes and forms. 
When we look at the role of head office and senior management it would 
seem that these schemes were highly centralised and senior managers certainly felt 
that they had much more control of or via these schemes. This was also true of 
business unit strategy. 
Where business unit managers did have some room to manoeuvre, it was 
in the setting of budgets although, even here, there was not very much scope. At 
the same time, however, business unit managers were much more closely 
monitored and measured and indicators of business unit performance were tied in 
much more closely with their own rewards through the setting of objectives and 
targets. 
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There was also a trend within management schemes towards individual 
perforinance contracts. This is a very interesting development. Although it needs 
further investigation, it may shed some light on why companies do not seem to 
have gone wholeheartedly in the direction of individualised contracts. For 
instance, it may be easier for some companies to alter the individual performance 
contract sufficiently without upsetting those areas of the employment contract 
which companies would prefer to keep consistent on a collective basis. This 
direction of enquiry was made all the more relevant by the finding that PRP seems 
to be concentrated in those occupations and industries not directly related to the 
production process (i. e. those areas of employment where it is particularly difficult 
to stipulate exactly what the contents of the employment contract are in terms of 
performance). A performance contract might be seen as a way of addressing this 
especially when a firm can get the employees to co-operate in putting down in 
writing what their job is and how they should be doing it. Hence, the setting of 
targets and objectives was emphasised as an 'agreed process'. 
Some of the attributes present would certainly substantiate the view that 
management were used as restructuring agents. Having said this companies do 
not always get what they want and it is clear from the interviews with senior 
managers that they are quite aware of this in some contexts. Indeed, when asked 
about the organisational context, many mentioned how the schemes had to fit in 
with, as well as attempt to change employee attributes. The following four points 
come to mind when endeavouring to illustrate the kinds of problems which 
employers face. First, it is not always easy for employers to bring about the 
changes they want given their existing structures and procedures. Second, the 
inconsistencies which the schemes produced also produced varying results for 
other outcomes. Third, the effects will depend on whether management decide to 
4 manage up'. or 'manage out' to borrow the terminology of Smith (1990). Finally, 
employees learn very quickly to play the schemes at their own game. For these 
reasons, what is happening with these. schemes is a process of re-negotiation of 
control and the effort bargain. It is within these areas that the research will 
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concentrate in the following chapters. This should permit an even closer detailed 
examination of some of the schemes and their effects on all concerned. 
Thus, the key objective of the next four chapters is to look at four of the 
schemes in detail using ethnographic case studies. The research for the chapters 
took place between 1994 and 1997 although the main ethnographic elements were 
undertaken in 1997. This meant that although the study did not set out with a 
longitudinal perspective, it managed to chart some of the effects of change over 
the period. 
As well as examining the main effects of PRP, the four chapters will 
specifically highlight the vagueness of the objective-setting machinery in each 
scheme and the ways in which this was fundamental in making the scheme 
inadequate in meeting the initial aims of improving performance based on 
agreements between all parties. Instead, it led to various struggles for control over 
the work relationship as organisational restructuring and new forms of work and 
pay organisation changed the shape of past relationships. The struggle for control 
also highlighted the complexities of the labour process in opposition to more 
simplistic definitions of such. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BANK CO. 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the organisation and effects of the Management by 
Contract scheme -within Bank Co. in the light of rapid reorganisation of the bank's 
own structures over the last decade or so. The chapter will firstly take a brief look 
at the changes happening within the financial sector, and in particular, the bank 
itself which are having a tremendous impact on the types of policies pursued. It 
will then look at the organisation and effect of the PRP scheme, highlighting in 
particular the vagueness of the scheme's objective-setting process in relation to 
the whole job and the other ways in which it has been utilised in a bid to aid the 
competitive position of the bank. 
The research for this chapter took place between 1994 and 1997 and 
although it did not set out to look at PRP from a longitudinal perspective it did 
manage to chart some of the effects of change over that period. 
The research included three elements: 
An examination of relevant written material on and related to the PRP scheme 
within the bank. This included booklets explaining the scheme, pay details, 
contract materials, staff surveys and so on. 
Interviews with senior managers from HR and from within the branch 
network. This included discussions with HR staff involved in policy and 
reward at Head office and with HR staff at regional level. Furthennore, some 
of these people were interviewed on more than one occasion to ascertain the 
status of the scheme as it progressed. 
Detailed case study work via participant observation in a 'cluster' of branches 
in the East Midlands. As part of this leg of the fieldwork 36 employees from 
two different sets of staff were formally inter-viewed using a semi-structured 
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interview forniat. The two groups were firstly selected from the appointed 
staff (22) who represented most of the managers. These staff are presently 
rewarded via the 'Management by Contract' scheme. Secondly, employees 
from the unappointed staff (14) who were in the main non-managerial and 
clerical workers were interviewed. These staff are already on a crude type of 
PRP scheme but they are due to be introduced to the contract scheme in the 
near future. Therefore it was essential that their opinions were gained in order 
to assess how they thought the scheme would affect them and how changes to 
the management scheme may be affecting the way they were managed. Staff 
were also spoken with more generally as I observed their daily tasks and 
routines, I also attended meetings between heads of sections and again was 
allowed to examine documentation. 
6.1 Structural change within bankin 
Financial service markets, once characterised by great stability and 
continuity are rapidly changing everywhere, partly as a result of increasing 
competition and partly the result of the growing use of computerised 
technology. (Bertrand and Noyelle, 1988. p8) 
The above mentioned changes, it is argued, promote a radical shift in the 
functional emphasis of firms away from 'production' of services (back office 
functions) towards customer service, sales and production development (front 
office functions). These trends do not apply just to the UK but affect financial 
services all over the world. The shift towards these new functions is also leading 
to a fundamental reorganisation in the division of labour. Bertrand and Noyelle 
(1988) argue that this is leading to a new emphasis on decentralisation of 
functions and decision-making responsibilities. They also argue that this means a 
ftindamental shift in the firms' HR, involving upskilling of the entire workforce 
and emphasis on new skills such as customer service, sales, entrepreneurship and 
high-level expertise. For them, the only problem is that firms do not seem to have 
a strong grasp of how to develop the new skills needed for middle-level 
management. Smith (1990), however, does not see this process in such a positive 
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light for employees. Rather, management are those used as scapegoats for the 
productivity problems of the 1980s, in the same way as labour were seen as the 
problem in the 1960s and 1970s. In the new climate, management are expected to 
're-tool their social relations with those that they manage and take on a unique role 
in pushing through new corporate conditions' (Smith 1990: P11), even if this 
sometimes means managing themselves out of a job. Managers become both the 
controllers and the controlled. 
One aspect that both authors do have in common is that the outcomes are 
likely to depend on the approach taken by the company and its management. 
While Smith emphasises that management can either manage themselves 'up' or 
'out',, Bertrand and Noyelle argue that reorganisation does not have to mean a total 
loss of jobs (i. e. there are new financial markets out there which need developing), 
so it is more the case that there is a mismatch of skills at the moment rather than 
anything else. It will depend on the policies of each individual bank as to what the 
outcome will be. 
With rapidly changing markets and increasing competition, financial firms 
have turned to computerised technology in order to reorganise both their 
production process and new products (see Bertrand and Noyelle, 1988). Financial 
services were one of the first to use mainframe computers. In the 1950s and 1960s 
the focus was on the automation of the transaction process. In the late 1970s and 
1980s the focus shifted to the automation of management reporting or 
management information systems (MIS). Furthennore, over this period, the 
emphasis went on the introduction of process technology in the areas of linking of 
front office and customers into the back office systems, electronic cash 
management; and still ongoing is the focus on the introduction of artificial 
intelligence into areas of lower-level decision making - expert systems. 
Developments in technology have gone hand in hand with developments in 
new products. Indeed, as better process and product technology frees firms from 
the limitations once imposed by semi-automated or manual systems, more and 
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more firms have shifted their focus to enhancing old products and introducing new 
ones. Credit cards, tele-banking and electronic cash management are but a few 
examples. They have produced a shift from a production- to a market-focus. This 
can clearly be seen in the efforts by many to reorganise their organisation from a 
'product basis to a customer basis'. 
Both new technology and products have allowed the banks to introduce a 
different division of labour, while simultaneously encouraging flexibility in work 
organisation and roles. Bertrand and Noyelle (1988, p?? ) argue that the; 
revival of competition and the continued introduction of new technologies 
everywhere are contributing to a major shift in focus away from 
production towards customer assistance, sales, the transformation of old 
products and development of new ones. 
This was also the case in Bank Co. where these types of changes were leading to a 
dramatic change in the organisation, its work and the jobs. A new reward system 
was seen as fundamental in aiding these changes and the problems encountered 
through them, and is best viewed in this light. 
6.2 The organisation of PRP in Bank Co. 
6.2.1 Company background 
For many years Bank Co. has been recognised as one of the best, if not the 
best, managed banks in Britain. It has often been hailed for a string of strategic 
successes over its history within the banking industry. In the 1920s, almost four 
decades before other major clearing banks began, it became internationally active 
and, more recently, it has been responsible for pioneering credit cards, cash 
machines and marketing new bank services. It has been argued, however, that this 
occurred in an era when it was difficult not to make profits (Gurwin 1982). 
Once known for its success over other competitors in terms of 
decentralised structures, Bank Co. is now in the throes of restructuring which 
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attempts both to centralise and decentralise. Prior to this, local directors regarded 
themselves as managers of their own districts and were permitted to manage as 
they thought best within the framework of head office policy. Decentralisation in 
the bank goes back to the days of its formation in 1896. It originated from an 
amalgamation of 20 private banks. Each senior partner became a board member 
while other partners became directors of their particular regions. In the 1980s, the 
bank began to pull power back towards the centre, with the challenge being to 
centralise power to head office and restructure management on a customer basis. 
In 1987 there was a major probe internally into the bank's operations as it 
became clear that it was losing its number one position to another of the 'big four' 
UK banks. The probe confirmed that the bank was losing market share, that 
profits were no longer healthy and costs were rising. It also found that the bank's 
staff thought that it was bureaucratic; too much central control meant that 
decisions were being made by people who were not in touch with what was 
happening locally (Hewitt 1988). 
In response, the bank streamlined its management structure and changed 
the shape of UK banking operations, separating its corporate and retail sectors. At 
the same time, the bank's existing structure of local headquarters was closed down 
and regional offices put in its place. Regional directors replaced the UK board 
structure and brought with them a culture change from a traditional banking one to 
a selling, market environment (Gregson, 1987). By 1989, Hewitt (1989) argues 
that the reorganisation had proved successful - profits were up 42% and the bank's 
image had much improved. 
The improved perfon-nance was attributed to a better production range, 
more aggressive marketing and more focused management. Specialisation 
became the name of the game and although the bank initially concentrated on the 
corporate sector, this focus had to change so that the personal sector did not 
become the 'poor relation'. In 1993, the bank appointed only its second 'non 
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family' chief executive, unique by his own admission that he had no previous 
experience of the banking industry. 
The challenge ahead was explained by the Director, Group HR: 
Banking historically, is steeped in tradition. While this can provide a lot of 
stability in an organisation, we at Bank Co. are changing significantly, 
principally driven by the co-ordinated use of information technology, 
which has enabled us to change the way in which we are structured 
physically on the ground, and also material changes in the way we handle 
work. 
Thus, historically, in retail banking, branches did everything, with very 
little central processing and with staff having fairly well-defined jobs. Now, a lot 
of work and back office processing jobs were stripped out of branches and were 
carried out centrally. As a result, there was a reduction in the number of people 
and branches, an increasing number of central units, and a change in work patterns 
and job contents which meant a split between customer service/selling and 
processing. It also meant less discretion for each unit in the way they operated as 
some functions became centralised. 
The change in work patterns and contents have led to a reduction in jobs 
and employees. Now, jobs are broader and, it is argued, give an opportunity for 
enrichment. The split between functions has also led to an increasing degree of 
specialisation. In the past banks attempted to deliver a range of products from the 
branch. Today, there is greater specialisation of outlets in the form of personal 
and corporate business banking and so forth. 
We are also utilising more flexible types of employment. We make more 
use of temporary labour, and cleaning staff, security, kitchen staff are no 
longer directly employed by Bank Co. " (Director, group FIR). 
This directed thought that technological change and innovation are very 
important pressures. Globalisation of markets is not a big pressure for a lot of the 
change in banking. It is not just technology and competitive pressures, but also 
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customer pressures. Change to the business also means that companies have to 
change the way their HR departments work. In Bank Co., HR no longer says 'this 
is the best way of doing it' but rather 'have you thought of doing it this way'? 
The Assistant Group Director of HR explained that the way in which the group is 
being run now is that the businesses 'go off and do their own thing' and head 
office departments are small, lean and add value. 
In UK banks industrial relations are now handled centrally. The old 
banking branch network is having to come to grips with a lot of change and is 
attempting to modemise its personnel policy very rapidly. It has subsidiaries 
which are more dynamic such as telephone banking, credit card business and inter- 
mortgage and there is an upward pressure on something which is still viewed as 'a 
little bit of a dinosaur'. 
How do you change something as big as 40,000 people working in a 
branch network of 2000 branches, its difficult to do. 
The new HR had to fit the new strategy. It also evolved, however, from 
the bank's own history. Thus, it now has a central HR department and all the 
other businesses have their own HR that fit into the overall structure. The bank is 
attempting to align HR to the businesses by devolving HR structures throughout 
the group. The different parts of the business are now being encouraged to see 
personnel issues as part of their business strategy. For this reason, HR has been 
divided into two main groups: 
o people management; and 
* policy (this unit is a first and part of the new structure). 
Policy is now focused down much more. It has become concentrated and 
focused because the bank considered that devolution was new. issues such as 
group values and process issues still need to be co-ordinated at the centre. 
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In the new structure, pay grades have been reduced to six clerical grades, 
seven management grades, senior executive grades and group senior executives. 
These and other work changes mean that promotion is less likely and more people 
will need to gainjob satisfaction from their currentjob. This is why the company 
is introducing a performance management system with management contracts 
which are supposed to involve employees agreeing with their boss what is the core 
content of their job and what is expected of them, rather than something which is 
'visited on them' from head office. Thus, HR people see or explain the process 
very much in ternis of the changing structures which give individuals some 
autonomy over the change which they are experiencing due to changing structures. 
However, the view taken here is that this is rhetoric and attempts to justify the 
processes explained in the section above. 
6.2.2 History of pay 
Until the late 1980s, both the unappointed and the appointed schemes were 
similar. Appraisal had been a feature of the pay scheme for some years and 
position in the range depended to a small extent on the performance rating. 
However, the schemes were seen to be more closely linked to seniority than 
performance. The schemes utilised five ratings and were seen as a subjective 
assessment of each individual. 
At the end of the 1980s a new job evaluation scheme was introduced for 
the management grades. It had fewer grades but a much wider salary range within 
each grade. Job evaluation united the old headquarters and branch management 
systems because of problems with wage drift and a lack of flexibility. The 
ultimate aim of these changes was to combine the introduction of 'management by 
contract' with the new grades in order to create a new reward structure; the 
eventual aim will be to link pay much more closely to performance. The company 
argued that the changes were integral to a wider development programme and 
were made to ensure that the bank continues its success into the 1990s. The 
company stated the following in an internal document: 'To maintain and improve 
our leadership in the financial service sector requires a renewed potential for 
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business performance'. It went on to say that it needed a re-focusing into yet more 
clearly defined corporate and individual objectives. 
The culture within the financial services in the UK has traditionally been 
one of slow change, predictability and security. Status has been an important 
element in job grades which offered slim opportunities for improvements in 
relative pay. This is now thought to be inappropriate to meet the challenges of 
today's commercial environment. This change was thought to be essential for two 
main reasons: To provide greater personal accountability in meeting objectives 
and to discriminate more between the rewards available for differing levels of 
performance. 
On this basis, the Management by Contract system was introduced in 
January 1991 with the new grades of MGI to MG7. The components of the 
reward system were now made up of three main elements. Firstly, there was the 
base salary, initially determined by job evaluation which placed the job within one 
of the seven salary ranges. Each grade would have a salary range which included 
a minimum, maximum and mid-point referred to as a 'bar'. 
Grade 
85% 100% 110% 
III 
Band Minimum Band Bar Band Maximum 
Positions within these ranges would now be determined by a combination 
of cost-of-living rises and an increase determined via a matrix system based on 
merit or performance. In addition, there was to be a bonus element also based on 
perfon-nance. This bonus was to reflect set percentage increases, depending on the 
ratings awarded via the appraisal system. 
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Figure 6.1 
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The matrix above shows that instead of someone progressing to the 
maximum of their salary band solely on the basis of seniority, this could now only 
be done on the basis of performance. That is, someone would have to continue to 
perform and exceed their contracts to be able to progress to the maximum of their 
salary band. 
In order to aid the appraisal process, each manager is now given a 
perfon-nance contract between themselves and their immediate boss. The contract 
is supposed to reflect the 'whole job' and is made up of five to eight 'Key 
Responsibilities' (KRs) which are supposed to represent the fundamental purpose 
of the job and its outputs. Further, these KRs are then be divided into objectives. 
The KRs and the objectives are supposed to be in han-nony with wider bank 
strategy. The principles behind Management by Contract are laid out as follows: 
Know clearly what is expected of us and why, 
Have demanding but achievable objectives, 
9 Have the ability and desire to meet these objectives, 
Have the freedom to make things happen, 
Are held to account for our actions, 
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Are recognised for what we contribute, and 
Are given help when it is needed. 
At the end of each contract year managers are appraised against their contract and 
awarded one of the following ratings; 
" 'Fell short' of contract - the assessment given to those who did not achieve 
the agreed performance in at least one key responsibility; 
" 'Met' contract - meeting the needs of the job by fulfilling each of the key 
responsibilities; and 
" 'Exceeded' contract - exceed in the majority of your key responsibilities, 
including, as appropriate, that relating to profit, revenue or cost management 
and have met all others. 
When assessing performance against contract, the purpose is not to assess 
the person, as in the old scheme but rather, to establish the extent to which the 
agreed plans were met and the reasons for under/over achievement. Because there 
is difficulty in defining what good or exceptional performance looks like, it is 
sometimes necessary to look beyond the criteria and focus on aspects such as 
quality. An important element of this process is agreeing the KRs and the 
objectives. In this way, according to the theory behind Management by Contract, 
it enables a reasonably objective discussion rather than the traditional subjective 
appraisal techniques. 
The bank has attempted to monitor the scheme via feedback and staff 
surveys. These mainly show that, although the majority of staff generally agree 
with the principle of Management by Contract, they are not at all happy with the 
mechanisms of the scheme. Because of this, the bank has made two major 
changes to the scheme and is looking at another three elements for the future. 
Firstly, it aims to make the scheme more attractive by giving more autonomy over 
pay decisions, the bonus element was altered from being a fixed percentage for 
each appraisal rating to having a maximum for each rating within which the 
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managers were allowed to determine what the exact percentage should be for each 
person. Secondly, the bank needed to translate the scheme into one of 'best 
practice'. Although the bank had all the components of a performance 
management system, they were not integrated as such. Therefore, it is now 
attempting to build an integrated system which incorporates the pay element with 
other factors such as a competency framework and business objectives. 
The bank is at present, considering three other factors for future 
introduction. Firstly, it is re-considering the possibility of introducing still greater 
autonomy in terms of further decentralising pay. This would include giving 
regions their own budget in terms of total staff spend along with information on 
distribution and market rates and then permitting them to decide how they allocate 
this. Secondly, they are hoping to introduce a new grading structure of six grades 
only to cover all staff. Finally, they are considering the introduction of a 
teamwork element to the pay allocation which would mean, for example, that 80% 
may be detennined by individual performance with the final 20% being 
determined by team performance. 
6.2.3 The Bank Co. cluster 
For this part of the fieldwork, several weeks were spent in a 'cluster' of 
branches in the East Midlands. A cluster, for the benefits of the uninitiated, is 
exactly as it sounds. It is an administration unit of, in this case, about 13 branches 
which were themselves split into customer-orientated groups (see below). 
Clusters then report to regional office. Total employment in the cluster was 
somewhere in the region of 270, including about 30 managers. The intention was 
to talk mainly to managers as they were directly affected by 'Management by 
Contract'. It became evident, however, that other staff were soon to have the 
scheme introduced. Therefore it was only fitting to seek their views as well; not 
only their thoughts on PRP but also how it had affected them so far via the 
management scheme. Another reason for interviewing other staff was because of 
the changes which were happening to the traditional hierarchical structure within 
banking. Traditionally the hierarchy was split into two main sectors - the 
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Appointed and the Unappointed. Over the past 15 years, due to the changing 
structures and job content, some staff within the unappointed grades had become 
managers while others in the appointed grades had less managerial power than 
before in terms of staff responsibilities. 
The structure of the cluster consisted of a main branch which incorporated 
the senior managers and some of the central services such as business centre, 
international department, customer services and typing pool. However, the bank 
was split into four core customer-sited groups which were based at varying 
different buildings or branches. They were as follows: 
* Operations - including people such as cashiers, accountants, and customer 
services and so forth; 
Personal - sales forces that actually sell the loans etc. to individuals; 
* Corporate - those dealing with the business customer side of things; and 
9 Risk - those dealing with the maintenance of loans and so on. 
The morale in the cluster can best be described as extremely low. This bad 
been caused by major change to both the structure of banking and its jobs, and 
simultaneously downsizing. Despite the fact that many people said that there was 
no longer a sense of company loyalty, especially among the unappointed staff, 
staff were found to be extremely loyal and conscientious. 
Many staff said that they were completely exasperated with anything 
which came under the guise of customer service and that, in general, in banking 
now, it felt as though they were managing a cost-cutting exercise rather than 
managing a business. According to senior staff, time lost due to sickness has been 
phenomenal and answering customer service is now hectic (with staff handling 
many more calls than in the past). The general impression given by staff is that 
the sales side are gaining all the resources and the better treatment while the 
backup staff are experiencing the redundancies. 
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6.3 The objectives of PRP and the management of objectives in Bank Co. 
The previous sections set up the background to the scheme and its 
organisation. The following will highlight why the objective-setting process went 
wrong and in what subsequent ways the scheme has been utilised for other 
purposes. 
6.3.1 The vagueness of PRP 
The company said that the main reasons for introducing the scheme were 
to aid the process of a change in culture, to help them control labour costs, to 
introduce a better link between pay and performance and, to a minor degree, to 
bring about more motivation. It was, therefore, important to assess whether this 
was being translated to other layers of management. One of the first questions 
asked of the managers was 'Why do you think the company is using a PRP 
scheme? ' There was a general feeling that this was Part of a new business ethos in 
the UK, and that there was also an element of it being the latest buzzword to do 
the management circuits. A second set of responses was that it concerned saving 
money. Finally, a large proportion of managers initially said that they had been 
asking the same question for a long time. 
The second set of responses fitted well with another question put to 
managers asking what they thought were the main 'aims and objectives of the 
scheme'. Comments ranged from those around saving on labour costs, especially 
on the non-pensionable element of pay, to those involving focus and getting 
managers to actually do theirjob. It has, in fact, been argued that restructuring of 
management is seen as a critical link in the regaining of competitiveness, much in 
the same way as the restructuring of trade unions in the early 1980s. 
For many staff, all of these factors were reflected and portrayed by the 
'performance contract'. They obviously felt that they were looking at a very clear 
set of objectives with the contract. In management's opinion, however, these 
objectives were not always seen as those that the bank should be concentrating on. 
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This thus highlighted management's role as subjects of PRP rather than the 
designers of A manager explained it thus: 
I don't think the contract system recognises all the jobs in the bank. If it 
was a pure sales organisation there would be no two ways about it. But 
there is more to it because there is the relationship side. 
This relationship side meant that managers recognised that, within the 
bank, a very important factor was making sure that customers or accounts were 
not lost. To some, this was as important as making money via sales; they argued 
that an emphasis on selling alone was too short-term. Not quite believing that the 
bank would be so stupid as to not recognise this, it led to accusations by managers 
that the scheme was only there for one reason: to reduce labour costs, and in 
particular, pensionable salary costs. This was., however, combined with a 
recognition that for the bank, it was also a means of replacing 'an archaic salary 
structure which didn't suit today's bank'. A manager summed it up neatly: 
The bank get to the situation where they have taken out a big chunk of 
your pensionable salary into PRP but by the nature of the contract that they 
set, and it is set with very little discretion, they can create a 'met' and 
therefore reduce the overall costs ..... and get away with it because there is 
so much uncertainty in banking. So its quite pleasant from their point of 
view because they can actually impose the contract from day one, 'fail' 
you if you don't achieve it by day 365, or they can 'meet' you, which they 
have assumed a 'meet' anyway, and they are still better off because they 
have shifted their costs and reduced their pension obligations. So that's 
good management to me but it doesn't motivate the staff. 
Managers thus recognised the need for change yet, simultaneously, were 
very critical of it. Many of the staff said that what motivated them was not the 
contract but how well they did in the headline figures. They emphasised that they 
did not want to look bad when the list of what everyone has done was produced. 
The scheme thus does not motivate but it did make staff want to achieve their 
figures in order to appear competent. This clearly highlights the point made in 
Chapter Six concerning the positive and negative aspects of motivation. The 
scheme has been forcing staff to achieve figures by all of the methods mentioned 
in the negative rather than the positive list. The Management by Contract scheme 
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aided this process by monitoring and measuring staff in two main ways. Firstly, it 
could be used by staff to monitor and compare themselves with the second, which 
was the bank's own measurement and monitoring systems. To some extent, 
because most of the interviewees were management, they were prepared to endure 
with, and even defend parts of this logic: 
I think from the bank's point of view it is ideal because it gives them a 
stick, which I think they need to be fair. They pay us a reasonable salary, 
they have got to expect us to do things which are in our contract. How else 
do you say you should be doing this or we expect this. 
This highlights the problem of companies gaining consent from 
management and whether the managers actually comply (Edwards 1987; 
Thompson and McHugh 1995). The scheme, according to the bank, was giving 
management a tool with which to manage. This does not necessarily mean, 
however, that it actually makes them manage. To clarify further, as will become 
obvious below, what this scheme actually did was to force managers to make 
decisions based on the contract. The problem is, however, that if managers 
deviate, they may do neither. This is where dilemmas begin to occur. 
I think we tended to concentrate on specifics, specific figures, specific 
profits, specific targets and not .... it's difficult to say we haven't given 
service, because I am sure that we have, but you can tend to neglect the 
service which in the long term builds up your long term relationships and 
your long term profits. 
On the other hand, 'if you raise discretion, which they are doing at the 
moment, manipulation can creep in'. This leaves management with 'grey areas': 
The trouble is you can't learn to play the game because we don't know 
what the game is anymore. You can try to impress whoever signs your 
contract off, but what is the game? 
Many managers said that the company is a branch network so you need 
consistency and rules for everyone, otherwise discrepancies make a mockery of 
the scheme. They were asking for consistency in 'playing the game', yet at the 
same time, consistency often meant standardisation, which in turn, meant a lack of 
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flexibility. Management were clearly not happy with the scheme at either 
extreme. Too much discretion meant no rules, too much consistency meant 
standardisation. 
6.3.2 Pay 
As mentioned in other studies of PRP the schemes relied heavily on 
appealing to notions of fairness based on equity (Kessler and Purcell, 1992. Geary 
1992). This was largely confirmed by this study, but with a twist. Everyone 
agreed with the principle that people should be rewarded for their performance. 
Yet it was equally true that, in practice, very few thought that it actually worked. 
It also became clear during the fieldwork that there seemed to be at least 
two separate cultures developing within the bank. The first concentrated on 
'service' and although one could say that it was a direct descendant of the old 
banking system where customers were seen as part of the family - the all round 
banker - in many ways it was not similar at all (i. e. it was far more product based). 
The other was the sales culture. This was very strong in some departments and 
staff actually said that they would like a large proportion of their salary 
determined as commission. Employees from both cultures were very wary of the 
other and accused each other of not working in the correct way. The service side 
thought that the sales people often disregarded important chunks of their job in the 
search for sales figures, while the sales side accused the others of being 
'dinosaurs', stuck in a bygone age of banking. The different cultures obviously 
made a great difference to the way in which PRP was viewed. Similar kind of 
results were also found in banking by Smith (1991) and Storey et al. (1997). 
People were generally happy with the amount of basic pay that they 
received but not with the mechanisms of pay. The new bonus element went some 
way to alleviate the problem of the scheme being too mechanistic, but even here, 
management was wary about how it should use the bonus element. These 
problems were highlighted in three main ways: firstly, there was the problem with 
grading and changing promotional structures. Promotional opportunities were no 
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longer available for many, and even where they were, staff thought that much of 
the time, the wrong choices were being made. One example given was of a person 
who was an excellent salesperson but terrible as a manager. Therefore, it was felt 
that the scheme should be able to reward without using promotion. Secondly 
there was the problem that the scheme had become too subjective and was open to 
manipulation, not just by certain individuals, but also by the institution. 
Last year our manager got an 'exceed', but when it went to regional office 
they decided that he had not exceeded sufficiently so it was brought back 
down to a 'met'. 
Another manager said: 
having decided last year what I was going to give subordinates, we then 
received a message saying that we were not to tell people if they were 
going to get above the 'norm' rise. The reason being that they were 
worried that they were going to exceed the budget. This reinforced my 
cynicism. 
Finally, there was the problem, or the perception that the scheme was not 
determined very well on an individual basis. 'In practice, it is difficult to get more 
than the leader gets' and 'it is not very tightly defined as far as the individual is 
concerned, that is, there is not a lot you can do as an individual to affect it'. Most 
managers perceived that there was only a certain amount of money set aside each 
year which the company would then decide how much it was going to pay out. 
They thought that regional office were responsible for distributing this. They also 
thought that this distribution information was unlikely to be shared with other 
managers. Although they were not formally told this, this is precisely what 
happens, according to both central and regional HR managers. 
6.3.3 Measurement 
One might think that, if introducing a scheme such as Management by 
Contract, there would be some idea of how to measure the success of the scheme. 
When managers were asked 'How do you know the scheme is workingT, 
however, there were two main types of answer, neither of which pointed to 
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scientific methods of assessment. Firstly, some commented that they had no idea 
how it would be measured or of whether the scheme was actually working or not. 
Many of them thought it was too difficult a task anyway. The second group of 
responses indicated that profits or labour costs would be the main two indicators. 
As Mulholland (1997) argues, however, profitability as an indicator of 
perforinance and measure of efficiency is flawed because it reveals nothing about 
the politics of production or the different sets of interest within the organisation. 
Managers were asked how they thought the company judged whether the 
scheme was successful or not? Most thought that it was an interesting question, 
one that they had been asking themselves. They thought that the only way that it 
could be measured was to look at profits, and that there should be some sort of 
correlation between profits and how many 'meets', 'exceeds' or 'fails' the bank 
gave out. Another manager felt that it was more simple than this and argued that 
it was aimed at driving customer service. If the customer service surveys were 
Okay then the bank would think that the PRP scheme was working, Only two 
people thought that the contract could actually measure the work that they do. But 
even here there were reservations. Most respondents made comments such as: 
'too difficult', 'too subjective', 'you just can't measure it' or 'easy to cheat'. 
To ensure there is good measurement one must first know what it is you 
want to measure (i. e. have well-defined targets and objectives). Secondly, one 
must then have the procedures in place to actually accurately measure how well 
people are achieving their targets. There were problems with both these factors. 
Firstly, managers were highly sceptical that they received clearly defined targets. 
We are very amateuristic at setting targets, we don't have enough 
experience at setting our own objectives. 
A lot of the elements of theirjobs they did not think were quantifiable. 
How do you measure customer service? Introductions ..... I can produce 
thousands of them if need be. Training staff, how do they know what I am 
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like? It depends how much they monitor you, but you can't actually 
monitor that contract. 
Some managers thought that financial objectives could be measured and, 
because they received monthly reports telling them where they were, they 
assumed that this was a fair and accurate reflective measure of performance. This 
assumes, however, that one is 'getting it right' in the first place. As a manager 
said: 
None of the measurement systems are robust enough yet. The auditing is 
not enough to make sure everyone is doing it properly ...... I think one of the 
problems is just measuring what a good job is. You could be doing a good 
job but not making any money. If the bank adopts a policy that doesn't go 
down well with customers, you have to sell that policy and keep the 
customers at the same time. So you may not make any money but you 
may well be doing a better job than someone who is. You stop the bank 
from losing money ...... We have never been good at rewarding true 
performers .... If you give someone a contract they can exceed that is 
useful .... but if they are exceeding because the contract is wrong then you 
are in trouble. 
When asked, 'do you feel pressurised by the contracts and objectivesT, 
only five people said that they felt directly pressurised by their objectives. Others 
commented that it was more of a focus or that the pressure was just from the 
volume of work rather than the objectives per se. Again there seemed to be a 
distinct split between the sales and other staff although this was more to do with 
the pressures of the job than the contract. The enthusiastic sales manager 
commented thus: 
I usually set my own goals as well which are usually higher than the 
bank's. So the pressure is in the job and not the contract. I get slightly 
irritated when we are matching words on a piece of paper with what I have 
done. 
Others recognised a divisiveness in the scheme: 
It depends on how important the bonus is. Some people are quite happy to 
plod along especially where base salary is high. But it is a culture change 
now towards more bonus so that this means that relatively if people don't 
perform their basic pay levels will start to fall progressively behind. 
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Thus, although pressure may not be immediate, if, after time colleagues are 
ahead in terms of base salary while doing the same job as others, then pressure 
will begin to apply. Others mentioned the increasing pressure but insisted that 
part of this concerned the fact that they were just expected to do much more work 
now. There had also been many new appointments in the bank and these people 
wanted to be seen to be doing well so as to keep the pressure on their subordinates 
to meet the objectives. 
Because there is a very high likelihood that the contract scheme will be 
introduced to the unappointed, it was interesting to gauge what staff thought the 
differences theirs and the management scheme were/are. The unappointed had 
very little working knowledge of the management scheme. Most mentioned that 
managers do not actually talk about it very much unless something specific was 
affecting them. Those who had conversations about it said that managers 
complained a lot about the fact that they had an enormous sense of 'loss of 
control' or that the scheme felt as though it was keeping them 'under control'. 
This put a lot of pressure on managers, according to the unappointed staff. One 
supervisor commented: 
Even management have constraints imposed upon them .... Most of the time 
they can't meet the targets they are told to meet. Effectively they give 
themselves a pay cut so they don't have a breakdown. 
Because of this, they all felt that most staff would fear it. They already felt 
extremely threatened by the thought of being put on a similar scheme. 
This section highlights the vagueness of individual objectives and 
measurement of them. The following section will highlight that this was the case 
with the overall business objectives, which aimed at various control elements. 
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6.4 Management by Contract: The politics of PRP 
6.4.1 Business objectives 
Management by Contract schemes are supposed to link organisational 
objectives with personal objectives. Managers were asked whether, in their 
contracts, they were aware of a link between their objectives and business 
objectives. All respondents said yes, but it would seem that their knowledge of 
business objectives was very localised. Very rarely were business objectives 
explained to them in their entirety and not one manager had an overall picture of 
what the business objectives of the bank were. All said that business objectives 
were cascaded down from level to level and from individual to individual. The 
focus was on defined sectors and the link between individuals and teams in these 
sectors. Several managers mentioned the fact that 'all the clusters have similar 
targets driving to meet the regional pot'. It is a very cascaded process: 'I assume 
that they mirror the group objectives, but I doubt whether they will be the right 
ones because there is too much change over a yearly period'. 
Contracts were obviously an important part of the whole procedure. The 
performance contract should be an integral part of defining exactly what the duties 
of the employee are, yet in Bank Co. contracts were 'standardised packages 
individually wrapped' in order to provide an amount of consistency (Evans and 
Hudson, 1994). However, constant change in the branch network was now 
leading to problems in this area. As was mentioned earlier, many of the jobs were 
becoming standardised and sPecialised in defined sectors. This led to a minute 
division of labour within the banking industry. Yet the bank staff complained that 
the two do not always match (i. e. contracts need to be sufficiently broad to 
encompass everything they do). This meant that staff could say that contracts 
suited their jobs on paper but that this did not transfer easily into daily practice. 
At the same time, it was clear that most managers realised that the contract 
made them focus. It did not really matter what the individual perception of 
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contract were - 'I don't care', 'I don't like' or 'I go my own way' - the contract 
dealt with different types of management to make them focus on the business. 
the only thing I can think of is that it might steer your conversations with 
customers, because you know if you are behind in your objectives you are 
going to want to start to .... for example, sell more insurance and that sort of 
thing. 
Others were less subtle about the matter: 
If you sign a contract, you have got to be conscious of it throughout the 
year. It's no good you going your own way because if you have not met 
the objectives in the contract you have failed. 
Therefore, it was extremely interesting to question why managers should 
actually worry about the contract. Although the bank had introduced the variable 
bonus element, it was still relatively difficult to be awarded an exceptional bonus. 
Combined with this, many of the senior managers mentioned that once a certain 
salary level was achieved, the incentive part of the salary began to become less 
important (although not having it may be more important). Thus, if it is not the 
reward element driving it, what could it be? The answer seemed to lie in 'peer 
pressure'. One senior manager summed it up when he said that he operates in the 
same way whether there is a contract or not. He said that he had always been 
successful and that this wasn'tjust down to targets. He continued: 
the bank now have information systems which were set up in such a way 
that you always begin to make comparisons. So you start to do it 
unconsciously. 
A more junior manager reiterated the same problem when he said: 
at first I was really motivated, but then in reality ..... PCA (portfolio 
contribution analysis) which is the income side of things, we get peer 
pressure on what to achieve, you know, so and so has agreed to this why 
can't you. 
So, there was the focus and then there are drivers to reinforce it in that: 
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it is human nature that if you have got a contract driving you, you tend to 
drive your work to achieve that contract. 
Thus, the contract seemed to be there for two inter-related reasons - To 
focus and to drive. Senior management might say: what is wrong with providing 
focus, after all we are in business? The problem, however, is that focus does not 
necessarily mean that matters are actually running efficiently. As one manager 
noted, 'this is not a performance-related contract, it is a target related one'. It 
means that one's overall aims are steered towards the targets and not necessarily 
towards overall performance or efficiency. For efficiency, there would have to be 
some proof that the focus was on the right types indicators or that the contract 
covered all aspects of the job. Yet, as another manager commented, 'if you 
concentrate on your contract you wouldn't speak to anyone else and that is not 
good for teamworking'. 
It would seem that the performance contracts, like employment contracts, 
meet with the age old problem of being able to specify every component of the 
job. Standardised contracts make the problem all the worse, especially when the 
company is undergoing rapid bouts of restructuring. In the words of another 
manager: 
it used to be well defined but with all this change it is so woolly. We have 
merged, and jobs have changed, but I still have the same contract. 
Where new jobs had been created, staff were often working with their old 
contract, an old contract from the new department, or even with no contract at all. 
The problem was that no one really knew what the contract was for anymore. As 
one manager said: 
originally we found them quite motivating. But when we saw these new 
contracts we said how do you 'exceed' or 'meet' this. The only figure they 
have got in there is PCA target but we don't understand it. We don't 
understand what it is, we don't understand whether we can meet it, but we 
need to put a figure in because Head Office said so. We looked at it and 
said we are 'meet' because you have got to do something exceptional to 
'exceed' or something stupid to 'fail'. 
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Other managers said that, due to outside forces, they knew that they had 
failed the contract well before the year ending. For example, circumstances had 
changed for one manager by the time his budget had been set up. Another 
manager, who was in one of the new sections which meant that there was some 
element of choice in terms of what went in the contract, said that everyone was 
wary and frightened about writing a contract because they had heard so many 
horror stories . They constantly looked to put figures in that suited them, rather 
than put down anything challenging in case they could not meet them. 
Talking to the unappointed staff highlighted how employees get drawn 
into such schemes, even when they know they are being exploited by the 
company. On the positive side, staff thought that they might get more money if 
pay were linked to performance or that they might have some individual influence 
over their own pay as a way of recognising their efforts. On the negative side, 
staff thought that it would put a lot more pressure on them or that it would actually 
be pushing them to do more all the time. 
Most managers felt that they did not need a scheme for their employees 
because it was their job to motivate staff. Some did think, however, that there 
should be a scheme for 'career' staff, indicating that they felt that there were now 
two kinds of staff (i. e. those to be trained and developed and those who, one senior 
manager labelled, 'cannon fodder'). Managers mentioned that they thought there 
would be measurement problems with the unappointed but, at the same time, 
commented that cultural differences were now taking over the bank. Many 
managers had moved from more sales-orientated divisions and as one explained: 
the cultures are very different. Creditcard division is a very commercial 
organisation, very cost conscious and profit orientated, it embraces change 
and runs with it. Domestic banking is less so. They are more disciplined 
but less. technologically advanced. They live in a much more paternalistic 
environment whereas in Creditcard division you look after your own career 
and future 
They felt that this kind of culture, with the scheme, would help to focus staff. 
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6.4.2 Managem nt tool 
If changing structures meant that there had to be a change in the ways in 
which management managed, then an assessment of whether Management by 
Contract is in fact one of the tools for doing it was needed. Only three managers 
said that they did not think that it was a management tool. 
The way things are going we need a system to benefit the hard workers. It 
(The scheme as a management tool) becomes an integral part of the 
remuneration package. 
There are different levels to this analysis, however, in that it was viewed as 
both a negative and positive tool. Most of the people who said yes thought that it 
was a driver to focusing and checking on people's performance. 
It focuses your mind and your bosses mind, what you are there for and 
, what is expected of you ...... It makes an easy checklist to see how well you have perfon-ned, but I would debate how effective it is. 
So the positive elements began to turn into negative ones: 
Yes I think the bank over the years is moving to a more dictatorial role 
with its managers, and I believe it will continue to do this and use it as a 
management tool to get rid of managers that are not effectively achieving. 
Those who did not agree that it was a management tool tended to think the 
opposite in that it was not a driver but rather it was used more as a 'stick'. One 
senior manager even thought that it was used as a management tool to standardise 
jobs. This was a very interesting comment and fits in with the argument raised 
later that for all the case studies, there was a considerable amount of 
standardisation of work tasks. 
6.4.3 Labour costs and distribution 
It is clear that both from the company's point-of-view, and for most of its 
managers, one of the key concerns when introducing the management by contract 
scheme was control of labour costs. As one senior HR manager put it: 
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Although control was not an out and out objective, it was there in the 
background. We needed effective targeting of salary spend and it achieved 
that. Only those people that continually achieve get towards the top end of 
the scale. It allowed us to get that under control and we have a much 
better idea of the shape of our structure. 
Keeping the shape of the structure meant that they needed to keep the 
distribution to the normal 'bell-shaped' curve. Thus, distribution of performance 
was also a very important factor. Companies were keen to keep a pre-determined 
distribution in order to allow the effective spend of the salary bill. The obsession 
with distribution was clearly highlighted in the region in which the fieldwork was 
carried out. In the first year of the new bonus arrangements (1996), total spend on 
bonuses was only approximately 55% of the budget allocated for the region. This 
was explained by many managers as the outcome of everyone being so wary about 
what to award because HR had been advising caution. Management were, in fact, 
told not to tell staff the percentage they were going to receive if they had 
recommended them for an above the 'norm' increase because they were afraid of 
going over budget. The plan was that if budgets looked like they were going to be 
exceeded, awards would be reduced pro-rata until the budget was back on target. 
In this way, staff would not be upset if their bonus was decreased after the event. 
Yet in the event of the budget being under-spent management did not intend 
sharing this out pro-rata as HR were now happy with management making its own 
decisions and said that it was only right that they should abide by those decisions. 
Thus, empowerment only worked in one direction. 
6.5 Summaj: y: organisation and effect 
A merging of branches and jobs into new grading and banking structures 
was present in Bank Co. and the pace of change was showing no signs of slowing. 
More technology was expected in the form of customer service machines with the 
bank encouraging -the use of these rather than the counter (where necessary). 
There were also moves towards the automatic measuring and monitoring of CWIP 
(clerical work improvement programme), the bank's equivalent to time-and- 
motion study. Other efficiency and cost-controlling measures were also being 
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closely and constantly monitored. Despite this, there was criticism at all levels 
that measurement problems were rife within the structure. Levels for targets were 
often done on a 'hit-and-miss' basis and inaccurate targeting was leading to a lack 
of co-operation between sectors as they all sought to hit their own targets by fair 
means or foul. Centralised functions were also made more difficult because they 
overlapped with the work of individuals, which meant that now these services 
were officially supplied by central services, individuals were not given any time in 
work schedules to complete theirjobs. Again, this led to a considerable amount of 
'fudging'. Departments were working below official staffing levels and staff were 
being told not necessarily to work harder but to work 'smarter' which was 
insulting to all. On top of this, redundancy programmes aimed at back office 
operations meant that the bank had lost a lot of valuable experience in the running 
of these and other functions. 
6.5.1 Labour costs and distribution 
An emphasis on costs and distribution had major implications for 
performance and the messages that were sent to employees. While the firm was 
encouraging them to perform more efficiently, it was also recognising the fact that 
only so many, the best performers, will be recognised for this. This is a factor 
which is seldom recognised by staff, even senior management, prior to the 
introduction of the scheme. In fact it is doubtful whether companies recognise the 
implications of this themselves. Even so, it is here that the dilemmas begin to 
creep in because of the lack of clarity and honesty over what the scheme is 
supposed to be achieving. An emphasis on discretion and empowerment are 
obviously meant to soften the effects and to make it look as though staff have 
some choice over the decisions they are making. The bonus element of the 
scheme was clearly an effort in this direction. Management, it was argued, were 
given discretion through the bonus to reward their staff as they saw fit. What the 
bonus scheme- did in reality, however, was force local management to take 
responsibility for their decisions, thus shifting the onus away from central 
functions. 
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The crucial and simple point here is that pay is not based on performance 
but on distribution. The scheme is not piecework or commission, based on effort 
for predetermined amounts of money. It involves sharing out of a controlled pot. 
The outcome is an implicit message which is wholly negative. What makes it 
even more negative is that while staff do not fully understand the reasons why, 
because of confusion over matters such as subjectivity and objectivity, they most 
certainly feel the forces of this confusion and the inconsistency that it breeds. 
6.5.2 Focus, drive and modes of control 
Focus and drive were clearly the main forces involved with the 
Management by Contract system. The scheme was clearly thought about in terms 
of being a management tool to carry out this process. As we saw, however, the 
scheme as a management tool involved both positive and negative elements. 
What we found was that it was not in fact the scheme which was the driver, rather, 
certainly in sales, the headline figures and the peer pressure which drove people to 
hit their targets. The contract focused people on objectives but one of the major 
problems was that most managers actually thought that the objectives were not 
always the correct ones for the long-term benefit of the bank. Added to this was 
the problem that objectives did not even cover the majority of a person's job most 
of the time. This was especially the case with the non-sales staff. Further because 
of the constant change and the staff shortages and so on, people were still expected 
to cover various jobs despite the trend towards standardisation and/or 
specialisation. This made a contract based on one job, or a specialisation of it, 
null and void in reality. Again, it came back to the problem mentioned earlier that 
the bank was attempting to restructure itself technologically but had cut back on 
staff to cope with this before most of the technology or structure was actually in 
place -a classic case of putting the cart before the horse. This, in turn, again was 
due to a combined pressure to cut back on costs because of increasing 
competition. . 
It was extremely tempting to try to encapsulate a mode of control in terms 
of one of Edward's (1979) three modes, or to present a new category which 
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reflected a progression of these categories. There were, however, many modes of 
control present, highlighting the simplistic nature of Edward's attempt to 
categorise the evolution of control, no matter how bold it may have been. The list 
below categorises all the elements of control that were present and utilised via the 
PRP scheme: 
Standardisation Control over work process and the division of 
labour. 
Labour costs/ Control of pay - 'The carrot'. 
distribution 
Responsible autonomy Control of management - very little direct 
monitoring. 
Coercive autonomy Control of the management of management. 
Systems control Headline figures. - Peer pressure - 'the stick'. 
No debate Control via silences over pay. 
Cultural control Sales mentality - peer pressure. 
Staff were not, however, merely the recipients of control. They also consented to 
some forms of behaviour while they resisted others. 
6.5.3 Playing the game: The effort bargain and resistance 
Staff were clearly beginning to learn the rules of 'playing the game'. 
Although the game was not yet clear, due to the rapid change, it was quite 
transparent for many that while the business of the bank meant one thing, the 
achievement of targets often meant another. 
Measurement systems, while becoming more and more advanced, were not 
quite sophisticated enough to measure every component of the job. Secondly, 
there had to be sorne questioning as to whether the reliance on those indicators 
which were utilised was the right indicators to measure in isolation from other 
factors. Staff were not always happy about bending the rules to play the game but 
it was clear that they were prepared to do so if appearing to succeed depended on 
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it. In this case earning the bonus was less of concern because most assumed that 
they would be awarded a 'met' anyway. What was important were the following 
two factors. One was to appear to be hitting the targets in terms of the published 
headline figures; the other was control over the effort bargain. Both of them can 
be viewed as elements involved in the redefining of the wage for effort 
mechanism. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Baldamus (195 1) argues that there are 
two mechanisms to control work intensity. One is the payment system and the 
other is the system of administration. 
Management by Contract involved both of these factors and can be viewed 
as an attempt by the employer to generally gain more control and compliance over 
the costs and the operation of the various production units. Management by 
Contract and the associated job evaluation utilised PRP as a payment system to 
redefine the effort-wage relationship, while also utilising the contract to attempt to 
administer what work should be prioritised. We also saw earlier that the HR 
department had been reconstituted into a new system of administration in which 
people management and policy -were combined in order to create consent for areas 
such as policy, while at the same time, softening the effects of this by using the 
language of training and development and autonomy. 
Reduced autonomy, discretion and centralisation of the different 
production units also occurred within the ambit of handing more autonomy and 
discretion. This, however, occurred only within defined budgets and rules. How 
then can this be understood? According to Streeck (1987), economic crisis forces 
employers to look for innovative strategies as a way of competing with other 
firms. PRP is just one means of finding a best practice with which to compete. 
Technology, work organisation, labour input and industrial relations institutions 
are all interlinked but how best to use them is a matter of experiment (Streeck, 
1987). Similarly, Nolan and Edwards (1983) emphasise that that employers may 
use many means to gain compliance or control but may not always know what it is 
they want to achieve. Certainly, Management by Contract may have seemed 
attractive because it incorporates most of the above but in terms of addressing the 
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problem of labour costs, it responds to the dual problems of occupational and 
employment factors (Baldamus 1951). Occupational deals with the skill and 
experience component of the wage rate while employment represents the rate for a 
particular amount of effort. Both factors were being addressed by the bank in the 
form of the division of labour and PRP. 
In the old pay systems based on the 'going rate' and seniority, effort was 
defined mainly in terms of inputs, while schemes based on PRP meant that effort 
became redefined in terms of outputs, even where schemes were supposedly based 
on competences. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
RETAIL CO. 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the performance management scheme in Retail Co., 
its organisation and effects. It begins by examining the changes in the retail sector 
more generally before looking at how these have affected the response of the 
company. It will then look at the performance management scheme, the objective 
being to highlight the vagueness of the scheme in terms of its stated aims and 
objectives. indeed, rather, the scheme involves control elements which are aimed 
at responding to the competitive position in which the company found itself 
during an cra of intense competition, restructuring and technological change. 
At Retail Co. the research took place at four separate stores and in various 
head office departments. During visits to stores, I researched by walking about 
freely and talking to staff at any time was permitted. Some were interviewed on 
the shopfloor while others said that they preferred to carry out the interview in 
private. The stores and departments were chosen in consultation with senior 
personnel of the company, but the individuals were mainly chosen at random by 
myself in order to prevent any bias. It was only in those departments where it 
proved necessary to pre-arrange meetings where the company chose staff at 
random for me. As well as formally interviewing 75 staff, written details of the 
scheme and pay arrangements more generally and any further information that was 
requested was provided. 
7.1 Retail secto 
The retail sector has always been very competitive but in recent years it 
has experienced many changes which, in turn, have led to changes in the structure 
of the industry. The sector is not a coherent whole so the responses to the 
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changing situation and environment have been many and varied. As Walters and 
Laffy (1996) state, however, there have been three main factors which have been 
responsible for much of the change, including influencing major changes in 
customer response: 
* Social change - leads to consumer changes in expectations, behaviours and 
expectations; 
Economic change - influences many things such as income, employment, 
development decisions and diversification opportunities; and 
Technological change - resulted in changes to working patterns, changes in 
customer service and changes to cost profiles. 
These changes occurred over time periods. In the post-war recovery 
period, there was a growth in the sale of consumable durables and the multistores 
which sold them. During the 1950s and 1960s, many companies undertook 
acquisitions in a bid to speed the growth process up whilst applying pressure to 
suppliers. The 1960s also saw a particular growth in the development of 'own 
brands' and a move away from solely low-cost based on quantity to more quality. 
From the 1970s, there was also a growth in segmentation and customer profiling 
as customers began to demand more diversity and to challenge previous notions of 
style. 
Technological developments in retail have been great and have diffused 
rapidly, especially more recently during the 1980s and 1990s. Technological 
development has occurred in distribution, material handling and packaging to 
name but a few but by far the greatest impact is in the area of information 
technology. 
Information technology has had both internal and external effects. Internal 
benefits have. accompanied the introduction of EPOS (electronic point-of-sale) 
data collection and EFTPOS (electronic funds transfer at the point-of-sale). EPOS 
has enabled retailers to manage inventories much more effectively. Stock levels 
have generally lowered while availability has increased. It has facilitated 
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merchandising replenishment and recording. The accuracy and immediacy of data 
flows produced by EPOS have also provided reliability in what is an unreliable 
sector. The consequences have been that planning and replenishment can operate 
on lower levels of stock and to shorter and much more accurate times. 
Electronic data processing technology also has allowed greater 
management surveillance and control of the labour process. EPOS, in particular, 
allows labour monitoring and gives the facility to schedule labour more effectively 
(du Gay 1996). By deploying labour at peak activity periods, overall staff costs 
can be lowered significantly. It also reduces operational costs as in the case of 
price marking. It can then work further down the chain by enabling labour 
schedules in distribution centres to be planned more cost effectively. Finally, it 
helps to control the costs of pilfering. The external benefits are that a different 
approach to the supplier/distributor relationship is available. EPOS data can 
create a whole supply chain, being extended, if necessary, right the way down to 
the producers of the raw materials. 
IT in general has allowed the focusing of sales down to different customer 
groups. It has permitted developments in unitisation - productivity of sales space 
is optimised to increase sales density. During the 1980s, the professional 
approach to retailing apparent in the 1970s was becoming dominant in the 
successful businesses. Clear views were taken concerning the positioning of 
businesses within their target markets. The 1980s and 1990s are argued to require 
a much more strategic view of retailing although just how strategic this is is open 
to interpretation. It has been the 'value led' 1990s, based on either quantity or 
quality, the 'back to basic' approach. This has produced a clear view of 
management philosophy and style for the 1990s as the pursuit for increased profits 
have focused on generating higher turnover and slimmer mark-ups. Having 
pursued rationalisation and restructuring many organisations emerged with much 
more favourable margins. 
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Efficient companies have positioned themselves so that they will be able to 
respond to growth opportunities with management and production structures that 
will benefit from low operational gearing. Companies have also taken a long look 
at 'what business are we inT This has resulted in major divestments being 
identified as not being central to the rest of the business (i. e. a redefinition of the 
'core' business). Retail Co is a prime example. 
This intense restructuring has caused much change in the way that retailers 
view their labour. For most retailers, labour represents the second largest outlay 
after merchandising costs. It is therefore not surprising that finding efficient ways 
of utilising labour are a great priority for many retailers (Penn, 1996). du Gay 
(1996), argues that an intense division of labour, a pronounced centralisation of 
command, surveillance and control have reduced significantly the degree of 
discretion exercised by shopfloor workers and even store management. 
The impact of decreased employer commitment to, and increased 
surveillance over, retail workers is reflected in the problems which retailers have 
concerning growing staff turnover. This is not helped by the fact that most of the 
ma . or 'multiples' have tended to go for a Taylorised mode of organising 
employment. All of the above may have led to what Fox (1991) calls a 'low trust' 
relationship in most retail companies as shop workers were transformed and de- 
skilled from assistants, who were expected to give customers personal service and 
have a detailed knowledge of goods, into check out operators (Sparkes 1996). Yet 
one has to qualify this by asking how far, for example, the check-out worker of the 
1970s was a skilled sales assistant in the first place. 
But towards the late 1980s and 1990s, however, the retreat back into 
specialisms, as competition intensified, led retailers to compete not so much on 
volume but orf customer and quality service. The customer became 'god' and this 
meant a different emphasis on shop workers who were now the key to providing 
customer service and capturing the hearts and minds of the consumer and not just 
their purses. Many commentators imply that this may have an empowering effect 
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(e. g., du Gay 1996) but within the minute division of labour that has occurred, it is 
extremely difficult to judge what this means in practice. What is clear is that part 
of the change meant that there now had to be a re-emphasis on training of staff to 
deal with the customer focus. 
Structural change in the industry led to changes in employees and the role 
of management. The most influential mechanisms promoting this change were 
advances in technology (Freathy and Sparkes, 1996). The ability to collect sales 
data through EPOS meant that store performance and thus individual performance 
would be monitored and controlled both continuously and effectively. At the 
other extreme, because retail was becoming sophisticated and technologically 
demanding, this led to the recruitment of graduate trainees. More professional 
management to cover a reduced number of store decisions, however, did not bode 
well for recruitment (Freathy and Sparkes, 1996). This rationalisation and 
specialisation led to a polarisation of the labour force (i. e. a small band of 
specialised managers and a large band of day labourers: (Sparkes 1986)). In fact, a 
duality of employment has occurred, causing an almost complete break between 
management and sales floor staff (du Gay 1996). 
Freathy (1996) looks at store roles in terms of segmentation theory and 
argues that there are three layers: 
Primary - management; 
Lower tier primary - supervisors; and 
Secondary - assistants. 
In reality, this picture is too simplistic. As Marchington (1995) comments, 
a lot of the debate on segmentation neglects notions of power and we need to be 
aware of management's motives for using part-time labour. It is too simplistic to 
assume that managers are just looking to produce secondary labour markets. It is 
only if part-time labour is explicitly cheaper that we can start to examine whether 
its status is peripheral. Part-time labour is not cheap labour per se for some 
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retailers but rather, a better means of utilising labour to cope with peak periods. It 
is one of many strategies available to them. 
7.2 The orggnisation of PRP in Retail Co. 
7.2.1 Retail Co. 
At the end of the financial year 1996, Retail Co. had again performed 
strongly. According to the company, the continuing growth demonstrated the 
effectiveness of focused product ranges, competitive prices, quality customer 
service and attractive shopping environment. 
Its profit improvement results from sustained application of our value 
based management approach, supported by retail information and analysis 
systems that are among the most advanced in the UK (Chief executive 
1996). 
According to The Econoniist (1997), Retail Co. sagged towards "mushy 
general retailing" in the 1970s/80s but was now reaping the rewards of steady 
growth, with return to shareholders in the past five years of 106%, comparable to 
Marks and Spencer. Retail Co's. response to the increasing competition was to 
retreat into specialism. The company has made major changes to their retail 
organisation which has resulted in significant improvements in their performance. 
The heads of the nine major business divisions now enjoy considerable freedom 
which represents a break from the traditional, highly centralised, decision-making 
structure. Retail Co. account for two-thirds of group turnover and operating 
profits (Vander Weyer 1995). 
Buying and merchandising have been reorganised into business centres 
based on product groups. This has enabled buyers/merchandisers to develop 
greater knowledge and expertise of their particular product groups. Store 
operations have undergone change. Operations management has been organised 
into large and small group stores. It was found that the problems in each were 
quite different and that more effective management was possible by this change 
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(Walters and Laffy 1996). This process evolved slowly. The success of Retail 
Co. small store format, concentrating on health and beauty, was clearly evident by 
1994. In September 1993, it was announced that the small stores chain would be 
increased by 240 stores over the next few years at a cost of L75 million (Cosinetics 
international 1994). They also piloted small stores within some Sainsbury food 
stores. In 1995, the change was completed in a major review of all store 
operations. Forty four large outlets were moved to the small store sector while 17 
others transferred to new areas altogether (Chenfist and Druggist 1995). In April 
when the changes came into effect the large stores numbered 172 and the small 
stores 989. Both groups had similar turnovers of around fl. 5 billion. By 1997, 
Retail Co. had 1,260 stores, 160 of which had been opened in the last four years, 
and they planned to open another 80. Space productivity has been improved by 
the operation of programmes to increase efficiency. Investment by Retail Co. into 
marketing, systems and store refurbishment is continuing. 
Operating efficiency has also been improved by the installation of EPOS 
throughout the chain of 1,260 stores. This was expected to result in a stock 
reduction of some 20% over 1993-94, some f-50 to E60 million less in working 
capital. The EPOS facility was also expected to improve staff scheduling so that it 
would be easier to meet the pattern of demand in the stores. A change in the 
balance of full-time to part-time staff is expected. A one per cent reduction in 
staff costs would result in a saving of E270 million. Improved gross margin 
perforinance as resulted from a revised product mix. Direct product productivity 
(DPP) control of 42,000 lines as also increased gross margins. DPP has facilitated 
range decisions by store location and store size. The sophistication of the 
information system provides information on price sensitivity which is particularly 
important for own label products. Sales of seasonal lines are tracked and adjusted. 
The information system provides for rapid replacement of fast moving lines and 
customer transactions are increased by cross promotions (e. g. films and sun tan oil 
(Walters and Laffy 1996)). According to the Retail Co. in-house magazine, in 
1996 they had spent around E52 million on new systems including computer 
capabilities for stores and head office departments. It notes that the new 
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technology is already in 371 stores and was being rolled out at the rate of 12 stores 
per week (Blueprint, August 1996). The company had been putting huge 
resources into its computer facilities, and as well as adopting electronic processing 
for their purchasing orders and invoicing, they were also planning to use 
electronic mail to improve efficiency and quality (Asia sources electronics, 1996). 
Retail Co. continued to lead other retailers in the use of information technology. 
A project (Sunrise) introduced in 1995 used computer technology to target 
information to the right people at the right time. Staff planning functions, training 
programmes, electronic mail and many other applications were all geared to 
minimise the time staff spend in routine activities and to free them for more time 
to help customers (Annual report 1996: 7). 
These developments have also been paralleled by specialist retailing 
activities such as health and beauty, opticians and photographic processing. Retail 
Co. have a third of the E8 billion market for health and beauty products which 
more than four times that of its nearest rival (The Econondst 1997). 
The secret of their success, according to Vander Weyer (1995), is a rare 
combination of long-established traditions and state of the art management 
techniques. Their strategy is as follows: 
Maintain a high level of investment, focused on our existing operations 
and directed to maximising long term value. Increasing focus on core 
business is a common theme across the group. Retail Co. is concentrating 
space and product development effort on healthcare and beauty products 
(Annual report 1996). 
Their activities have been governed by a simple but powerftil set of ideas. 
At all levels, from strategy down to product changes, it adheres to the principle of 
'value based management' which decrees that something is only worth doing if it 
creates additional value for shareholders (i. e. if it generates a long tenn return in 
access of cost of capital). 
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Ultimately value has been measured not by simple earnings per share but 
by the accumulation of gross dividends and growth in share price. The key to 
extracting value is maximisation of long-term cash flows. This is an attempt, 
according to some, which is not designed to hold the attention of City analysts. 
These results were traceable to two decisions in Retail Co. 's recent history 
(Vander Weyer 1995). The appointment of a new chief executive in October 1987 
and the purchase of a rival group in 1989. Their success also owes a lot to their 
management style, notably personnel, which, according to Vander Weyer (1995), 
is imbued with a set of values which owe more than a little to the cost conscious, 
phi lanthropically-inclined founder, who died in 193 1. 
The importance of staff is highlighted by the company annual report: 
Our emphasis on building value is evident. The value of our people 
continues to grow with their skills, knowledge, experience and dedication. 
It is no coincidence that our business won no less than three new investors 
in people awards during the year for the quality of their training and 
communication. Nor is it any coincidence that we can confidently put 
forward the expertise of our own store staff as key differentiators for our 
business. It is our people who build value and I am grateful to them for 
their achievements (Annual report, 1996). 
Research carried out for Retail Co. clearly showed customers want service. 
For Retail Co. this means trained staff who can spend more time on the shopfloor. 
In 1995, Retail Co. invested heavily in building on staff s existing skills. Every 
member of staff was trained in the 'Retail Co. experience' programme aimed at 
making sure that customers enjoy their shopping in the stores. Managers and their 
supervisory teams were being encouraged to take a more proactive leadership role 
(Annual Report 1996: 7). 
The e'x-director of personnel, who had been with the company for many 
years, did not like the term 'Human Resource', insisting that "people are people 
with sensitivities - not cannon fodder" (Hawkesworth 1996). He realised that 
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there was a general feeling among staff that management no longer cared about 
staff and that aspects of the company were not like they used to be with regard to 
personnel matters. He insisted, however, that Retail Co. was in a different world 
now and if it wanted to remain competitive, then things would have to change. He 
argued that because of increasing competition, there was more pressure on people 
and that emerged in people's minds as less caring, yet demanding organisations, 
with successful teams often being the most caring ones. He said that staff interests 
were of the utmost concern in the company's decision-making. He noted that 
value-based management did not mean abandoning all other considerations. 
Shareholder value must embrace, both customer and staff value. Although the 
country as a whole is characterised by high job insecurity, at Retail Co. 
employment levels have been maintained. This meant disposing of some sections 
of the company but they have taken on new sections as well. 
7.2.2 Retail Co.: Performance management 
Retail Co's. statement on remuneration in the annual report (1996) is as 
follows: 
We are motivating staff throughout the organisation to recognise and build 
shareholder value. In all our business units bonus schemes are based on 
the achievement of targets related more closely than ever to value creation 
The company's literature noted that they encouraged people to contribute 
and aimed to ensure that all individuals saw their targets linked to the wider 
business plan. The following are the five principles stated by the company 
literature: 
1. Mutual agreement of contract to improve individual's performance; 
2. Consider the whole job - not do so might cause focus on some aspects at 
expense of others; 
3. Define the job in terms of key responsibilities. i. e. the company's definition of 
what are the key outputs of the job; 
4. Define objectives in terms of what to do to meet the key responsibilities 
(KRs); and 
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5. Performance is reviewed or assessed as 'met', 'exceeded', or 'fell short' of 
contract. 
Performance contracts were to be utilised as a management tool, a new 
means of communicating and for influencing the way in which all staff 
contributed to the company's success. In particular, the reorganisation of the 
company and the introduction of value-based management meant that the 
company were attempting to line everyone in the organisation behind its main 
objectives. This was part of a holistic view of how the management of 
performance should progress, and as part of this, the company desired to focus 
people on performance and away from the 'going rate' for the job. 
The organisation of the Scheme: Performance criteria 
Each employee within Performance Management is given a contract, 
although for store staff below supervisory level it took a slightly different form in 
that it was not fon-nally called a contract. In order to manage the scheme, it was 
advised that each contract should have five to eight KRs in each job (in the case of 
store staff below supervisory levels, there are three standard KRs). Objectives 
cover areas within each KR, and good objectives must be SMART - Specific, 
Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timely. 
To keep everyone concentrating on the whole job instead of particular 
objectives there is a design feature built into the performance management 
system.. Breaking the job down into the KRs which then have their objectives 
within them means that, if people concentrate on one area, they would not meet 
their contract. Senior personnel said that this was a good feature and the fact that 
they have no evidence of staff concentrating on certain objectives to the detriment 
of other parts of the job is probably due to that design. Managers are told that they 
should review the contract throughout the year in order for it to work correctly, the 
idea being that the managers should be responsible. 
204 
Individuals are rated under one of the following three headings (figures for 
1996 are added to give an example of the procedure). 
FALL SHORT 
Individuals may fall below salary scale minimum if they receive this rating. 
No increase should be given. Only in exceptional circumstances. 
If the review is carried out later in the year and increase is awarded it must 
come out of the overall salary budget at the time. 
MET 
Those low in salary scale should receive a greater increase than high in scale 
The suggested increase is from 3% - high in scale and just met contract, to 
3.75% for those who comfortably met and are below 105% in scale. 
To reach the top of scale an individual should be performing at a higher level 
than met. 
Above scale maximum - same as exceeded. 
EXCEED 
" Low in scale - should receive the greatest increase. e. g. Sales assistant below 
105% of minimum 5% to 5.5%. 
" High in scale - lesser increase as they are being rewarded relatively higher for 
the job e. g. above 115%, 3.5% suggested. 
" Above the scale max. - Should have an increase no greater than 3% and it will 
be red circled next year. 
The scale maximum cannot be exceeded. 
When informing individuals of their award, the total salary relative to the scale 
should be given equal prominence to percentage increases. 
Managers are provided with two copies of review sheets. One is for 
carrying out preliminary work. The other has to be returned to area office. 
Managers have to work out percentages, basics, merits and so forth to get to the 
total increase for each person. They then have to total these up and adjust awards 
until they get to the store increase of 3.5%. Area offices have been provided with 
a computer salary modelling system to enable them to review recommended 
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awards. It is advised that no communication should be made with staff until the 
area or district manager has confirmed that store proposals have been accepted. 
7.2.3 Differences between large and small stores 
There was great similarity in the different stores visited, as will become 
clear in the rest of the chapter. There were also some subtle differences which 
deserve a mention, however. 
Midland store 
Staff at the Midland store were very reluctant to open up and express their 
views. It was also necessary to talk to people in much more simplistic terms about 
PRP, than say, Bank Co. Importantly, a striking observation was the fact that the 
contract did not seem to mean that much to anyone. 
Northern store 
Staff were a little more relaxed here than at Midland store. They talked 
more freely about how they are watched, monitored, and the fiddles which took 
place. The scheme was used as part of the interview technique at this store. The 
personnel manager commented that they mentioned the scheme to prospective 
employees and if they did not show any enthusiasm for the scheme they were not 
considered to be the type of employee that Retail Co. were looking for. The new 
culture was also much more aggressive in that management were attempting to 
make a clear break from their traditional paternalistic style of management. It was 
not just conscientious hard working staff who were required, but rather, staff who 
did what the company required, when the company required it. 
The store had been warned by area management about not awarding 
enough 'fall shorts'. Management and supervisors were unhappy with this 
because it was seen as a poor reflection on themselves. Yet in attempting to apply 
it they made themselves appear even more harsh to employees. 
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Small stores 
In the small stores, the emphasis was definitely on direct control, or what 
could be called 'direct paternalism'. Hierarchy was strict and a powerful force, 
with authority being passed from area to store managers. Employees were 
extremely wary of what they said and traditional small store management, who did 
not understand or agree with the new logic, were increasingly being replaced by 
young graduate trainees. 
Headquarters 
The HQ staff seemed to have far more to say than the store staff. They 
were far more confident and their jobs were also more fluid. Most new recruits 
were graduate trainees and seemed to expect rapid promotion within a year or two 
of starting the job, especially in the marketing department. Very few staff knew 
what grade they were on and did not seem to really care. It was easy to see why 
staff in these departments were on different salaries for the same jobs. Here wages 
reflected more the politics of recruitment and retention than performance. 
7.3 The obiectives of PRP and the manaaernent of obiectives in Retail Co. 
7.3.1 How the reward side works 
The company said that it tried to give line management as much flexibility 
as possible so that when it came to the annual salary review, the final decision was 
theirs. Thus the guidelines are based on a number of aspects. First of all, the 
increase should take account of the individual's performance. Second, the 
company had got a rough idea of how many people are going to 'exceed', 'meet', 
and 'fall short' of contract. Further, it turns out that roughly 4% exceed, 4% fall 
short and the rest meet. Finally, there was just one increase and it was 
performance related. The organisation has now made it standard, after three years 
of getting there, that people who 'fall short' get no increase. 
An example of the way in which managers were given advice on salary increases 
is as follows: 
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Exceeding contract = N+2% 
Meeting contract =N 
Falling short of contract = N-3% 
The company would usually increase both salary scales and overnight 
increases for the annual paybill (where N equals 3% for 1996). 
Senior personnel argued that for the company, the scheme was part of a 
holistic view as to how they manage people's performance and looking at all the 
issues around that. It was an opportunity to focus people on performance rather 
than the going rate. 
When asked specifically what issue it was brought in to address, five main 
reasons were mentioned - motivation, change of culture, pay/performance link-, to 
change the nature of the employment relationship and change the role of line 
management. Store managers also tended to mention most of these, but mainly 
placed the emphasis on controlling costs, signifying the pressures they were under 
to meet and manage budgets. 
The company said that they chose PRP because the old type of merit 
scheme was not working. PRP was seen to be 'best practice' and what was going 
on in the rest of industry. They also said that it fitted well with other business 
objectives because at the same time, they were making their planning process 
more sophisticated. Thus, for the company to make a more direct link between 
pay and performance, it came at a good time, particularly going back to aspects 
that they wanted to change - the culture and line up all the arrows behind the 
organisational mission objectives. Store managers, on the other hand, tended to 
put the emphasis purely on the fact of increasing productivity and fitting in with 
the use of performance contracts. In terms of the organisational context, they 
commented that: 
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I think we did want to have more of a process that would put standards 
across what is a pretty diverse organisation. We have still got that in 
Retail Co. because some of the areas have still not gone onto the full 
process, most people have. It did enable us to put a much more consistent 
process across, including making us change our pay review (Senior 
personnel manager). 
Store managers thought that it was much more of a pragmatic approach, 
believing that it was not really chosen to fit in with the culture. 
I think it was a case of the company wanted PRP so we will have this. I 
don't think it was a sophisticated decision" (store manager). 
The company was aware that the scheme had its problems. The main 
constraints form the personnel point-of-view was the skills of line management to 
effectively assess and differentiate shades of performance. This was important to 
the company. They thought that managers were getting a bit better but the limits 
of the scheme were 'squeezed' because managers were not going to give one 
person a big proportion because the implication was that another person gets less. 
Again store managers tended to lean towards the practical problems. They 
thought that one of the biggest problems revolved around the fact that PRP was 
restricted to a maximum set of money in any one year. They also mentioned the 
time constraint due to heavy workloads. 
7.3.2 Vagueness of objectives and lack of motivation 
The fundamental part of the scheme, both in terms of performance and 
application, were to do with the setting and measurement of the targets and 
objectives - the contract. It is clear from most of the research into PRP that these 
schemes very rarely work in the way that they are purported to do (Marsden and 
French, 1997. Lewis, 1997). It is, therefore, extremely important to judge the 
stated aims against the practice to see where it is that the practice differs from the 
theory. Only then can one tell what the main effects of the schemes are and 
identify what they are really being used for. The first point with any scheme is to 
see whether employees actually understand what it is. 
I 
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Most people thought ('thought' is emphasised because this is actually what 
employees said) that they had been informed about the scheme, but equally, many 
said that they did not understand it. In the light of the amount of time spent 
training staff, this is a very negative sign, especially with regard to the 
management and supervisory grades. The marketing department was particularly 
bad, with no one saying that the scheme had been formally explained to them. 
Consistent with the rest of the findings of the research, staff were largely in favour 
of the principle of PRP. Out of the 80 formal interviews carried out with staff, 
only II people said that they did not really agree with the principle of PRP 
(Northern had a much larger proportion of people not agreeing with the principle 
than any other store). Yet again, very few people actually thought that the scheme 
worked in practice (nine). However, some staff did express the feeling that the 
scheme had improved over the last couple of years. 
The reasons given for the scheme not working were as follows. Firstly, it 
was very much a case of people's relationships with senior members of staff. 'It 
depends on your supervisor, if your face fits, you get more' was an extremely 
common comment. Secondly, and most obvious, because the scheme was seen to 
be judged mainly on whether you get on with your supervisor or not, it was also 
seen not to relate to performance in any way. A common complaintwas that there 
were problems in the way that the scheme was monitored, with the performance 
criteria not being defined adequately. Thirdly, despite the anomalies demonstrated 
over the first two issues, staff viewed the scheme as being over-regulated. There 
were rules and regulations, objectives and targets, but little understanding of how 
the process worked. 
7.3.3 Pay 
The pay side threw even further confusion on the scheme. The fact that 
there was little consistency led staff to comment that 'The scheme depends 
entirely on management and the way that they use the salary budget'. Again, 
similar to Bank Co., the sums of money actually involved were seen as irrelevant 
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and paltry. Staff became upset, not by the amount, but rather, by how the whole 
process worked and money was shared out. 
'It's only right and proper that there should be devolved responsibility 
down to line management level. It encourages dialogue with the staff and 
helps to reduce poor performance. The problem is with the 
inconsistencies, even within a functional area never mind the company as a 
whole'(HQ). 
There were anomalies, largely brought about by changing structures which 
had left many jobs not fitting comfortably with the existing grading structure. A 
lot of these problems arose largely due to the fact that the pay system within Retail 
Co. was a very secretive affair. Even many of the store staff said ' we are not 
allowed to talk about pay. They are afraid that people will find out the 
inconsistencies'. Staff were also well aware that the company was working to a 
predetermined distribution even though they were not informed of this by the 
company. The whole process, as one manager described it, largely depended on 
management's ability to set good contracts. Yet again, staff felt very much that 
the system could be abused. 
'We set the goals and they always say that the targets are achievable, but 
the goal posts move'. 
This was a crucial point. It was not so much hard work but how they did it 
and what they did. Because of these kinds of anomalies, the scheme threw up all 
kind of problems on the pay side, with many staff saying that you never really 
knew what you had to do to achieve anything. 
This fed into the actual aims and objective of the scheme from the 
company point of view, which was to line everyone in the organisation behind the 
key objectives of the business. Store managers tended to be more practical and 
say that the main aims were matters such as customer care and trying to 
standardise the objective-setting process to fit in with the store action plan which 
was considered to be full of jargon and comprising no great detail. Another factor 
for store managers was that the goal posts were continually moving. Even from 
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the company to the managers, the message became distorted by the everyday 
realities and priorities of store life. By the time they got to the average store 
worker, even more distortion had taken place. This can be highlighted by showing 
the broad nature of some of the standard key responsibilities for manager: 
e Meet sales targets within agreed costs. 
Sustain the performance of the sales area by training, managing and 
developing a motivated workforce. 
Attain standard of customer service required. 
Conform with company policies, procedures and operating systems. 
Develop the business potential of the sales area. 
Deliver business centre marketing objectives. 
Just under half (39) of interviewed staff said that they were aware of a link 
between their objectives and the wider business objectives. This is not a very 
good result for a scheme given that its main objective was to line everyone up 
behind the business plan and objectives of the group. What makes the result 
worse is that staff were only aware of the business objectives in as far as they were 
cascaded down to them. They had no awareness of what this meant at a higher 
level. This implied that if managers were not very good at this process, and from 
the above it is fair to assume that this is the case, then employees and supervisors 
had no way of knowing what it was they were supposed to be aiming for. This 
was reflected when asking employees what they thought the aims and objectives 
of the scheme were. Their replies revolved around six main points: to provide 
focus, save money, raise profits, monitor staff and deal with poor performers. All 
six are inter-related and it is worth going through each in more detail. 
In relation to focus, staff actually welcomed the fact that it was better for 
them to know what is expected of them. They were quite in agreement that the 
company should be attempting to get the best out of staff and to correct things 
which were not being done. However, they did not always agree with the aspects 
that the company was trying to focus them on. Even some of the more senior 
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managers, who were given a wider picture of what the company were attempting 
to do, thought that there were ulterior motives: 
I get a copy of my manager's performance contract and the one for the 
buying group. You get both the targets and the budgets which helps you to 
know what you are working to. But I think it is various other things - it's a 
management too], to see who fell short, and an official document to use 
against staff and to standardise jobs. 
It is interesting to note that as part of the focus, many staff thought that 
jobs were being standardised. The focus for many was on a standardised element 
which they failed to link to wider objectives. Instead, they just linked it to the 
second factor - Save money and increase profits. Although they thought that there 
was job standardisation, they also felt that they were doing more work and to do 
more meant that they needed fewer people. This, in turn, meant that the company 
saved money. They thought that the company used the scheme to stop them 
giving money away to those who did not deserve it, thus providing an incentive to 
others. 
On a more negative side, however, they usually went back to talking about 
the 'pot' and 'do you moan about 3% or risk being with no jobT. For many, the 
focus and saving money was all to do with effort. 
It's to get more work out of you and pick up on the things that you have 
done wrong. You are made to feel that you have never done enough. 
They also said that the new ideas from the company were coming so 
rapidly now that they have trouble keeping up with them. 'It's all right saying we 
have computer systems to deal with it all, computers are all right until they go 
wrong'. Staff certainly felt that they were being set too many objectives. Related 
to getting staff to put more effort into the right things was also dealing with those 
members of staff who were not doing so - Poor performers. 
It's easy to weed out the poor performers with this scheme. 
213 
Managers said that they needed to get the right people into the right jobs. 
Many said that they had had to change staff who had worked for them for a long 
time because they were not the right kind of staff any more. Getting more effort 
out of staff and weeding out poor performers, however, also meant that one had to 
be monitoring what they were doing. Staff said 'it keeps a regular check on you. 
New systems always mean more work or less staff. Similarly, management 
mentioned 'It's to make you more accountable to monitoring performance and you 
can use it on the disciplinary route'. 
Staff felt that there were some problems with the aims and objectives, 
however. Particularly, they felt that they did not always have the time, or the 
opportunity, to meet all of the objectives. They said that if they were working on 
the counter they did not have time to do things like make a sales link, which you 
would be able to do working on the floor. For achieving these kinds of targets, 
staff received incentives of one sort or another, including raffle tickets for the 
sales links. They also stated that there is always someone trying to find fault with 
what they have done rather than providing them with the right kind of objectives. 
I can see what they are trying to do but sometimes it is the things that you 
don't do which may be a good decision. But that wouldn't be measurable. 
Instead, most concentration was on the competitive sales techniques for 
which they received raffle tickets. At the end of the month, the tickets would be 
drawn for prizes. Mangers commented: 
Customer comments get rewarded with raffle tickets, that way we know 
who the best performers are. 
7.4 The politics of PRP in Retail Co. 
The culture of Retail co. had always been one of strong paternalism up 
until the mid-1980s. It stemmed from the Methodist background of its founder. 
The company had always been a 'family firm' with strong Protestant work ethic 
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values. All this was to change in the mid-1980s, originally taking the form of cost 
cutting of welfare and other staff costs, including the numbers of staff employed. 
This was a first for many of the long-serving employees at the company. As 
mentioned earlier, however, the position somewhat reversed later in the early 
1990s when the emphasis was put on providing customer service. Although good 
quality staff were now the order of the day, there was still an element of utilising 
staff in the best way possible. This meant a combination of matching staff with 
peak periods and downsizing. 
Control, especially in the stores, had always been very much of a direct 
nature which tended to make staff very reliant on their supervisors. Supervisors 
were in constant contact, watching staff throughout the day. They walked around, 
observing what staff were doing in the most extremes of ways. I actually 
observed many supervisors walking close to members of staff and starting to sort 
out shelves almost next to the ones on which the members of staff were working. 
One member of staff commented that: 
it is a them and us attitude. They use the scheme to keep staff stressed and 
working harder. 
In fact, on several occasions when interviewing staff on the sales floor, 
supervisors came within feet of us and started the same ritual. This was despite 
the fact that all had been informed about the research taking place. This ritual 
obviously made staff feel totally uneasy and was obviously a form of behaviour 
that supervisors passed on to each other implicitly. When one supervisor was 
questioned about the behaviour, she was genuinely surprised and said that she was 
just checking the shelves. The behaviour occurred too frequently and in different 
stores for it to be a coincidence, however. 
Bureaucratic control had also been present in the company for some time 
but this was -mainly aimed at providing rules for behaviours, while direct control 
was aimed at securing compliance. The 1980s and 1990s had seen a rapid growth 
in technical types of control and all these various elements of control had been 
integrated into the Performance Management system. The technical control had 
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also made the standardisation of store work more possible. With the 
standardisation of roles, the company also began to utilise routines in terms of 
training staff in ways in which they should approach and respond to customers. 
Routinisation was aimed at providing a minimal level of acceptable work 
performance. However, as Leidner (1996) argues, these routines aimed at keeping 
the less competent or dependable workers from undermining organisational. 
standards can also prevent the better workers from using their talents and common 
sense to meet the demands of particular situations. 
The move to quality service in the 1990s meant that workers had to be 
controlled in other ways which gave them some amount of leeway to use their 
personal skills while at the same time complying with company standards. As 
Leidner (1996) points out, this leads to a three-way control system which involves 
employees, employers and customers. Each can be used by the other in the battle 
for control. This meant, however, a different kind of management than previously 
- the perfon-nance management system as a management tool. 
7.4.1 Management tool 
The company clearly saw the scheme as a tool for getting managers to 
manage and for 'lining everyone up behind the key priorities'. Store managers 
themselves also saw it as a means of dealing with theirs and supervisors skills. 
Restructuring the way that they dealt with peers and subordinates was very 
important. In the company, some jobs had been reorganised so that the title 
4consultant' now signified a senior salesperson who was a specialist in particular 
product ranges. This person was the head of a minute speciality such as cosmetic 
(brand name), perfumes, baby goods, hair care, photography and so on. These 
people were very much encouraged to view their own little section as their own 
business and to treat it as such. While this implied a certain amount of status for 
the person, it also made the job more controllable from the company's point-of- 
view. Lower down, on the sales force side, jobs had also been reorganised so that 
the sales assistants spent more time on the shopfloor with the customers. Their 
previous role had been split into two so that their stock duties were now carried 
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out by a person in a separate position - the sales support assistant. This split 
proved useful in two ways. Firstly, it allowed sales staff to be present in the store 
all day instead of fetching stock from the storeroom. Secondly, it allowed the 
company to put those staff who they deemed to be less suitable with customers 
into the sales support roles who now had much less contact with the shopfloor. 
Why, then, if there was such close supervision should the company need 
another mode of control? The answer may lie not just with employees per se but 
also with the role of managers. Again, the company were clearly very keen for 
managers to take hold of the whole process as part of the new culture of creating 
value. This meant that managers were required to manage in a totally new way to 
that to which they were accustomed. In a way, they were to take more control 
over the management of performance whilst at the same time giving or portraying 
to employees some autonomy over the contract setting process. They therefore 
had dual pressures acting upon them - the added pressure of more responsibility 
and more self-monitoring. 
Most employees did say that they thought the scheme was being used as a 
management tool. Many recognised the fact that it was only a tool in that it 
standardised the way the staff were expected to work. They said that, because it 
clearly documented what was expected of a person and was very useftil for 
measuring that person against it, it made it much easier to set standards. They 
thought that if managers and supervisors got together to set standards, it would 
become useful for managing everyone with. It was also seen as a time for finding 
out what individuals were really like. One could say that it was a reinforcement of 
the surveillance already carried out by supervisors (i. e. not only knowing what 
employees are doing but knowing their minds as well). 
7.4.2 Contracts 
Contracts were also an integral part of the performance management 
scheme. For store assistants, it was less of a contract and more of a reinforcement 
of the way they should work and the products that they should sell. 
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As well as objectives within their contracts, staff were given other sales 
related targets on a regular basis. To most staff, the 'Blue cards' were more 
important than their other objectives. These were publicised in league tables so 
that staff could see how well everyone else had performed. Figures were put up 
on the notice boards and staff were involved in all kinds of competitions. Staff 
said that a lot of the selling techniques were not based on customer service but 
actually upon hard selling. Specific training was, in fact, aimed at selling to the 
customer. It was based on the fact that if one said certain things to the customer it 
would make him or her more amenable to buying items or goods. The 'Retail Co. 
experience' -a customer service training scheme - was all about smiling in certain 
ways' and repeating words back to the customer. Staff were observed by 
super-visors to see if they followed it and the company also employed mystery 
shoppers to check on staff. Most staff said how ridiculous it was and how most 
customers thought that they were an idiot for repeating their words. They were 
also encouraged to 'link sell' and 'catch a browser'. These were all hard sell 
techniques which, along with the blue card, enforced sales against the customer. 
Staff were even given targets to go around other business rivals to check on what 
they were doing. 
One target I had was to go around other businesses (i. e. competing firms), 
that was too much. If they did it again I wouldn't agree. So you don't 
always know what you are agreeing to in the contract. 
Although contracts were supposed to be agreed, staff and managers said 
that they were largely standardised (ef Hudson and Evans, 1994) and that any 
ideas that they had were just put on top of the standard ones. Many said that 
additional ob ectives were aimed at what the company perceived to be one's 
weaknesses. Most staff were very adamant, however, that one did not question 
supervisors or managers as it might lead to either 'your face not fitting' in the 
future or petty vindictiveness. 
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7.3.3 Surveillance: measurement and monitoring. 
Central personnel said that they had lost quite a few managers and staff 
that were under-performing because the focus had been much clearer and there are 
fewer hiding places for people. From that point-of-view, productivity had 
probably improved. At the same time, they did not think that they could put their 
hand on their heart and say, 'here are some hard measures of performance'. 
Feelings of being watched or monitored was a common experience for 
most store staff so it is not surprising that not so many of them thought that the 
scheme had made this situation more intense. Surprisingly, however, it was 
mainly the HQ functions which thought that they were being monitored and 
measured more through the PRP scheme. By contrast, it was those stores where 
monitoring was most extreme in the past whose staff were least likely to feel that 
PRP was intensifying this situation. Staff said that they were watched and 
monitored all the time but one did not get told straight away. It was the negative 
approach. 
If it's messy behind the counter the supervisor will say, well you have 
fallen short today, and it puts everyone in a foul mood. 
Here, it is highlighted that supervisors could use the targets as a lever for 
punishment for non-compliance. Compliance of 'what to do' was reinforced 
through the blue cards: 
We get given a monthly card now to put things on, then we give it to the 
supervisor for assessment so she knows what we have achieved. 
To provide evidence to supervisors, for some, was, however, seen to be 
telling the supervisor that they were wrong. There were not many who were 
prepared to cross the supervisor. The pressure of direct supervision was 
highlighted even more clearly when talking to supervisors: 
I have a confidential file to remember what staff have done. 
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One supervisor admitted that she directly monitored staff- 
the scheme allows us to do that, sort out the wheat from the chaff, put 
round pegs in roOd holes. It shows up the problem areas and gets you 
closer to staff. 
Supervisors tended to say that they spent most of their time monitoring to 
gain more visual evidence of what staff were doing. Management said similar 
things in that 'It encourages managers to manage better but it is difficult to say 
whether it is the scheme or the standards'. 
It seems fair to say that most of the store staff were monitored in a child- 
like fashion. They felt that they had to ask the supervisors before they do a thing. 
This is not to say that employees are 'trodden on'. Rather, it is more of a state of 
mind. These workers are capable and usually become the controllers rather than 
the controlled when given promotion. Rather than challenging the behaviour 
which they did not like applied to themselves, it was almost as though staff felt 
that they had to behave in the same way so as to achieve the promotion. 
7.4.4 Resistance: Playing the game and rules 
In many studies of the labour process, it is assumed that employees are the 
unknowing recipients of capitalist destiny. Yet we know from other studies that 
the production process is riddled with examples of employees resisting the logic 
of the capitalist process. Staff at Retail Co. obviously had ways of circumventing 
some of the above factors. 
There were obviously some staff who thought that under no circumstances 
could they 'get one over' on the company. These people thought they were being 
observed at all times. 
There is room for fiddling, but its not worth it in the long run. I've thought 
about changing the figures but I have never done it because if I got caught 
there would be trouble. 
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Some managers and supervisors were sure that they saw everything while 
others felt that the issue was not so clear-cut. 
This is a line management issue. Management have to make some rules to 
make sure the rules are not bent. But it's inevitable with the different 
levels of skill that some people will get away with it. 
Finally, there were a very large proportion of staff who knew that, at one 
level or another, there were ways of getting around the rules at several stages 
within the process. Staff learrit the rules of the game at four different levels. 
Firstly, with objective setting: 
It is in my interest to set something which I can meet or exceed. It's down 
to negotiations and it's a matter of trying to take control of the target 
setting process. 
Secondly, with objective meetings, staff said that there was nothing to stop 
one putting such things as 'customer browsing' down. Thirdly, at the reviews 
process: 
They make a visit to the office on purpose to tell them what they have 
done - to get their face known. 
Finally, there was leaming to provide proof. Members of staff said that 
there was nothing to stop two people getting together and saying that a customer 
had given them a compliment or confirming 'catching a browser'. 
7.5 Conclusion: Control and effort levels 
Shop workers have a long history of 'paternalism'. There is a tradition of 
'living in' whereby staff were, at best, an extended part of the family and, at worst, 
paid slaves. The growth of the multiple stores, which to a large extent were 
usually owned by those with strong religious beliefs, brought with it a growth in 
welfarism and benevolence towards those who showed that they were sober and 
willing to tow the company line. Marks and Spencer, Burton's, Boots and John 
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Lewis are all examples. All shared a duty to imbue staff with certain moral 
standards. Despite the fact that most of these types of companies are large MNCs, 
their historical legacy lives on. 
At Retail Co. in the past staff have been expected to behave in certain 
ways, to dress in a particular fashion and to express the kinds of values that the 
company expected from its staff so as to provide a particular kind of service for its 
customers. In return, they were encouraged to confonn by being offered good 
fringe benefits, good wages, job security and a feeling that they were part of the 
family. All this was dependent on performing in the way required. Now, the 
ways in which store staff are expected to perform have changed. Combined with 
rapid technological change, this has meant that the company is in a much better 
position to control certain elements of the employment relationship. Because 
technology now measures sales, it must also feel that it is in a much better position 
to measure how well staff do and the ways in which they achieve objectives. This 
is a fatal error, however, because it assumes that the system is measuring the right 
(and most important) aspects, when, in fact, it is not doing so. 
The control in stores was found to be hierarchical. This was as much to do 
with status as it was with skill. In fact, skill in supervisory work was 'the control'. 
The assistant supervisor learnt her trade under the wing of, and while deputising 
for, the supervisor. The supervisors always had, to some degree, deputised for the 
managers although this was becoming less common in large stores with the 
polarisation taking place between management and the rest due to the recruitment 
of graduate trainees. The skills of supervisory role were implicit skills, passed on 
through the observation of behaviours. 
The old method of control relied on observing staff in terms of behaviours 
but left the selling technique to staff. In the new method, the behaviours were set 
in the contract and supervisors observe staff in the way they sell. Yet when 
supervisors are left to deal with behaviour and appearance, the emphasis is really 
on 'pleasing' the customer. Now, however, the'emphasis is supposed to be on the 
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customer: Staff deal with behaviours and appearance, and supervisors make sure 
they 'hard' sell. This is, in some ways, having the opposite effect, however. 
Service work is largely about behaviours, and indeed is, more so than 
many other kinds of work. In contractual employment, the more rationally 
organised, the more its outcomes are defined and fixed whereas in service 
activities, outcomes are more likely to be achieved, the less means and ends are 
specified in detail. Thus as Offe (1985) argues, service work is always at the 
intersection of two rationalities: 
contractual employment, which entails detailed specification of means and 
ends and close direct vertical control over work activities and a high degree of 
standardisation, and 
2. rationality of mediation and conciliation typical of service activities (i. e. 
respond as service to specific situations). 
Because there is a contradiction between these two elements, when under 
intense competition, companies tend to undertake two strategies: they have to 
standardise customer expectations towards their products which may be difficult 
for any one company to do or they have to standardise employee behaviours to 
deal with the customers in the way in which research and data show customers 
might best respond. The problem with this is that the company always addresses 
the average customer and the average worker who, by the very nature of things, 
are less likely to be problematic anyway. This leaves the very people one wants to 
standardise as those who are the least likely to respond. 
The type of control most prevalent in Retail Co. was to do with 
accountability and responsibility. Staff were expected to be responsible for their 
own actions.. For example, they were given a mini section of the store to run and 
they were accountable for the way in which it succeeded. This was not the same 
kind of responsible autonomy as Friedman's (1977), however, because responsible 
autonomy for Friedman is granted when workers are powerftil and leads to 
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genuine discretion. Empowerment did not figure at all, but this is not to say that 
staff did not enjoy some elements of it. It conferred status upon them which 
otherwise would not be there. 
In trying to make staff more accountable, Retail Co are trying to 
standardise tacit knowledge of ways to deal with customers. Direct control, 
bureaucratic and technical control (Friedman, 1977; Edwards 1979) are not always 
enough for service workers when dealing with service interactions nowadays. du 
Gay (1996) argues that the battle to capture customers' hearts and minds has 
meant a switch to cultural forrns of control -a switch from direct control to 
entrepreneuralism and self-regulation. In Retail Co the change was not so simple, 
however, and many different forms were being utilised together. For example, 
there is a problematic when dealing with interactive sales work in that there are at 
least three parties involved (company, customer and employee). Making staff 
accountable not only relies on control by the company but also turning to 
consumer control or management by consumer (Fuller and Smith, 1991) in which 
consumers and the company, in the form of mystery shoppers, combine to monitor 
staff performance. At the same time, the company was using products and the 
employee to control the customer. This meant that the interaction between the old 
style of service and the new was difficult. The old style of service interaction was 
based on the employee being in control of the knowledge in order to attract the 
customer whereas the new was based on attempts by the HQ to gain control over 
the whole process to make it more predictable. 
Whatever the style of service, employees could resist or consent to 
behaviour which benefited themselves, the company, the customer or any 
combination of these. This meant that the company's search for control entailed 
not just the choice of one single mode of control but many (Fuller and Smith 
1991; Hocshchild 1983; Leidner 1996). In fact, they made choices which entailed 
a 'control cocktail'. It is true that technical change within retail has made the 
flavour of the cocktail more palatable to employers and this has enabled 
employers to standardise what are notoriously difficult jobs to standardise. 
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Standardisation implies some element of a measurement factor and this is where 
performance management comes in. Once something can be measured, it can then 
be utilised to change the effort standard of the job. Performance management is a 
bridging point. It brings together standards and employees' own definitions of 
labour power into a neat contract. This does not mean, however, that the contract 
is accurate or safe proof Employees are resilient in defining new standards 
themselves - with change comes new means of resistance. Further, the fact that 
the company was attempting to do so many things while, at the same time, 
standardise processes meant that this transferred in practical terms to objectives 
which became extremely vague, producing increasing uncertainty over what the 
actual goals were. 
Diagram: Types of control in retail Co. 
Direct Consumer/ F-7ý Emotional 
Paternalism 
BureaucraticF-- 
Accountable/ Performance 
Contract E7--ýManagement 
Standardisation 
Accountable/ 
TechnicaIE777ý Contract 
In attempting to conceptualise control systems in Retail Co. the following 
diagram below was constructed. The three main categories of control are shown 
in bold. The flow direction shows that direct control and bureaucratic control 
were integral parts of the growth of paternalistic control within the company. 
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Standardisation, on the other hand, was only possible once technical control was 
combined with the other two. 
Once all three were in place it allowed other elements of control to 
combine with the main three. The perfon-nance management system allows the 
co-ordination of all these systems of control into one controllable entity. 
Consumer, emotional, accountable and contract control are elements which are 
linked to the other three via the performance management system. This is not to 
say that control evolves from one stage to the other, but various elements of 
control allow one to move onto other elements. Taylorisation of mass production 
allowed certain techniques of control to progress, as did the Taylorisation of retail. 
Different retailers may chose different combinations of control depending on their 
own socio, political and economic circumstances. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ENGINEERING Co. 
8.0 Intro uction 
The scheme in the engineering company highlights the complexities of 
negotiating a scheme whilst surrounded by rapidly changing structures, pressures 
and policy towards different groups and their employees were rapidly changing. It 
highlights how the original rationale for a scheme was quickly distorted and 
changed to fit with the newer goals and rhetoric. The scheme was very different 
from the first two case studies in that there was far more involvement from the 
union side in agreeing the scheme. Therefore, what each of the main parties saw 
as the important factors were examined before looking at the scheme and the 
elements of control and consent involved. This scheme did not involve the setting 
of objectives. 'Instead it revolved around behaviours used in carrying out the job, 
yet it was non the less vague in its purpose. 
Engineering Co. is the maintenance department of the manufacturing 
division of one of Britain's largest chains of highstreet stores - manufacturing 
division. Manufacturing division produces toiletries, cosmetics and medicines for 
several leading European and British retailers as well as making items for the 
other retail groups in the company (Retail Co being the main customer). With 
over 4,000 lines on its product list, Manufacturing division claims to be the UK's 
largest contract producer in the above mentioned sector. It has five main factories 
employing around 2,500 people. It also has a substantial development laboratory, 
helping the company to develop an estimated 800 new products every year. The 
division handles 'a very large inventory ... The flexibility of our equipment 
is 
critical in ensuring we get things right first time, ' (Cosmetics international). 
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Thus, Manufacturing division is in the unusual position of manufacturing 
low-price items for own-label clients while operating as the manufacturing 
subsidiary of a major high street retailer. 
Retail price battles obviously have a knock-on effect for manufacturers, in 
the form of extra pressure on cost and/or quality. But Manufacturing 
division is a completely separate business unit within the Main Group. We 
operate an 'arms length' relationship with Retail Co. and our other internal 
customers. In this way we can ensure we are customer-focused, and offer a 
full and equal service to our external and internal customers. (Annual 
Report 1996) 
8.1 Engineering workers 
Traditional engineering and related skills have taken what can only be 
described as an 'ideological bashing', mainly stemming from the early Thatcherite 
governments insistence that the manufacturing industries were no longer 
important as a source of national wealth. Combined with this was the fact that the 
traditional manufacturing industries which were also the stronghold of the 
engineering unions, were one of the main targets that the government was 
determined to crush. In no small way, this debate was also fuelled by Piore and 
Sabel's (1984) insistence that the growth of flexible specialisation was bringing 
with it a new type of entrepreneurial craft engineering in which 'small was 
beautiful' 
As Blyton (1995) notes, the higher proportion of craft skills in engineering, 
compared to other branches of manufacturing, and the traditional strength of craft 
unionism in the UK, have resulted in workers' job controls being comparatively 
strong in the industry. This is particularly true in relation to aspects of work 
organisation such as job boundaries (demarcation), labour deployment (manning 
levels) and job hierarchies. It was precisely this strength that the conservative 
government was determined to break in its search for completely flexible labour 
markets. The traditional strengths of these job. hierarchies, coupled with 
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weakened union power during the 1980s and 1990s , has resulted in a growing 
employer offensive against workers'job control (Blyton 1995). 
A good example was the tendency in collective agreements over flexibility 
issues to focus primarily on the question of job demarcation and labour 
deployment to a greater extent than other potential sources such as working time. 
Blyton also supports his argument by referring to Marsden and Thompson (1990), 
who highlighted that out of 56 agreements, labour deployment was mentioned in 
37, skill demarcation in 23 and grading in 20. Only 10 mentioned issues such as 
working time. A similar pattern emerged over negotiations for shorter working 
week(s). Agreements placed more emphasis on task flexibility (i. e., production 
workers, undertaking broader ranges of tasks and minor maintenance). The 
general picture is one of many managers identifying task related flexibility as 
more easily achieved and/or a more proactive source of flexibility, efficiency and 
lower costs than greater flexible working time (Blyton 1995). 
8.2 The organisation of PRP in Engineering Co. 
8.2.1 Engineering Co. 
Competitive pressures on the division have led to what is an already 
rapidly changing structures of the engineering group itself Primarily, the type of 
engineer that is being discussed are craftspeople and not design or project 
engineers, although they are present within the group but fall under slightly 
different pay arrangements. The structure of the engineering department has been 
changing rapidly over the last 15 years as the company itself has struggled to find 
a divisional structure to which it is best suited. This means that, although 
engineers have remained one group for the purposes of management and collective 
bargaining, they have come under the auspices of several divisions before arriving 
at the position they are at now. In the manufacturing division they have remained 
a single group but have become much more integrated within the different 
components of the division as an whole. Importantly for budgetary purposes, they 
now fall under what ever department they are located in. They still, however, 
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remain under different terms and conditions of employment to those of the 
production workers that they work alongside. One could say that they are being 
more closely integrated into the staff structures than production workers. This is 
largely because the skill levels of engineers are seen as more closely aligned to 
that of some managers, than others on the shopfloor. Although there has been 
some resistance, especially from the managers themselves. 
Engineering skills have not just been the recipients of changing 
infrastructure, however. Their skills have also been affected by management's 
search for better labour utilisation in the form of flexibility and cost reductions. 
This has affected the traditional demarcation lines of engineering workers as 
management have sought to gain more control over the labour process. For some 
engineers in industries such as mass and batch production, this may have meant a 
Taylorisation of the work process for skilled workers, sometimes based on the 
technological developments. Yet in maintenance engineering jobs are mostly of a 
one-off nature so cannot be reduced to a particular tasks or division of labour 
Nonetheless, the search for flexibility brought about a change in the way 
that management viewed the engineering department as a service. In 1979, there 
were nearly 600 engineers servicing the various sites and taking on large as well 
as small jobs. By 1992, there were just 400 engineers, and by 1996 only 300. 
Further, most, if not all, of the large jobs were being put out to contract. This left 
pure maintenance and specialist jobs to be carried out by engineers. To some 
extent, this not only meant retaining skills but also being flexible enough to take 
on some new ones. 
In most cases this did not mean complete multi-skilling but instead, the 
taking on of skills which were additions to core skills. In some jobs such as the 
maintenance of production lines, it meant a completely different job or becoming 
a mechanic/electrician to deal with the challenges of some of the new machinery 
while, at the same time, not needing all the previous skills. In these cases, jobs 
were renamed as technician roles. 
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It has not been easy to distinguish whether this was, in fact, deskilling or 
reskilling. It is probably more accurate to say that bits of both were occurring 
depending not only on the job but also on which department a worker belonged to, 
some departments being more technologically advanced than others. What can be 
said for certain is that this gave management more autonomy over defining jobs, 
by destroying existing demarcation lines. At the same time, however, it has to be 
remembered that the benefits were not all uni-directional. Many engineers 
received better pay and status from these changes, and for some, jobs became 
largely more secure as they became more job-specific. Further, jobs which had 
already expanded over and above the existing job descriptions and which could 
not be recognised under the old job evaluation scheme, were now being re- 
evaluated as employees learnt the new rules of the scheme. 
8.2.2 Trade Unions and Collective Bar *' 
Since the early 1970s the company have negotiated with the Engineering 
Joint Shop Stewards Committee (JSSC), consisting of shop stewards from the 
Transport and workers union (TGWU), UCATT, the Amalgamated engineering 
and electricians union (AEEU) and the Manufacturing, scientific and finance 
union (MSF) craft sector. These cover all skilled and unskilled engineering 
workers. Since the introduction of PRP in 1993 the JSSC have given up their role 
in the Joint Negotiating Committee which has now been re-named the Joint 
Consultative Committee. This means that its role in the negotiation of pay has 
been much reduced to that of discussing the overall pay pot and does not extend to 
negotiating over other issues. 
8.2.3 The Engineers 
The engineering group have been part of the company since the turn of the 
century. They cover the maintenance of all manufacturing plant and warehouses 
in the UK. Until 1989, the engineering group were split into three main functional 
sections: production, retail, and engineering group services. All three sections 
were responsible to the Director of Engineering. Since 1989, when the company 
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underwent a restructuring exercise towards product-based divisions, the sections 
have been split further and are now responsible (especially in financial terms) to 
the respective divisions of the company although the Director of Engineering has 
retained overall responsibility for the day-to-day r-unning of the group. The group 
has been split between six separate groups which came under the pharmaceutical 
division for administration purposes. In 1995, the phannaceutical division was 
sold and the engineering group was transferred to the manufacturing division of 
the company, with the exception of the pharmaceutical engineers who became 
employees of the new company. The trades used are more varied and include 
electricians, garage mechanics, pipe-fitters, tinsmiths, fitters, millwrights, joiners, 
painters, plumbers, welders, bricklayers, riggers, power-house operators, 
locksmiths, storemen and general helpers. 
Since 1989, after four years of negotiation and the introduction of changes 
in the job evaluation scheme to incorporate what the company call 'job 
enhancement', each section now has several multi-skilled workers. Management 
regularly states that they want to move towards a smaller, flexible and highly-paid 
workforce. The enhancement of the old scheme caused distortion and problems 
for both management and employees. For management, the problem was that 
everyone used existing job overlaps which had been previously protected by 
demarcation to gain extra gradings. Thus, the scheme became 'top heavy'. For 
some employees, the old scheme was not able to accommodate changes to their 
jobs in terms of additional reward (i. e. the skill hierarchies written into the fon-nal 
rules did not allow it). 
8.2.4 Management styles 
The management styles of the company have evolved over time. The 
original management style of the company can best be described as that of 
'sophisticated paternalists' (Purcell and Sisson 1983). This is best described as a 
unitary approach toward employees, with the exception that it does not take for 
granted that employees accept company objectives or legitimise management 
decision-making. They, therefore, spend considerable time and resources in 
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ensuring employees have the right approach. To this end, personnel policies are 
used to ensure that individual aspirations are mostly satisfied and collective 
bargaining is seen as unnecessary (Purcell and Sisson 1983). This was probably a 
direct influence of the original founder himself, but from in the early 1970s, a 
transition was made to the style of the 'consultative' element of the 'sophisticated 
modems'. This is a more pluralist outlook, trade unions are recognised and 
collective bargaining is well developed with the emphasis on co-operation. Purcell 
and Sisson argue that the two styles differ significantly in approach, yet many of 
the characteristics of the sophisticated paternalist style still remain to this day, thus 
highlighting Edwards' (1987) point that it is difficult to establish one particular 
management style. 
The above portrays the overall company style, but within the enterprise 
individual managers may well have their own idea of management style. As 
Purcell and Sisson (1983: 113) note whilst looking at Fox's (1991) 'frames of 
reference', 'many industrial relations specialists may be pluralist in nature, but the 
vast majority of managers are more likely to incline towards the unitary position'. 
This would aptly describe many of the managers within Engineering Co. 
It is also worth noting that as the 1980s have progressed, management 
have subtly sought to push the trade union role further towards the margins of 
collective bargaining. The 1990s have seen proposals which largely remove the 
trade unions from their role in the collective bargaining arena, and push them 
towards the margins of joint consultation and a role as disciplinarians (i. e. used 
mainly as a safety net in grievance and disciplinary cases). The emphasis is much 
more on individuals than collectivities, a move which is again likely to be 
represented by the sophisticated paternalist style once again. Yet these changes 
are very slow and cautious, a reaction which suggests that management are not yet 
sure of which position will best serve their needs. It also highlights the difficulties 
of utilising management styles. Management, while concentrating on 
individualism have also introduced empowerment and teamwork in a bid to 
increase productivity. 
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8.2.5 Engineering PRP 
With the new scheme jobs are evaluated using a Hay Oob evaluation) 
scheme and are scored on the basis of the following criteria: Know How, Problem 
Solving and Accountability. Jobs are then given a total score and each score is 
given a mid point, a minimum and maximum level which in the case of the 
engineers were plus and minus 10% of the mid-point. The engineers' increase in 
salary is then determined, in the future tense, by the appraisal process. It is 
interesting to note that just as the engineers moved on to a similar scheme to that 
of management, the managers moved on to a performance management scheme 
and a banding system in which jobs fall within grade bands rather than score 
bands. 
The company states that the appraisal is a means of. 
facilitating discussion on performance, 
encouraging feedback, praising good performance and helping 
underperformers improve, 
9 involving staff in key performance factors, 
9 acknowledging career aspirations and providing motivation, and 
providing reward for improved levels of performance. 
The stated objectives of the company in the appraisal are to: 
identify the training needs of individuals, 
recognise individuals and their aspirations, 
encourage better identification and achievement of objectives, and 
enable improved levels of performance to be rewarded. 
The company makes special note that personal bias must not be allowed to 
affect an objective measurement of performance, and for the appraisal system to 
be completely effective, performance must be measured continually. 
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Communication and feedback are seen as aids to building a good relationship 
between the manager and the team and to improving overall performance. 
Employees are appraised once per annum, with a further review of progress at 
least once per year. The scheme states, however, that dialogue should take place 
on a regular basis for the scheme to be effective. 
Performance is assessed via key performance factors (KPFs) such as 
approach to work, standard/quality of work, problem solving, initiative and 
attitude to others. Each KPF is weighted depending on its importance to each 
specific job. Each appraiser must clearly define the performance factors and their 
relative weighting to each appraisee. The weightings can be high, medium or low. 
An example of how weightings would be reached for a window cleaning job is as 
follows; 
High 
4 
Standard/Quality Approach to work 
Low 
4 
Problem solving 
Initiative 
Attitude 
4 
Relatively unimportant to the 
window cleaners final 
product 
44 
Because most important Time scale may be important 
outcome expected from but need not be adhered to 
customer (i. e. clean rigidly 
windows) I 
Once the appraisal interview has taken place the individual has to be rated 
from A to D on the five key performance factors shown in the table overleaf 
Once this has been completed, an overall rating of performance has to be awarded 
out of the following four categories: 
A- Outstanding, 
B- Superior, 
C- Fully acceptable, and 
D- Incomplete. 
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Key performance factors 
Approach to A Always uses resources effectively especially at times when excessive or 
work urgent demands are placed on them. Plans well ahead. 
B Regularly sets self challenging work schedule and strives for 
improvement. 
C Copes with work schedule, takes pride in the job and works to 
acceptable standard. 
D Leaves job unfinished. Little forward planning or organisation. 
Standard/Quality A Exceptionally high standards of work produced to all work undertaken at 
of work all times. 
B Always produces good quality work to a very high standard 
C Generally produces work to a good standard 
D Tends to work untidily and unmethodologically producing 
unsatisfactory results. 
Problem solving A Able to analyse complex problems/tasks and approaches them in an 
organised and systematic way to effect a solution. Is able to support 
other craftsmen in some complex tasks. 
B Analyses the full requirements of all tasks and is regularly able to 
complete them without reference to others. 
C Has experience of a wide range of operations/tasks and is usually able to 
carry out duties without guidance. 
D Not fully conversant with requirements of job and need regular 
assistance on a regular basis. 
Initiative A Continually challenges existing work methods, makes recommendations 
for improvements and implements where appropriate. 
B Regularly takes the initiative in proposing changes to work methods. 
C Self starter who need little supervision in carrying out his tasks. 
D Regularly requires prompting to complete the task he has been given in 
an acceptable manner. 
Attitude to others A Seeks to build teamworking, reduces conflict and develops co-operation 
with colleagues. Tends to take the lead in group situations. 
B Regularly offers support and guidance to all others in all situations. 
C Supports colleagues and demonstrates appropriate flexibility when 
required. 
D Tends not to support the team, possibly undermining the authority of 
others. Shows lack of concern for other peoples needs. 
236 
An example of how a performance rating might be awarded is given in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 
Performance factor Importance to job Perfonnance rating 
High / Medium / Low A B C D 
Attitude V/ 
Initiative 
Approach to work 
Standard/quality 
Problem solving V/ 
Overall performance 
Source: Engineering appraisal Booklet, 1993. 
In tenns of pay, pay will be linked to the ratings in the following way: to 
provide a safety net, the unions negotiated a general increase at the D rating and a 
merit increases at 'C', 'B' and 'A'. The award for each rating was agreed at the 
JCC and was then applied equally in all areas of engineering. 
8.3 The objective of PRP in Engineering Co. 
In order to find out what the initial momentum was behind the introduction 
of the scheme, senior managers and union reps involved in the introduction of the 
scheme and also those now responsible for the day to day running of the scheme 
were interviewed. The scheme also highlighted the complexities of the 
negotiating process, not only between management and unions but also between 
divisional and company levels. Whereas the previous case studies were 
implemented. centrally, Engineering Co. is one group within one division, meaning 
that the process was even more complicated as the scheme had to satisfy many 
different interest groups. This is highlighted by the fact that the scheme took three 
years to negotiate. 
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8.3.1 Reasons for scheme: management 
When asked 'how did the decision fit in with other business goals and 
objectivesT, it is interesting to note that there seemed to be two inter-related 
driving forces behind the scheme. Firstly, there was a need for flexibility and to 
fit with the changing structures of the company. Secondly, it coincided with 
changes to manufacturing division, thus beginning to fit in with the rhetoric of 
customer service and empowerment. 
It was not so much a business, as an engineering department, objective to 
merge into the new emerging divisional structure of the company. This also made 
it easier to transfer people from department to department. There was a lot of 
disquiet on the shopfloor about the old system (i. e. a worker could take on more 
work but not move out of the grade). So the company were looking at a scheme to 
address that. They also wanted to increase productivity by having a smaller 
workforce, better people and better pay for doing more work. They thought 
flexibility was important because the rest of the company was having to become 
more flexible or as they ten-ned it, 'customer aware'. They were also having to 
recognise that there were other competitors for the service that they provided to 
other sections of the company. 
There was also a problem over strong demarcation between the shopfloor 
and the management - the ties and the overall brigade - about wanting to get rid of 
that. Management said that it did not help the business to develop when people 
saw it as a difference. 
So it was to get rid of issues where by if the wife was ill, if you had got a 
tie on you could just nip home and sort it out. Whereas if you had overalls 
on you would have to book some time off. It was issues like that which 
needed to be dealt with. 
The personnel manager now in charge of implementing the scheme was 
rather more cynical about the rationale: 
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I think the words they were using were to do with motivation. But 
probably they just felt that it was a method of getting more hours, more 
effort out of people for perhaps a small financial reward because there as 
never been a great deal of difference between those at the bottom and those 
at the top end. 
When asked 'what role did the organisational context playT, the first point made 
was that the engineering group had decided to implement the scheme and had not 
been asked to do so by HQ. They sat down for discussions with the unions 
because the old scheme was becoming corrupt. It was becoming difficult to 
evaluate and reward who they wanted to reward because the old scheme had been 
devised for a certain purpose and then an extra element had been bolted on to it to 
achieve more flexibility. There was a working party with an equal numbers of 
stewards and managers, together with Hay consultants. Management explained 
that Hay kept interfering with the scheme. Thus, in the end, they stopped inviting 
them to attend. 
Management said that the organisational context was extremely important. 
Three factors played a part in the organisational. context: the presence of the 
existing Hay scheme, management resistance and engineering acceptance. Firstly, 
there were 8,000 staff employees already on the Hay scheme 'and I don't think 
they would have smiled if we had gone elsewhere for 400 odd engineers'. 
Secondly, the group had experienced a lot of resistance, not only from employees 
but also from the managers who did not want the engineers to have the same status 
as themselves. The company saw, however, the tradesmen as nearer to 
management in terms of skills and so forth., 'than the little girls on the line'. 
Thirdly, once they had negotiated with senior management/stewards, they had to 
sell it to the rest of the employees. They, therefore, spent a lot of time training 
managers and supervisors. 
We didn't want people going out there all guns blasting, which in the event 
some did anyway. 
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It took three years to get the new scheme off the ground, in the meantime 
everything around them had completely changed. By the time the scheme was 
introduced, management had made a lot of concessions to get the scheme in. 
Well we achieved the fact that we got a scheme which met the criteria of 
rewarding people for their own efforts and responsibilities. But the actual 
scheme was probably further away from the company scheme than we 
anticipated. 
The unions involved were traditional craft unions, with a degree of 
strength overjob roles. This meant that management were aware that concessions 
would have to be made at some stage. The unions set out to ensure the three main 
factors highlighted in Heery and Warhurst (1994) had a role in the regulation of 
appraisal, reduction of financial risk and procedural rights for appeals and so forth. 
Most of all, however, they set out to keep some consistency over the grading 
structures and pay bands and it was here where they caused management much 
trouble. Engineering management's initial idea was to align pay bands and scores 
for jobs with those of the staff scheme, but in the event, the craft grades turned out 
to require higher pay rates with which to match with subsequent scores. A senior 
manager explained that in so doing they fell out with central personnel on several 
occasions. 
The whole scheme was designed on the basis that 75% of people would be 
'average' and it proved extremely difficult to convey this message to managers 
and super-visors. They had all kinds of problems with managers and supervisors 
with respect to how they judged what rating they should give from year to year. 
One manager said: 
We had to sit down with supervisors afterwards and say you have been too 
generous. This caused all kinds of morale problems. So while the trial 
evaluations went quite well we realised six months later that everyone who 
had been over generous had to mark people down. 
The company said that they owed a lot to some of the senior stewards as 
they were quite instrumental in getting the scheme through, even to the point 
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where they had exercised restraint over some of the shop stewards who had not 
taken part in all of the negotiations. A good example was shown when the week 
before the negotiations were to conclude, some of the shop stewards had second 
thoughts They were mainly led by one particular steward, a born-again Christian, 
who said that he had prayed to God and He had told him that the scheme was 
wrong. The more senior stewards turned round to him and told him in no 
uncertain tenns: 
Your j ob is to supposed to be to consult your members, not f* ** ing God. 
Until your members say that they don't want the scheme you should keep 
your mouth shut. 
ýA senior manager said, 
'I think the only reason the scheme survived was 
because of the stewards'. 
8.3.2 Reasons for the scheme: the unions 
The unions agreed with management that it was mainly they who had 
raised the possibility of a different scheme, and had in fact been doing so for the 
past 10 years. 
The unions brought it up but all we wanted was a new evaluation scheme. 
We wanted a scheme that gave pounds for points, and the HAY scheme 
did that. But we didn't want PRP. We liked the appraisal bit but without 
any money attached to it. The company said that we had got to have the 
money side of it because they needed a carrot. 
A senior union official explained that the engineers asked for the scheme 
to allow them to make careers for themselves. They were not happy with the 
existing staff scheme so they wanted to adapt it to 'skills' and make the 
terminology easier to understand. This made the process of evaluating jobs more 
to the union's liking but they did not like the PRP. 
The company are finding talents that they did not know about, but the 
down side is the pay. 
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With the old scheme, the company gained a certain amount of flexibility 
but when they introduced the enhancement, everyone shot up to the top of the 
grade and were then stuck. With the new scheme the company, gained more 
flexibility and it also allowed them to control the costs of labour. 
In some ways, the unions felt cheated. They had gone, in all innocence, to 
look for a different evaluation scheme and landed themselves with negotiations 
over something they did not really have in mind. 
The scheme was plonked in front of us and they tried to make out that we 
requested it. In some ways we did but I reckon that it was plonked on us 
personally in the way that they did it. Management said that because they 
have got the Hay scheme in it makes sense to use it, to get rid of the them 
and us syndrome. They never believed it, they said all the right things but 
they never personally believed that we were the same as them. 
The unions said that it went from stage to stage until they requested that 
Hay not turn up anymore because they were trying to control it. 'They were trying 
to control the area pay rate by saying what the average should be, which, of 
course, was much lower than our rates'. Hay reported this to central personnel 
because they had an interest in keeping area rates consistent but, in the event, 
engineering management went to the Board of Directors who allowed them to 
carry on as necessary, much to the annoyance of central personnel. 
When the details were finalised, the unions said that managers and 
supervisors were sent on three days training 'out in the sticks'. They felt that this 
was not enough, considering that they were supervisors and foremen who had 
never done an appraisal before. 
It took us three years to work out the concept and they were supposed to 
get it in three days. 
This was also problematic to the unions, because as they put it: 
a lot of these people never learnt to talk to the shopfloor they know how to 
shout at them and bully them but they never learnt how to talk to them. 
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A further problem was caused by the fact that in the first year people were 
rated B when they should not have been, according to the unions. So, the next 
year, appraisers were told to be 'extra careful' and some of them went overboard 
by not awarding any at all or by withdrawing those awarded by some supervisors. 
Despite the fact that the unions had given up a large chunk of their role in 
the collective bargaining process, they had still secured a 'representational 
agreement' and a general increase. No sooner had they got the scheme in place, 
however, that the division began to introduce 'value based management' into 
engineering. On top of this, around the same time, engineering management 
began to implement teamworking and empowerment. 
In general, though, the unions thought that the engineers had benefited 
greatly from the scheme. They received much more high profile jobs. They also 
argued that teamwork and empowerment could not have been introduced without 
the Hay scheme and argued that job satisfaction had improved now and that they 
had more control over the way that they did the work. However, the unions felt 
that jobs were now far more differentiated and that reward should reflect this. 
8.3.3 Vagueness of the scheme 
In the light of the above discussion the remainder of this chapter will 
attempt to determine whether the scheme met its stated objectives, and if not, why 
this was the case. In doing so, it will highlight several important factors. Firstly, 
unlike the previous two case studies, this scheme did not include objectives. 
Instead, it relied on the setting and measurement of key performance factors. As 
with the objectives in the other schemes, the vagueness of this process meant that 
the scheme was immediately distorted from any of its original goals. Secondly, 
the scheme highlighted itself as a form of control in terms of behaviour, skills and 
costs. Thirdly, the scheme had unforeseen consequences in that employees 
quickly leamt how to utilise it for their own benefit. 
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As well as senior managers and union representatives who were referred to 
in the sections above, 24 members of staff were interviewed and many more were 
spoken with on an informal basis. Out of the 24 formal interviewees, six were on 
the new staff performance management scheme and the rest were on the 
engineering scheme. 
Despite the fact that the scheme had originally been introduced to bring 
about flexibility, motivation and control of costs, as it progressed, it had also 
become a goal of the company's that it would make staff more aware of the 
division's new customer orientation. This meant lining up staff behind the goals 
and objectives of the manufacturing division. The company failed at the first 
hurdle', however, as there was no way in the scheme to reinforce these objectives. 
This was reflected in the fact that there was very little consistency over why 
employees thought the company had introduced the scheme. This was so for line 
management and employees, thus indicating that they had not been properly 
informed as to what its purposes -were. Rather, reasons given by employees 
included: to cut money, gain control, 'carrot', focus, better performance and 
rhetoric. There were very few managers and supervisors who said that they fully 
understood the scheme. Very few employees agreed with the principle of the 
scheme, thus reflecting the longer collective tradition. 
Although assessing the fairness of PRP schemes was not within the 
purpose of the research, as it had already been widely established that lack of 
fairness is a very corm-non failing (Kessler and Purcell, 1992. Geary, 1992), it was 
still interesting to find that only three people thought that the process was a fair 
way of judging someone's performance. To make matters worse, appraisers were 
more likely to say it was unfair than appraisees. 
The first major problem was that only two members of staff thought that 
the appraisal process was consistent. They said that the scheme was governed too 
much by the mood of the appraiser, with very little emphasis on experience, which 
of course, is important in any kind of skilled engineering. They said that there 
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were so many different appraisers that it was not an exercise which was done in a 
uniform way and that, in any case, it was extremely difficult to assess performance 
accurately because it was so opinionated. On top of this, there was considered to 
be too much outside influence from higher management creating an immediate 
problem that the appraiser did not have a free hand. 
Despite the fact that the company said that they had given training to all 
employees, only 14 people said that they had received any. A supervisor said: 
I'm appraising people this year but I have not had any training yet. 
But went on to add: 
I work closely with the engineers so they tell me the ins and outs. 
This highlighted his reliance on his subordinates to tell him how itworked. 
Employees, on the other hand, said that the outcome of appraisal did not matter 
anyway because 'at the end of the day an accountant decides everything now, so I 
suppose it is an efficient way of controlling the salary increase'. 
Only two people thought that there was a pay link. The rest said that it 
was either insignificant, not worth the hassle or that there was not a link. Even 
those people doing well from the scheme had their doubts about its effectiveness: 
I've done all right out of it but I know people who plod and get aC 
whereas someone running around will only get a B, and there is only a few 
pounds difference. 
They considered it to be worked out on a league table basis, so if one 
selected the best technicians across the manufacturing division and put them into 
one department, they would not all get B's. Because of this, the scheme was 
considered a 'carrot', rather than a true incentive because it did not adequately 
differentiate people's performance. 
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Others said that the effort and experience did not match with the 'pounds 
and pence' anyway: 
I worked on piecework before and you didn't mind that, you always knew 
where you were and how you could affect Yourwage or bonus. 
Only one person said that they receive any clarification of performance 
expectations. No one thought that their performance could be measured 
objectively. They said that no one ever told them what they had to do to achieve 
anything. 
At one stage we all went in to see what was happening because of lack of 
work. He more or less said that is not your work, your work is on the 
lines. So if they are happy with you sitting on your arse why should you 
put yourself out all the time. 
One of the biggest problems was that the appraisers were always asking 
and probing individuals as to how they have performed. 
8.4 The politics of PRP in engineering Co. 
Because there were no objectives, it was the actual appraisal which was 
largely the controlling mechanism with this scheme and not a contract which was, 
of course, absent. The appraisal was not used as a two-way process. It was used 
as a disciplinary process. To make matters worse, the appraisers' lack of comfort 
with the scheme meant that they did not welcome any feedback from employees. 
Employees felt that the process had two main effects. Firstly, it was to do with the 
'blue-eyed' syndrome. Secondly, for those who did not fit in, it was used as a 
disciplinary measure. 
There. is a lot of the blue eyed syndrome, but it definitely gets those who 
didn't work before. 
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How they are viewed by the supervisor/teamleader was very important 
because they were the ones who not only rated them, but also gave out the work. 
This made a difference as to whether they received good or bad jobs. 
The whole idea of PRP schemes is to increase the performance of one's 
employees. Only three people said, however, that they thought that the scheme 
had any positive effect on performance, and even then, this was only in the form 
of saying that it was making them work harder again, emphasising the negative 
factors of motivation mentioned in Chapter Six. As Nolan (1989) argues, 
however, increases in productivity born out of intensification of labour do not 
always equate with efficiency. Employees also felt that it can be detrimental to 
performance if one spends all one's time 'bullshitting'. 
Last year I put loads of effort in and got nothing so I thought f'**k it. Then 
I went and got aB this year. 
8.4.1 Monitored 
Despite 'teams' and 'empowerment', employees felt as though they were 
being measured and monitored more closely. This was the case for all but 15% of 
employees. Some thought that the people who did not perform well were being 
monitored more, while others just did not like the idea of sitting in front of the 
supervisors and justifying theirjob. 
I think you are being monitored while you are not aware of it. So, 
sometimes you might go into the appraisal and get hammered when you 
were expecting it to be all right ..... At the appraisal, they come up with 
things you can't remember or don't expect. 
This led to changed behaviours but most employees said that it had only 
done so in a negative way. Employees said that it put people against each other a 
lot. Some employees argued that PRP only suited certain types of jobs and that 
they would not get anything out of it, so the 'fuck it factor' sets in. A manager 
said: 
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through teamwork, as well, they are much more aware of what they should 
do. Appraisal is much more a weapon for making some people do what 
they should or withhold their pay. 
In the main, however, most employees commented that it caused much 
backstabbing which went completely against ideas around teamwork. 
8.4.2 Engineers and Flexibft 
The company were looking for both multi-skills and numerical flexibility 
in terms of extra contractors. This was more of an ad hoc process than a move to 
the kind of model of the flexible firm advocated by Atkinson and Gregory (1986), 
however. From the example of the engineers, it is easy to see how Atkinson and 
others fell into the trap of mixing description with prediction and prescription 
(Polleri 1988). The company was definitely attempting to achieve some kind of 
flexibility but not along the lines of the core/periphery model. The developments 
over the 1980s could be taken as a move towards a core group on the basis of 
description. However, when looked at more closely, it was a short term response 
to the problems the company was facing in terms of intense product market 
competition and the threat of take-over. 
Functional flexibility aimed at the right to cross demarcation lines rather 
than multi-skilling per se. Individual managers were just as keen to upgrade 
employees and increase their own status if workers under their jurisdiction were 
seen to take on flexible practices and more skills. Yet the evidence on skills and 
training does not necessarily support the idea of moves towards a highly skilled 
workforce. The emphasis is, rather, on job specificity (the tailoring of jobs and 
training to the specific needs of the company) and the intensification of labour 
utilisation. 
The types of labour which are employed by the engineering group and 
described by Atkinson and Gregory as peripheral, again, did not match with their 
model. They reflect the traditional uses of these types of labour as described by 
other studies (Hunter and McInnes, 1991. Marginson et al, 1988). Temporary 
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workers were employed in newly expanding sectors to supplement existing 
workers whilst the plant became fully operational. Once this had happened, the 
workers involved were offered full-time employment. Sub-contracting increased 
gradually, although somewhat more rapidly, reflecting a long-standing trend. 
Contractors were used mainly to complement existing staff in the engineering 
group services department, taking on project work and leaving existing staff to 
deal entirely with maintenance. It may also be that sub-contracting was also a 
means of dealing with some of the problems of the job evaluation scheme (i. e. 
they used this type of labour rather than upset the internal structure). Generally, 
however, as Marginson et al (1988) found in their study, there was no upheaval in 
employment structure. 
8.4.3 Distribution 
Another form of control was that concerning distribution. It was explained 
above that the scheme meant to put the majority of employees into the C category 
- 'Average'. Rumours and experience of a fixed distribution were extremely 
widespread although there was nothing at all in writing to tell people that they 
must adhere to a distribution. The union said that they were sure that the company 
did control the distribution but that they just did not admit it. 
Appraisers said they were not given guidelines but made it clear that if one 
gave all B's, this would not happen, it came from management reading between 
the lines. They said that most of it came from the reviewing manager level. 
The reviewing manager might raise concerns on certain ratings. It 
happened once where I was told to downgrade someone because they had 
only been in the job two months. I had to go back and say that I had made 
a mistake. So you can't appraise people fairly and still motivate them. 
Table 9.1 highlights the relative consistency of the distribution but shows a 
slight tendency of a drift into the B rating. 
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Table 9.1: Engineering Hay Grades distribution 
Grade 1993 1994 1995 4 1996 
A 0 1 5 1 
B 15 92 100 122 
c 374 251 300 166 
D 1 2 13 2 
DN 0 28 7 6 
8.4.4 Playing the game 
As in the previous case studies, employees in Engineering Co both 
consented to and resisted attempts at change. Only four people said that one could 
not 'play the game' with the scheme. This was only in terms of the fact that they 
thought that supervisors could see through that sort of thing, however. Most 
employees felt they could. 
Yes definitely it's the only way to affect the rating ... You have to push 
yourself, its not enough to just do a good job .... There are not the fiddles 
there are in piecework, but you can manipulate the situation. 
They even played the game against each other as well as the company. 
Some said that where performance factors such as 'standard' and 'quality' were 
rated highly if one was being given the 'shitty' jobs all the time, one could not 
make them look good, no matter what. The same people always got the goodjobs 
and it affected how the finished products were perceived. One supervisor summed 
the situation up thus: 
You could have one person who thinks he can do the job quickly and puts 
down three hours, and then it takes him four. Then you could have another 
person who say's he can do the job in eight hours and it only takes him 
five. Now the second person is likely to get a better rating than the first, so 
it is no wonder that people learn to play the game. 
8.4.5 Teams and empowerment 
Clearly playing the game worked in two ways: It benefited the workers but 
it also benefited the company, working as both a control and consent mechanism. 
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This kind of process was further enhanced by the use of teams and the concept of 
empowerment. Teams had originally been introduced on the production lines. 
These included both engineers and production workers. The concept of teams had 
now evolved to cover all sections of engineering, however. This caused three 
kinds of problems: Firstly, there was conflict between engineers and production 
workers over 'who should tell who what to do' and 'who should be allowed to do 
what work'. There seemed to be resentment over women teamleaders especially. 
Secondly, craftsmen were expected to work together in teams but on different 
rates of pay. Thirdly, some of the work was simply not conducive to teamwork. 
As part of tearnworking and empowerment, teams were now supposed to 
be responsible for their own budgets. These were for costs of department, 
recov6y and every aspect of the department. Initially, this was problematic in 
that employees questioned who exactly had the responsibility. Was it the 
individuals in the team or the teamleader? Management said that it was the 
responsibility of the teamleader along with his immediate manager, thus putting 
the disciplinary onus on the teamleader. The main component of the budget was 
the 'recovery'. This was where teams were required to recover unit labour charge 
out rates by passing them on to the customer (i. e. through other departments). 
The union gave the example of wages. They said that one might be given 
something like 37Y2hours plus four hours overtime per person in the budget and 
what one had to do is charge as much of it as one could to the other departments 
so that one could recover the cost as profits. The way that it had been explained to 
them made it look as though the accounting system made it more profitable for 
them to sit around and bring in contractors to do their job because all of the costs 
of contractors could be charged out to the customer. This would thus count as 
6complete recovery'. 
Being engineers, they had a refreshing but totally naive view of the 
budgetary process. When asked about the pressures of not meeting budgets one of 
the shop stewards replied: 
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It's no Problem, if we don't meet our budget it means that the accountants 
must have got there original figures wrong, so it's up to them to sort it out. 
Having said this, they did realise that, in the future, more and more pressure would 
be applied through the budgets. 
Despite this some employees were happy with the team role even though 
team leaders seemed far more positive about it than team members. There were 
benefits to having more say over their work environment, even if they were being 
controlled through the budgets. Early indications suggested that the process was 
working satisfactorily until there was pressure on immediate management to bring 
about further change. Management then tended to flex their muscle again. The 
outcomes were indeterminate but it did highlight the point that employees 
sometimes consented to their own exploitation because it could benefit them 
(Edwards 1987. Thompson and McHugh 1995). 
8.5 Summary 
Within Engineering Co PRP, there was no way of enforcing a link between 
the objectives of the new division and the work of engineers. Further, because 
engineering jobs were mainly of a 'one off' nature, there was not the scope for 
standardisation. Nevertheless, management sought the right to change job roles as 
and when it suited them. In this way, they were going back to a more direct form 
of labour which one could call 'direct bureaucracy' - directly controlled labour but 
reinforced with a bureaucratic system of grades. Simultaneously, the company 
insisted on the introduction of teamwork and empowerment as part of their 'value 
based management' strategy. Yet again, there seemed to be no way that the PRP 
scheme could enforce this. It is, therefore, clear that the only consistent part of the 
changes desired by engineering management was the search for flexibility. 
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8.5.1 Engineering and Management Strategies 
In this way, it is quite clear from the study that the overriding concern of 
management over the 1980s was control of the labour process. Can this be 
interpreted as a strategy on the part of management, however? This study shows 
that the emphasis was on responses to situations. If a strategy was present, it was 
sadly lacking in foresight and content. The changing economic environment led 
management to cut labour costs at a time when they were seeking to secure the co- 
operation of the workforce. The company responded by seeking flexibility not as 
a means of gaining efficiency per se, but in terms of increasing labour utilisation. 
As it turned out its proposals were frustrated not only by workers but also by 
lower levels of management who saw the up-grading of the workforce as an 
enhancement in their status. Yet again the company responded by proposing the 
present scheme in 1990. It was hoped that PRP would control the influx to the top 
pay grades. Yet a study by Walsh (1992) indicates that this is likely to prove more 
costly for a firm's internal labour market as grading structures and rates of pay 
become differentiated from each other. 
Fourteen years out of the last 17 have been spent in detailed negotiations 
over changes to pay in one from or another. This is hardly evidence of a strategic 
led approach by management. Rather, it confinns the ad hoc opportunistic 
reaction to the problems of the day. Business strategies of a short-term nature 
seem to be present but labour does not form a part of them. Rather, management 
respond by attempting to utilise their employees accordingly. In so doing, they 
fail to go ftirther than the labour process and constantly find themselves dealing 
with the inconsistencies of their actions. 
Matters are not so clear concerning the role of the trade unions. In the 
mid- I 980s, it was thought that the institutions of collective bargaining at the work 
place had held up remarkably well (Mclnness 1987). Yet there is evidence that 
this began to change in the late 1980s and 1990s (Millward et al. 1992). Via the 
new scheme, the unions lost the ultimate sanction on future wages (i. e. the right to 
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ballot members over it). They did retain, however, a very strong role in the 
administration of the scheme. 
Management may well find themselves facing a fire fighting exercise 
caused by individuals who find themselves with added bargaining power. 
However, bargaining power based on a bilateral monopoly position brought about 
by job-specific skills may lead to a situation where infighting between employees 
rather than collective action intensifies. This may prove costly to some 
employees, but most of all, it will be management who pay the ultimate price for 
constant disruption. This was partly recognised by the fact that the unions secured 
much more of a decision making role in the scheme than originally anticipated by 
the company and were using this to police internal consistency of the scheme. 
Management's quest for control over the labour process, and the 
inconsistencies which this involves, has led to ever-changing employee relations, 
all of which involve varying elements of conflict with and between the parties 
involved. The focus on the term strategy, therefore, leads to misleading 
conclusions, as has occurred in the debates on the flexible firm and FIRM. 
Engineers are still redefining demarcation lines and management are still 
attempting to apply complete flexibility, combined with training and a horizontal 
expansion of some jobs. Even so, hierarchical struggles will still be present as 
management resented engineers and engineers resented production workers. This 
was a very important point, especially when one considers the introduction of 
empowerment and teams. 
Edward's (1979) or Friedman's (1977) modes of control prove inadequate 
in explaining the way in which PRP was utilised to gain flexibility. This was not 
the kind of bureaucratic control or responsible autonomy. This was an evolved 
struggle for control moving back and forth between various categories aimed at 
consent and control. In this way, control strategies were many and varied. What 
makes it all the more interesting is that at the time of writing, management were 
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attempting to introduce a performance management scheme with contracts and 
objectives. 
Engineering craftsman are perhaps one of the best known groups for 
having the ability to retain job controls. It is still difficult to tell whether this has 
remained the case in Engineering Co. Certainly, the modes of control seem to 
have swung against employees with PRP in that there has been a redefinition of 
the effort bargain. Engineers by their own admission are certainly working much 
harder. Yet, at the same time, they are still busy redrawing new demarcation lines 
and the overall rules of the scheme. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
PUBLIC AGENCY 
9.0 Introduction 
In the Public agency, as with the previous two case studies of performance 
management schemes, there was a vagueness and inappropriateness about the 
performance contracts and objectives. Further, the Agency was undergoing much 
change which led to a consequent struggle for other modes of control. This in turn 
was leading to unforeseen complications in the changes being implemented. 
These changes were primarily to do with the restructuring role that the 
government was attempting to introduce in terms of the benefit system and its 
relationship with its employees. 
As well as interviewing senior management, several weeks were spent in 
two separate offices in the North West of England. The main role of the agency 
revolves around getting people back to work and/or testing their availability for 
work and benefits. Approximately 45 people were inter-viewed and many more 
were spoken to and observed in their daily work. This gave an insight into how 
their work environment impacted on issues around the pay system. This proved 
invaluable as much of their work, as it turned out, is impossible to incorporate in 
the kinds of objectives they received. 
9.1 Restructuring of the Civil Servic 
Public agency were, and to some extent still are, an inherent part of the 
civil service. As such, they have been affected by the changes to the civil service 
in much the same way as any other section. It is, therefore, worth taking a brief 
look at the restructuring of the civil service in order to present a more 
comprehensive picture of the forces acting upon public agency. 
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The civil service became the subject of more or less sustained government 
concern. This should come as no surprise as the civil service is the apparatus 
through which the state administers it policies (Winkler 1990). It is also by no 
means a new phenomena, but the intensity of the focus certainly increased 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Butcher (1995) argues that purpose of these changes was a search for 
efficiency, effectiveness and value for money, or -what have commonly become 
known as the 'three E's - economy, efficiency and effectiveness'. The first 
element of this was the shedding of labour but, alongside a reduction of staff, the 
government has also undertaken a major internal reorganisation of the civil service 
(Fairbrother 1994). 
While the 1980s concentrated on the first two E's, the 1990s concentrated 
on the third E- effectiveness (i. e. greater emphasis on the delivery of service 
(Butcher, 1995)). This led to what Fairbrother (1994) describes as the focus being 
put on the tension between centralised control and decentralised managerial 
accountability and responsibility. This led to some of the initiatives listed below 
which were an essential part of the reorganisation of the civil service throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s: 
1.1979 - Scrutinies of government departments by Lord Raynor, 
2.1982 - Efficiency controls through the financial management initiative (FMI), 
3.1988 Next steps - separation of delivery from policy, 
4.1990 - Deregulation of management freedoms, together with setting of 
financial and performance targets, and 
5.1992 - Market testing via Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Butcher 1995). 
The period since 1979 has been dominated by the idea. that the public 
sector should learn from the management systems and techniques of the private 
sector. Contracting out and the introduction of market mechanisms into the 
delivery of welfare have been seen as just part of the wider developments to 
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improve the management and efficiency of delivery agencies of the welfare state 
(Winchester and Bach, 1995). Central to the restructuring has been an attempt to 
redefine the relations between management and workers. There as been a 
reorganisation from what was a hierarchical form of organisation formally based 
on concensual relations between managers and workers to a decentralised and 
devolved form of organisation with managers who are henceforth expected to 
manage workers (Fairbrother 1994). The first steps towards finding economy 
savings was the appointment of Derek Raynor as Head of the Prime Minister's 
Efficiency unit, following the general election in 1979. This was aimed at 
improving administrative efficiency and the elimination of waste, and was to be 
aided by the introduction of a massive computerisation programme (Butcher 
1995). 
To improve the financial management of the various departments 1982 
saw the launching of the FML This involved the devolution of budgetary control 
to departments. Pyper (1990) argues that as part of FMI, a vital prerequisite of 
enhanced internal accountability was a clearer definition of specific civil service 
roles and responsibilities. This meant identifying performance indicators suitable 
for civil service roles. Having said this, there were still problems inherent in the 
measurement of quality. Firstly, public services were less tangible than material 
products and as such were difficult to test and measure. Secondly, services are 
consumed as they are produced so it made it difficult to filter out substandard 
products. Thirdly, the producer of the services is part of the product. Fourthly, the 
customer is an inherent part of the product. Finally, the role of the customer in 
quality assurance is problematic (Pyper 1990). 
Sir Robin Ibbs succeeded Lord Rayner as the Head of the Efficiency unit 
and the Ibbs report (1988) was a response to the perceived failure of the FMI to 
bring about the desired changes to the civil service (Pyper 1990. ). The report 
identified three principal obstacles to real change in the civil service (Fairbrother 
1994): 
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1. The lack of focus on top management on the service delivery and executive 
functions of government, 
2. The effect of treating the civil service as a single organisation, and 
3. The lack of effective pressure to get better results. 
From the Ibbs report flowed the Next Steps programme. The aim of this 
programme was to improve management and deliver better services with available 
resources. 'The means of achieving this was the creation of agencies, semi- 
autonomous managerial structures with discretion to provide services proxy to 
market criteria and indicators' (Fairbrother 1994: 6). It was all part and parcel of 
the political programme of rolling back the state, or the privatisation of welfare 
delivery (Butcher 1995). The Next Steps programme was imported from the 
private, commercial sector (i. e., downward devolution of responsibility combined 
with clearly specified budgets and measurable targets and outcomes). In effect, it 
was the creation of a 'consumerist' culture or character, but Davies and Willman 
(1991) argue that there are limits to this which derive not only from the absence of 
market forces but also from the fact that agencies are engaged with the public 
collectively as well as individually. By 1989, five agencies had been set up with 
another 37 announced. By 1990,34 were established amongst them the Public 
agency with 33,800 employees (Fairbrother 1994). 
According to Davies and Willman (1991), the central plank of the 
government's policy was the control of public expenditure. As a means to 
achieving this, the Treasury had two main tasks in relation to agencies: 
1. to develop appropriate performance indicators and 
2. to control delegation of pay and job structure. 
Carrying through the kinds of changes involved in the creation of agencies 
required the co-operation of the workforce. Unfortunately, the programme was 
implemented by a government who failed to recognise the contribution that staff 
make to any business (Davies and Willman 1991). 
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During the 1980s with the computerisation of substantial sections of 
clerical work, civil service offices were transformed. Instead of organising around 
paper records, they were increasingly organised around computerised record- 
keeping procedures (Fairbrother 1994) although some departments such as the 
Public agency still kept both paper and computerised records. Drewry and 
Butcher (1991) argue that the government had become increasingly dependent on 
computers and the people who operate them. 
The perceived benefits of IT for the civil service are as follows (Drewery 
and Butcher 1991): 
Savings in staff costs, 
Benefit in accuracy/speed which transactions are processed, 
Better quality service, and 
Cash point type system of benefits. 
. Drewery and Butcher (1991) argue, however, that the goverm-nent 
has put 
the emphasis on cost rather then on effectiveness. An essential part of the use of 
IT is the identification and measurement of perfon-nance indicators. Performance 
indicators are nothing new, being used as long ago as the mid-1970s, but there has 
been considerable growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The growth of 
performance indicators draws even more heavily on private sector concepts of 
management accounting. There are, however, few effective indicators when it 
comes to quality and customer service (Butcher 1995). Public agency has been no 
exception. They have had two separate computerised systems introduced in the 
mid-1990s - Labour market survey (LMS) and Job seekers allowance(JSA) - 
aimed at making it easier to identify claimants and to record staff performance. 
Both have been experiencing teething problems. Pyper (1995) argues that, 
initially, agencies were slow to set quality targets and performance indicators, but 
by 1992, commentators were beginning to notice some differences. However, 
though key agencies were meeting most of their targets, this did not necessarily 
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mean that they were more efficient. This may suggest that targets are too low or 
that they are being 'fiddled'. 
All in all, the reorganisation of the civil service into agencies has led to the 
following three important changes: 
e Bureaucrats redefined as accountable managers, 
e Public sector operations redefined as businesses, and 
o Public seen as customers(Butcher 1995). 
As mentioned above these types of changes needed the co-operation of the 
workforce, both in terms of the ways in which they were paid and the way in 
which they carried out their work. The government's view was that PRP is seen 
as central to providing quality service in many private sector organisations. It was 
seen to fulfil several objectives which the government viewed as essential for the 
civil service: 
9 to encourage staff to meet objectives, 
9 to assists in retaining staff who perform well, and 
e to offer alternative to promotion (Davies and Willman, 1991). 
In the Citizens' Charter (1992), the government stated that linking pay to 
performance is an important and effective way of focusing people's energies and 
motivating them to achieve quality standards (Fairbrother 1994). It also fitted 
well with the government's objectives of moving away from national level 
collective bargaining towards more flexible labour markets. Agencies and 
departments were continually encouraged to customise their pay arrangements, 
one rationale being that it would result in the effective and efficient delivery of 
service (Fairbrother 1994). Agencies have to be careful, however, because they 
may make control of pay in public services much harder and force management to 
devote undue resources to pay matters. 
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At a micro level agencies are said to be moving away from national pay 
structures for a number of reasons (Davies and Willman 1991). Firstly, this 
enabled them to address labour market factors such as recruitment and retention. 
Secondly, agencies which provide services directly might have wished to increase 
pay flexibility to improve quality of service. Thirdly, a grading structure which 
covers a huge variety of functions and levels of work might provide insufficient 
flexibility for smaller organisations. 
The civil service comprises two groups of workers: the generalists and the 
specialist. In the case of generalists it is likely that new kinds of skills make them 
immobile, even within an office. This means that the way the office is organised, 
the physical conditions and the prospects of promotion become more important 
(Fairbrother 1994). 
The core of the terms and conditions of employment of civil service 
workers has been pay, which has long been marked by huge variation. In 1992, 
the range in pay rates went from L6483 to E87,620. Over the past four decades, 
employees have experienced a relative decline in earnings. Further, the Treasury 
gave notice that it was suspending comparability arrangements (Fairbrother 1994). 
In the public agency, the number of grades has been reduced and the grade 
bandings widened, thus making for further disparities between people within 
similarjobs. 
9.2 The organisation of PRP in Public Agency 
9.2.1 The history of PRE 
Prior to 1990 
In the past all staff in all government departments were paid according to 
the Civil Service wide terms and conditions applying to their grade. Each grade 
had a pay range with a minimum, maximum and fixed increments in between 
(known as Min+l, Min+2 and so forth. ). Increments were paid to individuals on 
the anniversary of their entry to the grade. Once an individual reached the 
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maximum of the scale, their salary remained at that level. Increments were, 
therefore, based on service rather than performance. Each year, the salary scales 
were revalorised (minimum, maximum and all points in-between raised by the 
same percentage). Individuals automatically moved onto the new rate appropriate 
to their point (e. g., Min+l) on the scale. All staff were appraised on an annual 
basis but overall performance marks were only used for postings and promotions. 
1990 to 1991 
New pay agreements were negotiated by the Treasury and the central trade 
unions. This continued progression between the minima and maxima by 
increments but also introduced an element of perfon-nance pay. Individuals 
became eligible for performance pay, or range points, after they had been at the 
maximum of their grade's pay range for one year (unless they were outstanding 
performers - see below). The detail of each pay agreement varied slightly but the 
general principles meant that individuals had to attain a consistent level of 
performance for a number of years in succession before receiving additional pay. 
Outstanding performers were awarded accelerated increments if they were below 
the grade maximum. 
1992 to 1994 
New pay agreements were negotiated between the Treasury and central 
trade unions. These pay agreements saw the first real divergence from standard 
systems across all grades. The grade four to seven pay agreement gave 
departments and agencies greater flexibility to implement procedures and policies 
to suit their business needs. Flexibilities were also available in other agreements, 
but not to such a large extent. The main features were: 
* the removal of incremental progression, 
9 no progression for less than satisfactory performers, 
9 individuals had to have at least 90 days paid service in the reporting year 
(variable) to qualify for an increase, and 
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unconsolidated bonuses were paid to those at the grade maximum, subject to 
continuing good performance. 
1994 onwards 
Public agency received pay delegation (i. e., freedom to design its own pay 
and grading systems to suit its business needs). In January 1994, it immediately 
implemented structural change for 17,000 executive officers (EOs) to senior 
executive officers (SEOs). This included changing the performance pay system 
for these grades or Management Pay Bands (MPBs) as they are now known. 
Report year ends were aligned to the 30th September, with performance awards 
being paid from the following April. Overall performance marks changed from 
one to five, to A to D and linked to achievement of agency objectives. 
Performance was paid on an equity share basis. A single share was calculated as a 
percentage of the mid-point of the pay band in which the individual spent the 
longest period. Percentages negotiated each year, depended on affordability. 
Qualifying service was extended to 180 days paid service in the reporting year. 
Grades four to seven continued to be paid under the 1992 agreement until 
August 1995. All pay awards from 1996 were to be on equity share, as similar to 
MPBs as possible. The principle of pay and appraisal was now the same across 
the bands and the phased introduction of the system was now complete. 
The starting point for the pay and appraisal scheme are the six 'public 
agency' essentials. These are a set of broad statements which describe the 
operating objectives of the Public agency. The main outputs by which they are 
judged are as follows: 
9 Annual Performance Agreement. Meet APA targets which reflect 
client needs and government 
priorities 
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9 Living within our means. At every level within the Agency use 
the resources committed to us 
properly and effectively. 
Value for money. Quality and continuous improvement 
at every level to deliver the same for 
less or more for the same. 
The company said that it is important for all job holders to understand how 
their jobs integrate with their business objectives and the business plan for their 
office or team. The company received its Annual Performance Agreement (APA) 
ftom the Treasury. From then this was cascaded. The APA was split into 
manageable blocks with clearly identified objectives. This was then used as a tool 
for management and development. When standards and objectives were set every 
job holder should be considered on his or her own merits and job holders were 
expected to: 
set up a performance agreement, 
define the job purpose and key responsibilities, 
agree operational objectives and standards on which they will be assessed, and 
agree on development needs 
The appraiser and appraisee are then expected to establish criteria for 
setting standards based on speed of response, quality of work, willingness to help, 
knowledge of the organisation, telephone manner, and technical competence. 
There are two types of objectives: operational and personal development. 
Staff should be clear about what is expected of them in their jobs in terms of the 
output needed, quality and standards needed, and measurable quantities they need 
to achieve. Objectives should be S. M. A. R. T. and individuals should have no 
more than six to eight or no less than two. Objective control sheets should then be 
used as a means of helping to develop and document the objectives. 
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The perfonnance appraisal review was sUPposed to be a two-way process 
and the agency said that the feedback should be an encouraging and supportive 
role, giving praise for achievement and constructive criticism when needed. Job 
holders should also give regular feedback to management and may have to be 
proactive to ensure regular reviews. Before awarding an overall performance 
mark, appraisers were advised to take into account the following: 
" whether the job holder exceeded, achieved or not achieved the objectives, 
" effectiveness over the year against KRs, 
" standard and quality of work, 
" how problems were tackled and resources managed, 
demonstrated initiative, and 
are they self starters/ innovators? 
Next, an overall performance rating of A to D was awarded, ranging from 
extremely acceptable to unacceptable. Each rating was then awarded a certain 
amount of shares, depending on the grade an individual was in. The value of the 
share was detennined by the company and each person then received the value of 
how ever many shares they were awarded for their performance. 
9.3 The objective of PRP and the management of objectives 
9.3.1 PRP in the Agency 
Public agency senior management commented that initially they 
introduced PRP because it was centrally dictated. Since taking responsibility for 
their own pay, however, the main reason was because individuals now had annual 
objectives that were tied to the organisation's objective. They also hoped to 
improve retention, motivation and control of labour costs via pay for performance. 
Control of labour costs was something that we were trying to achieve 
through the equity shares system because we can control the value each 
year rather than it being a fixed award. It has to because we only have a 
finite pot (Pay strategy unit). 
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The agency emphasised that PRP is not distributed as it is in the private 
sector. Despite efforts to reflect a similar belief and similar culture, it does not 
have a movable quantity of money (i. e., a government pay freeze meant that any 
additions to pay budgets would have to be found from efficiency savings). This 
was causing them tremendous problems. Even so, the Agency said that it fitted 
well with other goals and objectives because it is driven by the APA agreed 
between the Chief Executive and the Secretary Of State. This was then fed all the 
way down. Everybody now had to describe their job against critical success 
factors - 'public agency' essentials was the generic term for these. 
Clearly ministers have been delighted to see us being very active in the 
introduction of the sorts of changes that they were advocating for the rest 
of the economy but different regions have different characteristics and they 
are trying to control that. 
The main aims and objectives were control and motivation, but knowing 
that motivation did not work, there was an ongoing process which tried to make 
sure that each of the key managers - the nine regional directors and six members 
of the board - managed their performance well (i. e., personally manage well the 
next tier down and tighten the reward). 
If my boss is tough on me then I am hardly going to become a sort of lily- 
livered liberal with my line (Senior manager). 
In terms of the organisational. context for the scheme, the size of the 
agency and the need for consistency were important. It also had to deal with the 
controls imposed upon them by outside forces (i. e., government and the fact that 
they could not vary the size of the pot). 
Yet there are very clear conflicting tendencies within public agency 
Firstly, there was a clear difference in the way that management in the public 
sector and those in the private sector viewed their positions. Public sector 
managers had far more in common with subordinates in their view of how a 
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service should be provided. Secondly, there were very clear differences in the 
way that the pay and the appraisal sides of performance management were viewed. 
The two were designed and implemented by different departments. The appraisal 
was the work of the HR department while the pay side was designed by the pay 
policy unit. Both had different views on PRP. 
When it was first pointed out that they would be expected to use PRP, 
there were two main threads to their thinking. The first was to do with making the 
best of a bad job (i. e., 'we have got to have PRP so what shall we do with it'). 
The second was to do with thoughts that the present arrangements were pretty 
unsatisfactory so it might be something positive in its own right. The first thought 
was to do with performance management and encouraging managers to manage 
their staff. The second stream of thought was to deal with the old culture. The 
record was less happy here, however. Further, the public sector ethos, although 
not popular at the moment with government, was one of the main driving forces 
for most people. A third conflicting tendency arose out of the fact that districts 
had been given an element of autonomy as part of the initial changes in the civil 
service. Some districts had decided on types of employment policies they thought 
appropriate, just prior to the introduction of the new pay scheme. These had 
clashed with central pay policies and caused some resentment among the districts 
and HQ. 
9.3.2 The vagueness of objectives 
The background has now been set for discussing the organisation of the 
scheme and the various factors impacting upon it. This next section will again 
highlight the vagueness of the objectives, meaning that the scheme was 
unsuccessful in meeting its stated objectives. It did have some success in 
satisfying other control elements, however. 
Only about a third of staff said that they really understood the scheme, 
with a similar number also saying that they agreed with the principle of PRP. Yet 
again, as with the other case studies, nobody felt that the scheme worked in 
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practice, most saying that it was far too vague and not at all fair. Like everyone 
else, staff clearly recognised that the old civil service department were inefficient 
and ineffective and clearly wanted to do something about this. Many mentioned 
that there was a 'lot of dead wood' in the civil service and that pay based on 
seniority was not always the best method of payment. At the same time, fairness 
based on equality rather than equity and status based on hierarchy were much 
more ingrained into the culture of the organisation. 
The scheme was encountering enon-nous problems. Very few staff said 
that they were un-aware of a link with business objectives or operating plans. 
Despite being aware of the link, staff mainly thought it was a waste of time. They 
said that they tended to be given the profile for the office and then plans were 
cascaded down. At the same time they felt as though they were searching for 
objectives to write down. Many also mentioned the fact that they thought the 
agency was attempting to apply a model of what they thought it was like outside 
in the private sector. One recent member of staff commented: 
I was surprised when I came to work here because it was so sales oriented. 
I never realised for one instance that they put so much emphasis on 
numeric targets. 
One manager told the staff that 'whatever you achieve will be what you set 
out to achieve', thus indicating that the figures would be inserted after the event. 
Staff thought this strange and commented that because of this it was nothing to 
do with performance, Rather, it was a 'carve up' of the figures. This led to all 
members of staff thinking that the scheme was about saving money or attempting 
to make staff achieve more. 
The performance contracts, or performance agreements as they are known, 
were an integral part of the performance management system. They were also 
supposed to be an integral part of an empowerment relationship in which both 
employees and management agreed upon what their roles were to be. Yet only 
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one-fifth of employees thought that the performance contract meant anything, and 
this was only in terms of focus. Some staff commented: 
It's to focus people in certain directions because if you don't do the 
objectives you don't get anything at the end of the day. 
Others were more reticent about the contract, saying that they did not 
really feel anything about it. They said they had their own standards to work to 
and that they did not agree with objectives which stopped client's money. 
I come to work because I like the job and nothing else will make me do it 
differently. If someone else is not pulling their weight then they can be 
pulled over the coals without this system in place. They are just playing a 
game so that they can be seen to be good, but it's not fair on the recipients. 
The rest realised what the contract was about but resented its implications: 
The theory is that if I don't hit my targets I don't get aB but it doesn't 
work like that. It just means that the clients don't get the best deal because 
we are aiming for the targets. We have pushes for certain things and we 
just end up playing the game. 
They said that they were conscious of the numbers but that 'if you get 
them done you can sit back'. There was an underlying stress factor, which they 
thought was up to them to be aware of, but they did not always get the time to 
think about it. The problem was largely one of the vagueness or inappropriateness 
of the objectives (i. e. they were supposed to be agreed). Objectives were already 
pre-set, however: 
We actually negotiate the office targets before the objectives are set. We 
get together (office management) in April to discuss the district targets and 
work out what each office can do. 
This it led to three kinds of responses from staff, all of which led to 
vagueness in the process. The first set of responses said that they were asked 
whether objectives were realistic and so forth. Yet they commented that the 
underlying objectives were there anyway and that they just discussed how to 
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achieve them. Thus, 'they are agreed but we have no option in them. They are 
just there'. The second set of responses concerned a sentiment that the objectives 
were not negotiable so they thought that it was negative to start looking at reasons 
why ones targets were not hit when they were so unrealistic. The third set of 
responses were to do with staff s disagreement over some objectives because 
many of them were cascaded down whether they were achievable or not. This was 
also because some of the targets could be given away to others even where they 
were achieved. 
I don't always agree with the targets. If someone helps me with a referral 
then they might get the figures. The line manager has the authority to give 
it away. A lot of the targets are given away to make other sections look as 
though they are performing. The line managers do it between themselves 
so that it looks good to the business manager. 
They also had objectives such as those for reducing the number of 
claimants which they disagreed with. They were told, however, that if they did 
not agree, they would have to see area management. They were made to feel very 
uncomfortable about not agreeing with targets, and thus, eventually gave up. 
They said that they did not always agree with the objectives but it -was government 
policy so they did not have any say in the matter. 
Matters were made worse by the fact that there have been many new 
managers in offices over the past few years. This made a difference because when 
they were new they tended to panic over the objectives. Further, as more staff 
were taken away due to downsizing, individuals' targets keep rising. In some 
cases, offices were starting to realise this and thus, when they has reached their 
targets, were no longer trying to get any more in case they were incorporated into 
the next year's targets. There was also the realisation, however, that: 
You can't blame some of them for going for all the targets because it is the 
only way that they can get on. 
Staff said that they thought their attitude mattered to many of the clients 
but when new technology came in, it all went 'out of the window'. The trouble 
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with the objectives for many employees was that they did not reflect all or most of 
their work. They were seen as aspects to do additional to the job. 'You can get on 
with doing your proper job once you have reached them', was a common attitude. 
Even where objectives concerned development, they went wrong: 
My objectives were to sit with someone and learn the job. But that went 
right out of the window and I ended up doing the job without training. 
9.4 The politics of PRP in Agency Co 
All staff thought that measurement systems were a problem. They 
considered the old reporting system to be better than the new one because it 
looked at how clients were dealt with (i. e., at customer service). 
With this new one you could be rubbish but as long as you got your figures 
you would be all right. 
The problem was that while the objectives were supposed to be agreed 
with the emphasis on the whole job, rather, the emphasis was on figures and these 
were used as a control to focus people. Most staff said they were not monitored 
while dealing with the public, but were measured purely on the figures. This 
could have a very large effect on the way the public perceived the office. The 
emphasis on figures was further highlighted when staff said: 
You don't have time to tell management how you are doing; there is 
always so much information coming through that you are always at 
saturation point. 
The information was used to encourage staff to keep up with numerical 
targets. They could print out from LMS if they wanted a record. This told them 
what they had achieved on a weekly basis. The trouble was that the printouts were 
not always accurate. There was also a lot of work that was not measured which 
was a crucial part of the job. Staff said that offices tended to have 'Pushes on 
things'. 
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They will say things like whoever comes through the door today make sure 
they go on such and such a scheme. 
One member of staff commented: 
I've seem people doing things and I think that they have just lost the 
human touch. They have targets for suspending people and saving money 
and they just do it, I've seen staff suspend people for things that I would 
let them off for. 
Overall, however, staff did not think that it was very efficient when 
everybody was massaging the figures. It just became another case of 'here we go 
again' and it was not unusual for sections to steal targets from each other. People 
could achieve the figures but did not tend to really deal with the problems. If 
client advisors did spend a lot of time with clients and made them feel the 'bees 
knees', management were on their backs. The people though that they were great 
but, in the eyes of management, they were no good. Even an office manager said: 
There is constant pressure to measure people through the targets but we 
have to take account of other factors and we have to justify that. Last year 
with all the changes we didn't meet our overall targets so I got a box C. 
Now I could have passed that on to my EO's but I didn't. This year I have 
put objectives in place for the EO's so they will have to take part of the 
responsibility (Senior manager). 
Staff said that they had to work around the scheme and use their own 
system to measure it. Also, they had to use their own judgement as to whether 
people were doing well or not. 
9.4.1 Monitoring 
Management said that PRP is part of the 'value for money' culture since 
they had become an agency. As such, report forms were now geared more to 
monitoring headline performance whereas the old ones tended to be general. 
Managers said that there had always been extensive monitoring at public agency, 
'it's just that pay is related to it now'. Staff got monthly printouts of what they 
had done but one of the things people forgot was that both of the key measurement 
systems (LMS/JSA) were management systems and are geared for sending figures 
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to district office who then produced league tables. These were then used to 
compare region against region, office against office and department against 
department. The effects of this have been well documented, with staff being 
intimidated into registering 'phantom' job placements to enhance managers' and 
government targets (Milne 1997). Staff also thought that they were experiencing 
more direct forms of monitoring. In particular, they experienced what Townley 
(1990) highlights as Foucault's 'surveillance panopticon'. 
We are being monitored more all the time. They keep records of 
everything and they sit behind you day to day watching what you are 
doing. The same goes for the office manager. They used to have their 
own offices upstairs, but this one believes in the hands on approach. We 
all feel really cautious about it. They are listening and watching 
everything and to make it worse the front counters are filmed by security 
cameras as well. 
Supervisors said they knew what staff were doing anyway. Sickness was 
always monitored and there was pressure on staff from that point-of-view that 
there was the threat from district management of downgrading or the sack if they 
thought staff had too much sickness. The way work was carried out was rarely 
monitored, however: 
With work it doesn't matter you could be here all day doing nothing and 
they wouldn't say a thing. 
As in the previous case studies, the distribution of performance was also tightly 
controlled. In 1997, however, because a new system had been introduced -'vhich 
caused much turbulence, managers had been advised to give everyone aB rating, 
thus making a mockery of the scheme. 
9.4.2 Resistance and consent: Playing the game 
It was clear that the majority of interviewees thought that it was easy to 
massage the figures. There was a lot of number crunching to make figures look 
good; Staff said that it was usually the office rather than the individual that was 
fiddling the targets. Others mentioned that management got locked into 'fudging 
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the figures' because their pay was based on individual targets more than that of 
other staff. 
If someone tells you to get a figure then you get it and people turn a blind 
eye because their manager wants it. 
The civil service was all about massaging figures. One department said: 
We had to count the unemployment figures when we took it over and there 
were hundreds missing. We found out that the other department used to 
guess it. 
Because of an increase in monitoring and computerisation, there was a temptation 
to say that one could not play the game anymore - but they could. 
It's difficult to fiddle the figures because of the computer system keeps a 
record but we lose more results than we record because there is not ample 
training. 
Some staff refused to do so at all: 
I won't fiddle my figures but it is done in every office. Everyone has got 
someone else on their back so you have to. Once you start it is never 
ending. 
Others had already leamt that targeting was what they needed to do: 
Last year we played it straight and we probably learnt that it doesn't pay. 
There are certain things that still get counted manually and we estimate 
them in our favour! 
Some staff thought that it was easy to fiddle the figures, even to the detriment of 
the clients, thus consenting to the exploitation of others: 
You can spend all your energies getting people on placings; trip clients up 
etc.; target certain people, for example, those who can't read well or don't 
understand it. 
Then again, they could also consent to their own exploitation: 
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Offices, department, regions swap figure to make them look good but then 
they set next years figures on last years fiddles, so it goes on. 
One member of staff told of a colleague, %vho was determined to get an A 
rating. So he went 'hell for leather' for it. For example, he got targets for 
'placements' but none for 'follow ups' so he never did any follow ups. This 
meant that he only performed part of the job, yet exceeded his objectives. 
Finally they could also do it to the detriment of the agency: 
Its easy. You can put placings on the LMS system. If a client comes in 
and tells you that he is looking at a particular job and it is one that he 
hasn't got through the job centre then you could type it in as a result of 
yourself. You can also influence people on the type of thing they do. 
They also had targets to get disabled workers (PW) into jobs. Some staff 
were so skilled with the rules that they could classify hayfever as PW. They said, 
however, that there were more casuals on the front desk now who did not know 
the system so well. 
9.5 Summary 
As with Bank Co there were two separate cultures in the agency, stemming 
from the merger of different functions within the civil service. One was more 
concerned with providing service aimed at helping people to get employment, 
while the other originated from the benefit side whose members were taught to be 
suspicious of people and deal with them from a distance. This second side was far 
more figure orientated and far less service orientated, but like Bank Co, it was this 
harder side which was seen as uppermost for good performance, while the rhetoric 
of the service side was being encouraged. 
The PRP scheme in the agency was a prime example of a scheme driven 
by numerical targets which ignored large elements of the way the work was 
performed. The objectives via the APA were clearly the key to the performance 
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management system, and if it was to work at all, this part of the process needed to 
be accurate. Yet this was far from the case, and because headline figures ignored 
large chunks ofjobs, they became inappropriate. 
Rather, the control element of the scheme came directly from the 
government's role via the Treasury in the provision of such services. Because 
these figures were likely to change depending on government policy, this meant 
that while the agency were busy attempting to implement new employee relations 
systems, govenu-nent policy distorted their effects. 
Techniques used to change the office labour process paralleled changes in 
manufacturing, notably the fine division of labour and large batch productivity. 
None of these techniques were new to civil service agencies (Winkler 1990). The 
introduction of Fordist and Taylorist techniques into the civil service had taken 
place over a number of decades. Managers during the 1980s and 1990s, however, 
have had to attempt to deal with 'culture change' aimed at an enterprise or 
commercial culture where workers identify with state corporations and are 
rewarded for individual effort (Fairbrother 1994). The civil service is the 
apparatus through which the state administers its policies. 
The government of the day can therefore exert direct control over the civil 
service through its position as managers and via the hierarchy of 
accountability and can hence determine the nature of any restructuring 
(Winkler 1990: 136). 
Being organised as managerial units with some degree of autonomy and 
discretion over staffing matters could be construed as a move towards more direct 
forrns of control over the use and the deployment of the workforce. This occurred, 
however, within a framework of policies detennined at the centre (i. e. determined 
by structural reorganisation and budgetary controls). Thus, a relatively clear 
strategy of change in work and employment practices bad been mapped out, with 
the aim of reorganising local offices so that a layer of staff - the district managers 
277 
and other senior staff - were responsible for the budgeting of the offices 
(Fairbrother 1994). 
In practice, agencies began to experiment with flexible forms of 
employment and working procedures. Office routines and procedures were recast 
as the civil service attempted to utilise different technologies at work. Because 
office labour process remained fundamentally unchanged (although the 
introduction of IT transfon-ned some processes), however, changes in the size of 
its activities were more often than not transferred directly into changes in its 
employment size (Winkler 1990). 
In order to meet the demand of a more malleable workforce and a 
management with the authority to do so, two conditions were necessary. Firstly, 
the standardised employment relations of the past had to be ended and second, this 
meant that local management required the authority and responsibility to 
reorganise work procedures and organisation. Until recently, there was no marked 
divide between different grades of work, with management acting as 
administrators with little substantive discretionary authority over lower grades of 
workers. In these circumstances, it was not unusual for middle grade civil service 
workers to express interests in common with lower grade workers and vice versa 
(Fairbrother 1994). In order to elicit worker support for restructuring, while 
retaining staff motivation, there had been attempts to motivate staff through PRP. 
However, vague objectives led to employee dernotivation. Agencies used their 
new-found status to implement new forms of employment relationship and 
performance management was an attempt by the agency to concentrate a smaller 
workforce on its main objectives (i. e. unemployment) but the concentration on 
meeting headline figures alone as meant a great deal of cost and a steep leaming 
curve to learn the new skills (Davies and Willman 1991). 
Therefore, transformations using PRP required control over manpower via 
improvements in line management and a distancing of the administrative functions 
of the state (although in reality this is not possible as the state still retains overall 
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control). Winkler (1990) argues that this involved a move away from bureaucratic 
rules towards management according to financial demand, but in reality, it has 
only involved a different set of bureaucratic rules along with more direct forms 
and technical surveillance. 
More than in any of the other four case study organisations, it was 
extremely difficult to envisage exactly what the public agency was attempting to 
achieve through the use of PRP. The control of costs was extremely important, 
but the objectives and targets were not driven by their association with pay, as 
most regarded the pay rise as being insufficient. 
. 
It would seem that most of the pressure to hit targets was increasingly on 
the various levels of management who then cascaded them down to other 
employees. Statistical informationworked as a constant source of effort control as 
employees were encouraged to compete with each other. The fact that supervisors 
scrutinised these records acted as an added source of surveillance. These factors, 
when combined with the fact that the work of the agency was very much dealing 
directly with the public under increasingly stressful conditions, meant that the 
staff were experiencing increasing levels of illness through stress. In many cases, 
under very similar circumstances, the increased levels of illness were put down to 
sick building syndrome. Yet as Baldry et al (1997: 337) highlight, it can be as 
much to do with the way the labour process is organised. 
This suggests that when workers have minimum control over both work 
and the working environment and where intensification of the labour 
process takes place in a working environment incapable of supporting it, 
workers can quite literally be pushed to the physical limit. 
The performance management system in the public agency was helping to 
perpetuate these kind of conditions. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
10.0 Introduction 
Economic crisis leads to a search for innovative strategies, one of them 
being a reliance on contract as the instrument to define the terms and conditions of 
exchange. Another is flexibility in order to react as quickly as possible to 
situations (Streeck 1987). This involves, however, an inherent contradiction and 
makes the employment relationship much more complicated. It was found that 
PRP is one way of utilising contract but the complexities associated with it means 
that companies are continuously searching for better ways of resolving these 
contradictions. 
As an attempt to conceptualise why this is happening, two processes will 
be explored. The first process is a wish to alter the 'effort bargain' which involves 
the reorganisation of work in a bid to standardise effort measurement, combined 
with attempts to intensify effort levels. The second is a 'process bargain' which 
includes a change to the organisation's administration systems. Examples include 
human resource management, differing systems of budgetary control and 
performance management which all include consequent changes to systems of 
rules, measurement and control. This highlights the fact that organisations are 
attempting a general renegotiation of systems of control, with management 
forming the primary change agents. 
These processes, however, involve contradictions because they are often 
dealt with by different levels of management who have different priorities. 
Combined with this, they often deal with different issues. For example, an effort 
bargain may involve contact at the point of production while a process bargain is 
an overall view of how the company believes that it should manage issues such as 
human resources. This may lead to schemes which do not always achieve what 
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they were originally purported to be achieving. This was primarily the case here 
because there was, firstly, a standardisation of objectives and contracts, while 
secondly, the objective-setting process was so vague. This was so because 
companies were attempting to address many different contradictory issues. Not 
least among these were those revolving around the individualistic versus the 
collectivist nature of the employment relationship and those revolving around the 
need for standardisation versus flexibility. 
Importantly, it will be argued that this is not a search for control per se as 
simple labour process theory would predict. Rather, it will form part of a wider 
search for competitive advantage which includes restructuring and change to the 
whole organisation. The changes in the companies studied here were complicated 
by a search for control, compliance and consent and the outcomes were largely 
specific to each organisation. This means that it is inappropriate to define systems 
such as PRP in terms of simple changes to all embracing 'modes' of control 
(Friedman 1977, Edwards 1979, Burawoy 1979). After a summary of the 
chapters, the remainder of this conclusion will further explore the above- 
mentioned factors. 
10.1 The organisation of PRP 
The use of PRP schemes has certainly increased over the 1980s and 1990s. 
Their popularity has been seen to be associated with changing theoretical 
doctrines and changing organisational structures and objectives. In Chapter Two, 
it was highlighted that the popularity of PRP reflected pressure from two main 
sources. The first has been management practitioners and consultants and the 
second the governments of the day. Both were reacting to what they saw as a 
possible cure for the ills of economic recession. In other words, the concept fitted 
well with an ethos of what successful companies should look like and the kinds of 
policies that they should be utilising. This being the case, organisations that 
wished to be, or to continue to be, seen as successful were unlikely to admit that 
they could not meet the criteria needed to establish a PRP scheme. 
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Yet the schemes were, to some extent, and still are looked upon in 
isolation from changing structures as a positive means of motivating employees. 
Yet in Chapter Two it was highlighted that research has begun to point to the fact 
that the schemes are not successful in meeting these objectives. Thus PRP was 
either considered to be a complete failure or a possible success if altered in 
particular ways. 
It was found, however, that the purported traditional uses of PRP were not 
clear cut in practice. Recruitment and retention were better addressed through 
market structures. Chapter Two also highlighted that concepts such as motivation 
and fairness were far too complex to be dealt with through a pay system alone. In 
fact, the politics of pay meant that norms and customs could only be altered 
through a process of 'negotiated order'. It was the performance contract that was 
being used in an attempt to do this in the establishment, while at a wider level, the 
government attempted to change pay norms via economic policies. Chapter Two 
also highlighted that, because the use and introduction of PRP had many 
ob . ectives, it was perhaps better to approach the nature of the subject differently 
from the traditional position of whether or not it motivates. Thus, it was argued 
that PRP was better viewed as an element involved in the renegotiation of systems 
of control and the effort bargain. 
Chapter Three highlighted that a case study methodology would prove 
more successful in investigating these factors while the use of survey data would 
provide a good background for choosing which types of establishments to study 
and any characteristics which they might portray. Also that establishments with 
PRP seemed to be concentrated in certain industrial sectors, while Chapter Four 
highlighted the fact that the average PRP establishment showed certain distinctive 
characteristics to those without PRP. We saw from the WIRS analysis that most 
establishments were part of a large multi-establishment organisation. They were 
also more likely to be in competitive markets, with demand for their products 
being sensitive to movements in prices. As such, these organisations were those 
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more likely to be affected by recession and so forth. This was home out by the 
fact that the establishments had experienced more change both in work 
organisation and production technology. The administration systems were also 
different and this could be a function of the fact that the organisations were also 
multi-establishment. This could also be confirmed by the finding that there were 
more management layers and that managers tended to have more autonomy over 
decision-making other than those concerning finance. 
It is also interesting that the organisations were experiencing an increase in 
non-manual membership and recognition, posing questions as to whether PRP was 
a reaction to growing membership (i. e., seeking individualism) or whether 
growing membership was a reaction to PRP and the growing insecurity within the 
establishments, especially for white collar-workers. PRP establishments were 
more likely to have a union present and were also less likely to have a committee 
whose primary concern was consultation. Chapter Four highlighted that PRP 
establishments were likely to be using a combination of what could be seen as old 
industrial relations type policies and new HRM policies. There was also a 
suggestion of more conflict within the establishment, including more grievances 
over issues such as pay and appraisal. There were also more disciplinary 
sanctions being applied by the establishment. Combined with this, the 
organisations thought that their management/employee relations were poor. 
Although it is difficult to theorise on the basis of the WIRS data, they 
enable us to argue that organisations utilising PRP are located in highly 
competitive sectors, and as such, may be among those most likely to be searching 
for new strategies of competitive advantage. The fact that poor industrial relations 
and financial performance are present may help to confirrn this. 
In line with the predictions of contingency theory, certain distinctive 
factors were portrayed by organisations which utilised PRP. True to the 
prediction mentioned in Chapter Two, however, organisations had a degree of 
choice over the way in which they implemented policies. This was indicated by 
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the fact that despite a trend towards similar types of scheme (i. e., performance 
management), the application of the schemes portrayed many differences. There 
was both a diversity of performance criteria and methods of scoring individuals, 
and of the means of linking pay to performance. Thus, the different labels 
disguised similar schemes while the similarity in the concept of payment systems 
disguised many differences based on organisation specific factors. This might be 
explained by different consultants developing their own particular packages based 
on the 'flavour of the month', while practically, organisations have to adjust their 
schemes to fit their own organisational contexts. Yet it was found, as will be 
shown below, that even where the same consultants are used schmes still differed 
in practice. The main point to highlight here is that, on paper or if analysed 
through survey methods, these schemes would have appeared very similar. The 
use of a case study methodology allowed one to see beyond the initial veneer to 
the complexities of the processes involved. 
The four ethnographic case studies highlight examples of three companies 
with the same schemes on paper and with the fourth organisation moving towards 
this type of scheme. However, as mentioned in the preceding section, despite 
appearing similar, all were applied differently in practice. 
What they did share was the fact that all were attempting major 
restructuring and change, including constant 'tinkering' with their PRP schemes. 
This was easy to see with hindsight. Organisations did not have the luxury of 
hindsight, however. Instead, most appeared to take the 'suck it and see' approach 
of having to make ad hoc alterations to the schemes. Taking this approach was 
very costly so organisation were reluctant to give up their scheme altogether until, 
one would have thought, it had gone through its life-cycle and exhausted its 
purpose. 
The Engineering Company scheme was one of the older type of PRP 
schemes which concentrated on behaviours and actions which the company 
thought were specific to the roles within the organisation. This type of scheme 
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had already been experienced by the other three organisations prior to the 
implementation of performance management. Engineering Company was largely 
concerned with gaining flexibility from the scheme, along with control of labour 
costs. Yet, the scheme was ineffective in terms of guiding engineers in what they 
should do. Becuase of this, the scheme was likely to be short lived as it only 
allowed a transitional shift in terms of breaking down demarcation lines. In fact, 
as this conclusion was being drawn, the company was already in the process of 
attempting to negotiate a performance management scheme which was equivalent 
to that in the rest of the organisation (i. e., Retail Company). 
In practice, Retail Company managers were uncertain as to the accuracy of 
the objective setting process. They felt that the scheme put them under pressure 
rather then providing them with help and guidance. Shopfloor workers thought 
that objectives were too standardised. They often resented the fact that they were 
being told exactly how to sell, in addition to being monitored by mystery shoppers 
and being closely supervised. 
Employees in the Public Agency had similar problems to those in Retail 
Company but were probably the most frustrated by the whole process as they did 
not have full control over their own destiny. In other words, the Treasury was in 
overall financial control even although the Agency was portrayed as being an 
autonomous organisation. This meant that the Agency weas always working 
within parameters that had been pre-specified by government. 
Managers at Bank Company had been used to PRP for a long time. What 
they were not used to was the fact that their performance was now so closely tied 
to their pay. Managers at Bank Company were not strangers to having their 
performance scrutinised but in the past, this was mainly for the purpose of 
promotion. Thus, they not only felt that control had been taken away from them 
but also that their roles were moving away from what they considered they should 
be. 
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Despite the overall negativity of the schemes, employees did see some 
benefits arising from them. In particular, there was the opportunity to express 
their feelings to a certain degree within the appraisal process; this was especially 
so for those employees who felt they had an amount of personal bargaining power. 
In addition, some employees in Engineering Company felt that they could use the 
scheme to their own advantage in terms of getting extra pay for additional tasks. 
Employees also found various ways of manipulating targets or results. 
In Retail Company, managers welcomed the performance management 
process as a good idea but had doubts about how it worked in practice. 
Employees were driven more by peer pressure than objectives, as were managers 
in Bank Company. This was because carrying out the job competently gave them 
an element of 'status' in the eyes of others. The appraisal process was less of a 
positive experience in Retail Company due to the prevailing culture of 
paternalism. Those employees who had good sales performance used the scheme 
to their own benefit in additionally highlighting this fact through objectives. 
In the Public Agency Company, management still had certain sympathies 
with other employees in that managers felt more aligned with employees than 
being the 'agents of capital'. Both were bearing the brunt of the many changes 
which the organisation was undertaking. Employees did not mind that the 
organisation was searching for more efficient ways of providing the service. 
Many of them found the old ways of doing things to be overly bureaucratic and 
thus welcomed a certain amount of change. In their opinion, the problem was that 
the kinds of processes and objectives being imposed on employees were more the 
product of cost-cutting exercises than of an efficiency exercise. Thus, to an 
extent, both management and employees were willing to conspire in the 'fudging' 
of figures. 
In Bank Company, managers were conscientious and very self-motivated 
but felt that they were being devalued. Despite the fact that objectives were 
becoming standardised, the bank was making a genuine effort to give its managers 
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some autonomy (i. e., through the bonus scheme). This autonomy was still within 
tight financial controls, however. The bonus element of the Bank Company 
scheme appeared to have many more positive effects than the rest of the schemes 
in that it gave managers a wide degree of choice over the possible awards for good 
performance. Managers did not welcome the unconsolidated nature of the bonus, 
however. 
It was also highlighted that there seemed to be similarities in what the 
schemes were aiming to do and what their effects were. Despite an overriding 
emphasis on developmental factors, none of the schemes were actually carrying 
this out in practice. In particular, they seemed to aimed at aiding a change in the 
way that the organisation was administered and in altering the equilibrium level of 
effort. Ways in which they were aiming to do this were as follows: 
4, control labour costs and their distribution, 
9 individualism - individual contracts but standardised, 
9 flexible standardisation - the combined search for flexibility and 
standardisation simultaneously, and 
* management - as agents of restructuring. 
Finally, Chapter Five highlighted the ways in which management was being used 
as the agents of restructuring, in a perceived separation of the company from its 
management. In other words, the change was perceived as being the choice of 
managers rather than the choice of the company itself There were four problems, 
however, which hindered this process. Firstly, it was not easy for employers to 
bring about change given the existing structures and procedures. In other words, 
they had to live within their historical and social contexts. Secondly, the 
inconsistencies which the schemes produced, led to varying results for other 
outcomes. Thirdly, the effects of the schemes depended on the attitude of 
managers, or to borrow an expression from Smith (1990) whether they 'managed 
up' or 'managed out'. For example, while some managers followed the scheme to 
the letter, it often meant that they were implementing changes which would put 
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themselves out of work, while other managers used the schemes to protect 
themselves from such change. Finally, and related, employees very quickly learnt 
to play the schemes at their own game. We need to be able to conceptualise why 
these factors were present in order to understand the full nature of PRP. 
10.2 The objectives of PRP 
10.2.1 The performance/pay lin 
PRP holds out the promise of a link between an individual's performance 
and their increase in pay or bonus. This concept has proved attractive to 
employers and, on face value, even to employees. It is almost built into our value 
of the work/pay relationship that we should have a fair link between what we do 
and what we receive in return. In fact, employees may believe in equity of pay 
structures because it represents lasting differences in the status of labour 
(Baldamus 1961). 
The post-war period has been characterised by these values being 
determined collectively for the benefit of all. A shock to this system of 
determination meant that a search for a different way was demanded by some 
employers and employees, for one which provided a better link between what 
organisations and individuals achieve and what they receive. This provided the 
motivation that if people want an increase then they have to earn it, or that if the 
organisation does well then employees will be rewarded. In chapter two, however, 
it was noted that this simple yet overpowering message can be distorted into a 
means of achieving several objectives whose only relationship is that they are in 
some way linked to addressing labour market factors. This distorts the 
relationship even before the effects of the complexities on employee relations are 
examined further. 
The theoretical justification for PRP in the UK came in the form of the 
revitalisation of orthodox economic theory during the 1970s, and the fierce attack 
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on labour market regulation by successive Conservative governments. Yet the 
problem with theories of wages has been that 'they have always over stressed 
coherence and functionality and underplayed conflict and contradiction and scope 
for discretionary, random and opportunistic decisions (Rubery 1997: 337). PRP is 
best envisaged in this way rather than from the orthodox wage theory view which 
sees the market as the best determinant of the employment relationship. Whereas 
orthodox theory sees the market as bringing about consistency via the 'invisible 
hand', recent changes in labour markets have widened pay differentials much 
further than in the past, causing a misallocation of resources, and thus placing in 
doubt the proposition that they improve market conditions or efficiency (Rubery 
1997). Thus, in individualising pay, PRP may perpetuate differentials. Yet we 
actually find that PRP is an attempt to address many factors, not least of which is 
an attempt to manage the inherent tensions of the wage relationship. By 
recognising these contradictions it can allow more progress in terms of analysis 
than past research into PRP has done. It also highlights its political divisiveness 
and the fact that the schemes can become locked into the inherent contradictions 
of the employment relationship. 
Right from the start, the problem with PRP schemes has been that there is 
very little evidence of a genuine link between an individual's perfon-nance and 
their reward. Secondly, the objective of new pay structures may not just be to 
improve performance per se. For example, in Chapter Five, it was observed that 
most of the organisations sought to control the distribution of performance, and 
hence, pay, through their schemes. In addition to performance factors, these new 
pay schemes and structures may have allowed the redistribution of income to 
particular groups, mainly managers and the higher paid (Rubery 1997). 
The assumption of a normal distribution, found in most of the case study 
companies, is that the average worker's effort is definable by the organisation. 
Organisations work on the assumption of a normal 'bell-shaped' distribution curve 
which positions the average worker in the centre of that distribution. All the 
organisation has to do, then, is to rate each employee between poor and good 
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standards and arrange them to fit. The bell-shaped distribution assumes that there 
are few poor and excellent performers and that working inward from both 
extremes, more and more people congregate in the centre, towards the average 
perforiner. This means that it is a forced distribution by the organisation. Also, 
the normal practice is to distribute pay on the basis of, for example, five percent 
being paid as poor performers, five percent as excellent perfon-ners, and the 
remaining ninety percent paid as average. Further, this is done with finite 
amounts of cash. 
What this means is that firins are arranging all workers so as to share out a 
pre-determined 'pot' of money. While this practice may be quite acceptable and 
fair within the limits of a pay budget, confusion stems from the fact that 
organisations go on to portray the scheme as Purely performance based and 
employees expect it to be so. It does not usually take long before staff realise that 
this is not the case, with the consequence that the scheme loses credibility. A 
further problem is that within this distribution, rewards are aimed at giving more 
to the above average performance and nothing to the below average perforinance 
within the limits of the pay 'pot'. Therefore, only a certain number of people can 
ever better their pay above the average, whatever their performance. This means 
that the determination of performance comes more under the control of the 
organisation which then attempts to base it on setting new norms. The new norms 
in the case of PRP, however, are not set on the basis of the average perforiner. 
They are always set on the basis of the 'outlier' being the model employee. This 
is highlighted by the fact that employees are always told that colleagues were 
accepting higher targets and asked why did they could not do similarly (e. g. Bank 
Co). Thus putting pressure on employees to accept higher targets. However, once 
objectives were exceeded, the new figures tended to be incorporated into next 
year's targets, thus making the model employee more like Taylor's first class 
worker than the setting of the average (Newton and Findley 1996). To add to the 
confusion, the total pay 'pot' can be manipulated by the organisation so that if 
decreased, performance then becomes based on ever smaller amounts. This means 
that there can never be a chance of a true relationship between pay and 
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performance in the same sense as PBR. Even the average worker may get less 
than he or she would have expected under previous schemes. 
This introduces the possibility that the motivation for changing pay 
structures may not just be the result of changing organisational requirements or 
needs, but may also be to do with changing power relations among worker groups 
and between capital and labour more generally. It is precisely the political and 
labour market changes in the UK and changes to the wider external environment 
that not only stimulated organisations to make changes, but also gives them the 
opportunity to do so. The fact that changes in the external environment stimulates 
and gives organisations the opportunity to change does not explain why PRP does 
not give a precise link between pay and performance. That PRP is used to address 
many differing factors might do so, however. 
Thus, the effects of PRP may be distorted by factors other than 
performance. To make matters worse, perhaps the most damming reason why 
these schemes do not work as they are supposed to revolves around the objectives 
set for individuals as part of their performance contracts. For the purposes of 
explanation this can be split into two main sections: the vagueness of the 
objectives and the fact that they tend to be standardised. 
10.2.2 Vagueness of objectives 
Part of the problem is because the objective setting process is so vague. 
Objective setting is seen as a mechanism for linking corporate plans to the daily 
work process. Within this, it is argued that for most organisations, this need is 
emphasised by an 'exposure strategy', exposing employees to financial and 
organisational information about the company's competitive situation (Smith 
1991) in a bid to win employees over to the goals of the organisation. Combined 
with this, records of how employees meet these objectives then make up the main 
source of information for effort stability control. This can only be true, however, 
if the firm does not undergo any major changes (e. g. new methods of production). 
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Yet we know that most organisations and employees are experiencing 
many changes. For example, objectives at Bank Co were seen to be inaccurate 
and often unachievable from the start of the contract. This led to a lack of co- 
operation between various new sectors within the bank as they sought to hit their 
individual targets. Objectives were made even more inappropriate by the fact that 
staff shortages meant that employees often had to cover for different jobs within 
these sectors. A similar effect was also present within the public agency, though 
not so severe. In the public agency, it was more the case that objectives were in 
opposition to what staff thought the job entailed. Staff thought that spending time 
with the clients was an essential part of getting them back to work, and also for 
identifying who the 'genuine fraudsters' were. Objectives, on the other hand, 
were reducing the time they were allowed to spend with each client while 
increasing the numbers expected to be taken off the unemployment figures. Staff 
in all the organisations were also upset by the fact that the objective setting 
process talked in the language of empowerment, yet in reality, the opposite was 
happening. In Retail Co, objectives attempted to reinforce behaviours: which 
employees thought inappropriate for their jobs. While on the one hand the 
company were promoting the scheme as a two-way relationship in which workers 
set their own objectives, on the other, they were giving them objectives they did 
not agree with. This not only attempted to control their behaviour but also the 
exact comments they were to use with customers. 
Combined with these conflicting objectives is also the fact that when 
someone got a certain performance rating in their contract, they were expected to 
perform better the next time. This was built into the nature of the system. If one 
exceeded one's contract, then this becomes the norm for the next year. It is this 
type of constant pressure which is responsible for the amount of fiddling or 
playing the game which staff did to keep up performance levels. It is also this that 
distorts the nature of the objectives. 
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The severity of this process is partly dependent on the severity of the 
pressure which management may be under. Where there is little pressure the 
objectives remain relative. For example, at the Public Agency Co., the pressure to 
hit the government targets was great but it was spread throughout the organisation 
and largely seen as stemming from government rather than from management. 
However, in Retail Co the emphasis was less on figures in the objectives than on 
direct controls and monthly objectives which already existed. The objectives were 
more to do with reinforcing the behaviours which were to be utilised in meeting 
objectives. 
10.2.3 Standardised contracts 
Part of this problem of vagueness is due to the way in which the 
performance contracts and objectives are set. In Bank Co and Retail Co the 
perfon-nance contracts for individuals were standardised, meaning that other than 
the addition of numerical details, the objectives were largely standardised. There 
is also a difference between those which are standardised because management 
could not be bothered to differentiate them and those which are standard because 
head office have provided standard templates of what they should look like. 
Public agency Co was an example of the former while Bank Co and Retail Co 
were examples of the latter. 
The companies attempted to provide standard contract templates in an 
effort to stem the amount of subjectivity surrounding objectives, which then meant 
that that the objectives did not reflect the whole of an individual's job. These also 
allowed management to ignore the process of setting objectives relevant to the 
individual, which organisations were so keen for them not to do. The fact that 
organisations like Bank Co are staffed by managers who were already very self- 
motivated because of the status that the positions they held meant that, for most, 
the money side was secondary. Yet the fact that they were treated as if they did 
not understand theirjobs caused much resentment. 
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The reason why organisations were experiencing such problems with their 
pay schemes was because they were attempting to address so many different 
issues through the schemes. For example, in Engineering Co, unlike the other 
three companies, the scheme was mainly about the right to introduce more flexible 
working practices and less about giving staff objectives. It was also about 
individualising pay relationships, yet at the same time, it was introducing team 
work which indicated an element of collectiveness. Thus, all the companies had 
two main contradictory relationships running through them. The first was that 
around the relationship between individualism and collectivism. The second, a 
little talked-about phenomena, was the combined standardisation of jobs while at 
the same time seeking flexibility. 
Rubery (1997) argues that what distinguishes the changing job structures 
of the 1980s and 1990s from those of the past is that the growth of job specific 
requirements and competences are part of changes away from those based on 
strong occupational identity. Rather, the notion of the flexible career is being 
promoted along with the notion of individualism. For many organisations, a 
change in their payment system was a central part of this individualisation 
process. Brown and Hudson (1997) argue that organisations are reacting against 
previous payment systems towhich they had been shackled by unions, and instead 
they are experimenting with forms of PRP. While this was true for the 
organisations in this thesis, the process was not so straight forward. For as Brown 
and Hudson (1997) themselves argue, managing pay on an individual basis is 
certainly no simpler than managing it through collective bargaining. 
10.3 The politics of pay 
10.3.1 Individualism versus collectivism 
Crouch (1993) argues that as part of the return to the doctrine of orthodox 
economic theory, there is a new kind of mass individualism based on an 'exit' 
type of market. It is the mass individualism and not so much the exit type of 
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market which is significant here in that the 'mass' signifies that everyone is the 
same, while 'individualism' means that everyone is to be treated differently. 
Thus, the inherent contradiction is summed up in a single concept. 
Taking this a stage further to the application of PRP, when introducing and 
working out new routines of organisational structure and stability control, the 
question of effort and wages becomes unavoidable, and a bargain over new 
notions of pay and effort usually follows. In the past, it is this bargain which has 
usually been responsible for the supposition that workers and their institutions are 
irrational or hostile to all technical or organisational change (Baldamus 1961), as 
resistance is usually perceived to be against the interest of the organisation, which 
'knows best'. It is usually this factor which leads organisations to want to 
individualise the employment relationship. Yet, if, as Brown and Hudson (1997) 
argue, a change in pay system is a central aspect of introducing the 
individualisation process, then it is equally true that organisations would only 
want to follow the individualisation process through if they thought that 
employees would resist change. This is because there is also the need to keep the 
4mass' collectively consistent. On the other hand, if workers did not resist change, 
then there would be little purpose in individualisation for the sake of it unless the 
organisation felt that there were other benefits. Thus, change may be one goal but 
individualisation is another matter altogether. 
The assumption of individualism in pay is that if effort can be brought 
down to the individual level, it is easier to measure and enables the payment of 
appropriate subsequent levels of reward. This, for some, leads to the assumption 
that the collective means of representation is seen as inappropriate. The fact of the 
matter, however, is that collective rules and regulations are still highly appropriate 
and it may well be the case that there are transaction costs benefits for 
organisations in offering uniform non-pay conditions (Brown and Hudson 1997). 
Organisations might want to individualise the pay relationship while retaining the 
collective element of rules or they may just want the right to do as they please 
when they please. This means that when an organisation changes its relationships 
295 
of the past with the unions, the outcome will largely depend on how the 
organisation viewed the role of unions in the first place (i. e. their past experiences 
and future expectations). If they can win power over the bargaining relationship 
while maintaining union's consent, the role that the union might play in 
maintaining the consistency of implementation means there is no need for the 
organisation to attempt to rid themselves of the union. This may account for the 
fact that unions have been marginalised in pay, while they have maintained a 
presence and even a strength over certain non-pay issues in the workplace. This 
was certainly indicated by the finding that despite the fact that only five 
organisations involved unions in the design of their schemes, there were 13 
organisations that involved the unions in the administrative process of the scheme. 
Further, even in Engineering Co where the unions had more bargaining power, 
management still saw an advantage to making concessions to the unions. It may 
also be that the benefits of flexibility involved with these systems off-set the 
transactions and other costs of moving away from bureaucratic structures (Rubery 
1997). 
It was highlighted in chapter two, however, that organisations were 
struggling with the distorting effects of attempting to simultaneously individualise 
and develop their internal labour markets. 'By minimising the status of workers 
as members of the enterprise and relying on contract as the principle instrument to 
define the terms of exchange between employer and employee, neo liberalism 
permits enterprises to have recourse to the external labour market for increased 
numerical and functional flexibility' (Streeck 1987: 293). Yet organisations have 
also developed internal labour markets, seeing them as a means of containing 
opportunism and contributing to efficiency (Edwards 1990). 
One of the problems is that the focus on the individual as the unit of work 
through PRP means that the collective and social elements of the work are left 
hidden (Townley 1989). This need to simultaneously internalise, standardise and 
provide flexibility was noted in all of the case studies. 
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10.3.2 'Standardised flexihUW 
In most of the case study companies, and certainly in those involved in the 
ethnographic case studies, there was a great deal of standardisation of jobs. On 
the surface, employers were no longer looking for skills in terms of broad range, 
but rather, those utilised individually on the job (Regini 1995). In reality, 
employees were utilising a broad range of skills in covering for otherjobs, but 
'were only being paid for those in their performance contract. Thus, the 
development side of the contract acted as a means of absorbing knowledge from 
employees as they discussed what they had to do each year, while the contract was 
based on a standard job gauged on the application of new measurement norms 
-which may have been inaccurate anyway. 
Mostly this standardisation was brought on by the application of new 
technology and new product ranges, but also by organisational decision-making. 
For many, the fact that more complicated computerised measurement systems 
existed, meant that the organisation also thought the performance management 
systems were highly appropriate for the purposes of standardisation. The problem 
was that the measurement systems were only as good as the information fed into 
them. This is a crucial factor. The concentration on 'paper efficiency' gave 
organisations the illusion that what they were measuring and monitoring was 
accurate. Yet while they were highly efficient at recording facts and figures, what 
they could not do is identify how tasks were performed. This was extracted by 
appraisers through the performance review and objective setting processes. 
There was a greater division of labour and standardisation in all but 
Engineering Co. Here, the emphasis was more on being able to cross demarcation 
lines rather than narrowing them. Hawkins (1978) argues that traditional craft 
norms of custom and practice make it very difficult for organisations to change 
their norms. Yet in Engineering Co, job specificity was intemalising employee 
norms while PRP enabled the organisation to change roles and make them more 
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specific. It could be claimed that this job specificity was a form of standardisation 
in itself. 
This led to changing norms, in that all the case study organisations 
comprised jobs that were becoming very much job specific to these organisations. 
This is much more complicated, however, than the process of deskilling portrayed 
by Braverman (1974). While jobs were being standardised, it is not apparent 
which were being deskilled or upskilled. In Engineering Co, job content seemed 
to be enlarged at first sight in terms of the amounts of skills used (i. e. multi- 
craftsmen). The fact of the matter, however, was that skills were becoming more 
job specific, not only to the organisation but also to the various departments. In 
other organisations, as new products developed they required differing types or 
amounts of knowledge and skill. The only thing which can be said with some 
certainty is that because the jobs were becoming more standardised around 
particular roles or products they gave the impression of being more easily 
measured. 
Because in many of the cases the jobs and the work organisation were in a 
transitional phase, however, thus, it meant that employees were covering more 
than one type of role. This problem was intensified by the fact that the 
organisations were downsizing, usually before the transition was complete. 
10.3.3 How can we conceptualise what is happening? 
How do we conceptualise what all of this means and how it links to PRP? 
The starting point is to look at the relationship between effort and reward. We 
have already mentioned that the employment relationship involves a double 
contract in which the employer purchases an amount of labour power, and then 
has to find the means of transferring this into actual amounts of labour. (i. e., 
amounts of effort). Baldamus (1961) argues that there are two elements to the pay 
rate package: one is the rate for skills and experience on the job, the other is the 
rate for the amount of effort. It is this second element which is the more 
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problematic of the two, causing recurrent disorganisation in effort and reward. 
The problem is that effort contains such subjective elements that it defies rigorous 
definition and measurement. Also, it would be far from true to say that effort is a 
constant throughout time, and this could force us to ignore that organisations have 
to apply different methods of administrative control in order to extract employee 
effort (Baldamus, 1961). This means that there not only has to be an 'effort 
bargain' but also a 'process bargain' to establish the basis and administrative rules 
of the relationship. 
Effort Bargain 
Every employment contract involves a bargain to decide how much effort 
is required and how much is utilised. It has been customary for the basis of this 
bargain to revolve around three factors: custom and practice, formal standards and 
the conflictual tension between the two (Littler 1982). Systems like scientific 
management are aimed at making the notion of the effort/wage bargain more 
transparent and changing the basis of custom and practice in favour of the 
organisation. For this to be the case, there has to be a normative basis to the levels 
of effort built into skills and occupations. Thus, there must be some relationship 
between effort and control in the minds of those involved in the bargain. The 
objective of the various parties involved is to guess as consistently as possible the 
purely subjective element of effort standards, and subsequently to adjust rates of 
pay in accordance with them (Baldamus 1961; Littler 1982). Baldamus may have 
had piecework in mind, but PRP may turn this on its head in that it keeps pay rates 
relatively consistent, while giving employees the impression that they can adjust 
their effort to gain more. Technical tools such as computer systems are thought to 
make consistent the guesswork on effort intensities and to make it easier to 
establish these customary norms. As Edwards (1991) argues, however, custom 
only becomes practice when it ceases to be an understanding and becomes a right 
to be insisted upon. Thus, a bargain must take place to establish custom. 
One of the main problems, as noted above, is that if there is a further 
division of labour and job roles are fractured, then there are no longer any 
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customary standards. Yet, it is equally true that if jobs are purposely changed then 
it may allow a redefinition of effort levels to suit. Thus, there may be a dual 
purpose in wbich some effort norms have changed due to restructuring while some 
restructuring may also be specifically aimed at changing effort norms. This has 
led Baldamus (1961) to describe the bargain as involving effort stability controls 
(criteria of employee performance in order to guess the effort needed) and effort 
intensity controls to increase degree of effort. PRP involves both these elements. 
With PRP, at best, workers are thought to be stimulated by the knowledge 
that output is expanding. At worst, however, it can mean constant intensification. 
The fact that there seems to be a rule that rough guesses of effort usually provide 
sufficient guide for administration (Baldamus 1961) is utilised in PRP to generate 
norms. Knowledge of effort levels based on this are then utilised in order to 
intensify effort. 
Process bargain 
If we combine this process with the increasing use of technology and job 
standardisation, this means that the control of effort via the use of incentive 
schemes such as PRP also requires other specific devices for administrating such 
schemes (e. g., HRM). 
Littler (1982) implies that the process is all about identifying effort levels 
and then trying to formalise these into standards. For some organisations, in the 
past, piecework was an example of an attempt to reinforce effort levels under a 
previous system of employment regulation. The problem with that system was 
that employees found ways of restricting output. Output restriction was based on 
fears of rate cutting and these fears were fed by past experience of such. In an 
arena of mistrust, therefore, management were faced with the problem of lack of 
observability. The same was apparent with PRP over objective setting. This 
highlights the fact that effort controls are heterogeneous and cannot be confined to 
particular modes of control. 
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Supervision is one means for equating worker's effort and price at an 
equilibrium, as are other management techniques. All have in common the fact 
that they were utilised in order to aid the stabilisation of the average level of 
individual effort over time. It is this stability function of effort control which 
appears as a separate mechanism from any market mechanisms (Baldamus 1961) 
which may be at play and which is usually more commonly recognised as the 
system of administration. 
Hawkins (1978) argues that changing times forces the various parties of 
industry to require a change of norms. The past norm of effort, based on a fair 
day's work is now being challenged via PRP and requires different administrative 
processes to establish new norms. While it is usually argued that the right to 
manage is never challenged, unless disrespect is shown for customary norms, it 
was management who were challenged by new processes such as PRP, as well as 
employees. In all three companies using performance management systems, there 
were dual cultures which signalled a transition from one set of nonns to another. 
The 'cold' sales culture was becoming prominent, along with the old culture of the 
4customer is always right'. This was despite the fact that the cold sales culture 
was built on the rhetoric of customer ser-vice. Yet, in reality, those employees 
who had the 'customer is always right' mentality, were considered to be too soft 
and not sufficiently motivated. Thus, it was not the emphasis on customer service 
which was important, but rather, the ability to portray the customer as being 
important. This was the behaviour that organisations like Retail Co were 
attempting to reinforce through objective setting. This highlights the fact that 
while organisations place a large emphasis on profits and the illusion of success 
on paper, they also realise that while they push hard, they need to gain the consent 
of the customer for what they are doing. 
A final element in the process bargain is that employers can no longer 
achieve loyalty through the provision of deferred pay and long career ladders in a 
context in which there is increasing uncertainty over the survival of jobs and 
institutions. Employers have to respond to changes in perceived risk attached to 
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traditional internal labour market structures, even if these responses involve them 
in increased costs (Rubery 1997). The attraction of PRP in offering the illusion of 
empowerment must be extremely attractive in these situations. However, the 
rhetoric of delegation and decentralisation may help to disguise an enhanced 
surveillance and concentration of power at the centre. (Newton & Findlay 1996). 
10.4 Bargaining, uncertainly and power 
10.4.1 Renegotiation of effort and control 
What the above implies is that faced by crisis, organisations become 
involved in a renegotiation of effort and systems of control. PRP is one way of 
achieving this for some organisations. The implication from the work of authors 
such as Edwards (1979) is that employers move from one mode of control to 
another and workers can do nothing but resist, at best. Yet the above is not 
arguing that the 'power is exercised unknown to the manipulated', but rather, it is 
embedded in the techniques and processes. For example, with piecework, 
intensity is hidden behind the technicalities of rate-setting, while with PRP, it is 
hidden behind the process of objective setting. It is thus the change to the systems 
which causes a search for, and change to, the methods of control and effort. 
However, employees can quickly learn how to get around these new methods and 
rules or to keep them where they are beneficial. 
The labour process debate has now moved on from earlier attempts to 
identify universal management solutions to problems of labour control (such as 
through deskilling). It is now acknowledged that management have, at their 
disposal, a wide range of mechanisms through which control can be sought. PRP 
is thus one such important mechanism in management's armoury (Newton and 
Findley 1996). It was also highlighted that management themselves were not 
immune from this process with the use of PRP. 
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10.4.2 Consent, compliance and control 
This section will discuss the way in which the organisations sought to 
control management, the effects this had on employees and the ways in which 
employees (including managers as employees) were able to distract the 
organisations, control objectives by leaming the rules of the game. 
Management 
While some may talk about the prolatarianisation of middle management 
(Braverman 1974), others (Armstrong 1989) prefer to talk about struggles for 
control within capital, reflecting the tensions and contradictions in the agency 
relationship. In other words, employers and senior managers are inescapably 
dependant on other agencies to secure corporate goals and policies. A focus on 
competing agencies and professions also emphasises the specific historical bases 
and differences in the development of management theories and practices 
(Thompson and McHugh 1995). 
Management perforins dual functions as both the controller and the 
controlled, and as such, is not immune from the displacement process affecting 
workers. As Streeck (1987) argues, economic crisis causes strategic problems and 
the need for flexibility. The competitive process has led to radical alterations to 
organisational structure and employment conditions with the consequence of 
aggressive attacks on staff and organisational management in an effort to reduce 
overheads (i. e., paring down of corporate size and greater centralisation). 
Reductions in layers and so forth allow management to regain and maximise 
control over the production process (Thompson and McHugh 1995). Yet this does 
not mean that organisations set out to look for new systems of control. They may 
seek to solve their competitive problems by restructuring the organisation for 
competitive advantage and then find that they need to look for new processes to fit 
in with their restructuring. 
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Management strategy 
Performance management is portrayed as part of a larger strategy tying in 
an organisation's goals throughout the whole of the organisation. The idea of 
strategy as been much debated, but as Thompson and McHugh (1995) argue, the 
concept can still be of use if we rccognise the fact that there can be variations in 
the goals and environments, while still recognising, as Hyman (1987) notes, that 
there is no one best way of managing these contradictions but only different routes 
to partial failure. As such, we also have to recognise that there is a whole set of 
internal and external factors which play a role in the strategy, along with product 
and labour market factors, technology and employee resistance. Thus, strategy 
can be unden-nined by many different elements and the varied objectives of 
different groups, only making possible its achievement through a bargain with 
management, workers and any other associated elements. Organisations cannot 
merely control while workers resist. 
Rules of the game 
This introduces a further element. Employers have to attempt to control 
workers' effort levels, while at the same time, realising their creativity. Workers, 
in turn, have an interest in avoiding their own subordination but also need to co- 
operate with employers because they rely on them for their livelihood (Edwards 
1991). This is clearly highlighted with PRP in that objectives attempt to tie 
employees to the job while the language of agreed contracts and development 
aims to give employees the impression that it is 'their scheme'. Employees, in 
turn, clearly accept parts of this arrangement because it gives the impression of an 
amount of control over the way they work and status. 
Within the bargain over control of work organisation, even where workers 
do not agree with parts of the process, they can always find ways around rules 
which help as well as hinder the production process. One example is Burawoy's 
(1979) 'playing the game'. Another is the fact that employees may even bend the 
rules to increase production where it suits them. The managerial aim of a steady 
flow is only subverted when managers insist on imposing their own formal rules 
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instead of permitting workers to interpret them (Edwards 1990). This applies to 
the objective setting process with PRP. Managers also often tolerate a bending of 
the rules because they realise that is the only way to get work done (Edward 
1990). 
Thus, Burawoy's (1979) 'playing the game' and 'making out' are 
particularly relevant to PRP, given its emphasis on management strategies aimed 
at eliciting a measure of voluntary compliance (e. g., appraisal can be seen as a 
process through which previously collective issues, such as performance levels 
and allocating pay increases, are transferred to the level of the employee and their 
supervisor (Newton & Findlay, 1996)). Workers are often aware of the attempts 
to reshape their attitudes through objectives but they sometimes realise that 
relative gains are to be made by complying. There is, therefore, a need to 
acknowledge the propensity of employees to resist the normative influences of 
schemes like PRP as well as complying to them (Newton and Findlay 1996). 
In Smith's (1991) study, middle management actually 'played' with the 
ranking so that they could distribute the pot so as to avoid a crisis of control and 
consent. This was also the case in the case studies here . Managers aimed to 
be 
fair by attempting to award performance pay to those who were not likely to 
achieve the promotion they might have otherwise done under past systems. They 
also played games with the rankings, which further served to highlight to others 
the subjectivity of the whole process. Higher management also used it as a source 
of control over lower management by inducing their participation in re-ranking, 
suggesting that if they did not go along with the game, there would be worse 
personal outcomes for them. 
10.5 Does this mean the identification of an all embracing mode of control? 
The above attempts to highlight the fact that organisations faced with 
increasing competitive pressures have been attempting to renegotiate systems of 
control and effort. PRP is but one element of this for some organisations. What 
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this thesis is not attempting to argue is that this is a new mode of control following 
from Edward's, Friedman's or even Burowoy's categories. Others have already 
warned against the labour process being seen as though capitalists have a common 
and clear sighted view of their control problems and the best way of overcoming 
them (Nolan and Edwards, 1983). 
Representing control and reactions to it as homogeneous is dangerous and 
misleading and leads to labour control systems becoming the sole focus of crisis. 
The case study organisations were attempting to use many types of control and 
had been using them in various combinations for a long time. There was no 
automatic historical progression from one mode to another and no one best way. 
Rather, each organisation struggled with its own historical consequences and 
present context, against a backdrop of changes used by itself and other external 
factors. 
Burawoy (1979), for example, shows how restriction of effort cannot be 
taken as a straightforward indice of resistance. Employees may be co-operating in 
their own exploitation by 'playing the game'. Similarly, Smith (1990) highlights 
that this process is also present for management in that they can either manage 
themselves up or manage themselves out. Capitalists may want control but they 
also rely on employees to cooperate in production. 
What is being argued here is that PRP can be viewed as a convenient tool 
by organisations, given the economic and social pressures they face. 
Organisations used PRP in different ways to gain differing methods of control 
with the outcomes being indeterminate. What was identifiable is that all were 
being used as an element involved in a new effort bargain. Like Burawoy, the 
case studies highlighted how the nature of management had changed and that once 
placid managers put pressure on others when themselve's faced with it. 
For Burawoy, the game does not always involve a changing of the rules 
but it may stay constant reacting to circumstances as they happen. It is not 
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'workers against management', but rather, worker against worker and manager 
against manager. The game can be played individually, collectively or both. 
Although the game is an attempt to control the effort bargain there is no 
achievable equilibrium point to be reached, however, in that way the game is not 
played between two players. 
While not disagreeing with the basic tenets of Burawoy's ideas, the fact 
still remains that there is an air of coherence about the process for him, whereas 
the examples in Chapters Six to Nine show that people refer to what they do as 
playing the game, yet the experience for each individual is different because they 
bring to it their own set of social and organisational experiences. 
Burawoy attempts to move away from the game being the spontaneous, 
autonomous creation of workers, to the other extreme, by saying that they are 
regulated by management. However, both occur. So the game is not about the 
establishment of rules, but rather, the conflict over them. The fact that pay is 
involved makes it all the more problematic because the involvement of the means 
to subsist meant that the conflict is between all parties, not just employers and 
employees. It also means that in the case of PRP, the conflict over effort for 
employees was not just about finding new norms but in stopping these norms from 
increasing. For example, piecework concerned the payment of people for the 
amount of work they did (although decelerating models worked against this). 
Nonetheless, they were still based on the principle of Taylorism: that the extra 
effort should be shared out. With daywork, pay was based on the idea of expected 
amounts of effort for predetermined amounts of pay. PRP, on the other hand, is 
about paying people for an increase in their performance (e. g. if productivity stays 
the same then they do not get the money). 
Streeck's (1987) argument about economic crisis and the search for 
innovative strategies is that a continuous process occurs until best practice is 
found. Yet there may be many types of best practice. It is also the case that 
employers pick up innovations as best practice and try to incorporate them into 
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their own strategies. Given that there are only ever a limited number of strategies 
this may be why we get 'cycles' of activity such as pay (Kessler and Purcell 1992) 
and participation (Ramsey 1991) (i. e. the same strategies may be attempted but 
with different emphasis): 
While it is highly plausible that choices of markets, product ranges, 
technology, work organisation, labour input and institutions of industrial 
relations are somewhat interlinked, how best to match them is difficult to 
say beforehand and remains largely a matter of practical experimentation 
(Streeck 1987: 285). 
This is precisely how best to conceptualise PRP. Rather than viewing the 
schemes as not working because they do not motivate, it is better to view their 
continued use in terms of the above. In this way, their outcomes are indeterminate 
in terms of long term performance even if there might be certain benefits in the 
short term. That the schemes change so rapidly tends to point toward the fact that 
in meeting one objective, they produce yet another set of problems. In solving 
either the effort bargain or the process bargain, norms become established, then 
challenged and the whole process begins again. From this point of view, as 
Rubery (1997) contends, they might well cost dearly in the long term if 
organisations do not become aware of the fact that they have to think very 
carefully about exactly what it is they are attempting to achieve. There is no short 
term solution to the employment relationship only a continuous bargain and 
renegotiation of employee relations. 
10.6 Relevance for poligy and future research 
The relevance for policy from this research can be explained under four 
main headings. Firstly, there is no definable effect on performance. Secondly, the 
schemes have a negative impact on employees. Thirdly, there are effects on 
management as agents of restructuring. Finally, there exists the effects on pay 
and grading structures. 
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It was highlighted that because objectives were so vague and the 
standardisation of objectives was often concentrated on issues which were not 
specific to each individual job, dual effects were present. On the one hand, 
employees concentrated on the objectives to the detriment of other aspects of their 
job. On the other hand, they might ignore objectives which were considered 
important by the company to complete those aspects of the job which they 
themselves felt were more important. This means that the effects on overall 
perforinance are indetenninate, especially if managers' views coincide with those 
of employees in general. At one extreme they might have a positive impact in the 
short term, with unknown long term effects. At the other extreme, the impact 
might be wholly negative. The fact that organisations have no way of measuring 
performance, nor do they seem bothered with finding one, brings into doubt the 
effects of the schemes. 
It is difficult to imagine how long term performance can benefit when the 
schemes seem to have such a negative impact on employees. In all four case 
studies, employees were inundated with change. PRP was, at best, irrelevant in 
these circumstances, and at worst, extremely dernotivating. Many employees 
considered that their workload had intensified tremendously. In such cases as 
performance management, employees often felt that they were too busy doing an 
'ordinary day's work' to bother with the objectives. 
For managers, these processes had a double impact. Managers were not 
only the wielders of the 'stick', they were also the recipients. Managers could not 
win. When they demanded guidelines and objectivity, they had no room to make 
personal decisions. When they complained about too much standardisation, they 
were faced with problems of subjectivity. Which ever way they turned, 
management felt that they were being devalued as decision makers. Their own 
roles were tightly constrained by the limits of their objectives or targets, whilst 
simultaneously, the organisation portrayed the process as being an autonomous 
one. Managers were given tight financial and budgetary objectives and then left to 
deal with these within the confines of certain central rules and regulations. 
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One of the consequences of this, it was argued earlier, is that PRP schemes 
were producing a greater degree of differentiation in pay. Broad-band grading 
structures, introduced to slow down progression through the grades, made this all 
the more possible. Again, this produced a contradiction borne of two dilemmas. 
One was the need to slow progression down, the other a need to give more scope 
for progression in any single grade to compliment the lack of promotion 
opportunities brought about by the thinning of management layers. While it is too 
early to judge the full effects of this process it seems quite feasible that over time, 
there is likely to be a greater growth in differentials, even between those carrying 
out the same functions. 
What does all this mean to the practising HR manager? One meaning is that one 
has to give a great deal of thought to such schemes before their introduction. PRP 
is not an automatic performance improver. Organisations have to take stock of 
what they are attempting to achieve as an whole. PRP cannotjust be tagged on as 
an after thought. It is also no good playing lip service to those parts of the 
schemes which are thought to be giving autonomy to employees. If the scheme is 
supposed to be about agreeing objectives, then this is what it must do. This means 
that management structures may have to change ftirther so as to create an element 
of trust between work groups. Finally, schemes must be much more transparent. 
If they purport to pay employees for their performance then this is what they must 
do. One -way of doing this could be a bonus system. For example, managers in 
Bank Co. seemed to prefer the option of awarding PRP bonuses even where they 
were concerned about the non consolidated element of this system. Importantly, 
organisations must begin to recognise the conflictual nature of the employment 
relationship. While co-operation between employees and employers is an 
amicable goal, there will always be conflict within organisations. The quicker that 
companies realise this and learn to live with it, the more they will begin to 
understand employment relations. 
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This thesis has highlighted the complexities of PRP and the fact that, 
conceptually it can be examined with greater analytical foresight from a control 
perspective than the usual starting position of whether it is motivational or not. 
This in itself has highlighted that there are still areas of PRP which require further 
investigation to enhance our understanding of it. Not least of these is the need to 
research fully the systems in place in individual firms to assess how they react 
with other features of change on a longitudinal basis (i. e. examine the processes of 
change). Secondly, and related to this, is the need to examine exactly why firms 
continue to use such schemes when faced with the fact that they are notworking. 
Lastly, but not least, is the long term effect of such schemes on actual performance 
and productivity. Of course the examination of all of these factors would be 
helped by the collection of a larger amounts of survey data on PRP. Hopefully, 
the forthcoming Workplace Employee Relations Survey will assist in this 
direction. 
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